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Chapter  
1 Introduction  
 
 
Abstract 
 
This chapter begins with a background and definition of basic terms and concepts such as 
Non Timber Forests Products, agroforestry domestication and institutions that will be used 
throughout this thesis. In the section that follows, we establish the problem statement leading 
to the specific objectives of the study. The chapter ends with an outline of the thesis.  
 
 
1.1 Background and definition of concepts 
 
Non-Timber Forest Products (NTFP) are usually defined to include all biological materials 
except timber that are harvested from the forest for human use (de Beer and McDermott 
1989). These may include food, medicine, spices, essential oils, resins, gums, ornamentals, 
small wood, fibres and many other products. FAO (1999) uses the term Non-Wood Forest 
Products (NWFP) to describe goods of biological origin other than wood derived from forests, 
other wooded land and trees outside forests. One of the major reasons why some scholars 
prefer to use the term NTFP instead of NWFP is that the latter as defined by FAO excludes all 
wood  products (Belcher 2003)  and not only timber.  
 
NTFP are commonly known to come from wild sources with insecure tenure over collection 
areas until overharvesting incentivises cultivation (Simons and Leakey 2004; Belcher and 
Schreckenberg 2007; Ingram 2012). Overharvesting is generally the result of increased 
commercialisation (Ticktin 2004; Brown and Lassoie 2010). Increased commercialisation also 
referred to as ‘increasing the value of NTFP in trade’(Belcher and Schreckenberg 2007) 
stems in part from the work of development organisations that progressively encouraged 
populations in forest areas to collect and sell NTFP found in their natural environment. These 
efforts are hereafter  referred to as “valorisation” of NTFP (Tieguhong et al. 2012a). In order 
to reduce pressure on the natural resource base and enhance the sustainability and 
contribution of NTFP to livelihoods, some organisations like the World Agroforestry Centre 
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(ICRAF) conduct research on and encourage domestication of valuable NTFP especially 
indigenous fruit trees, leafy vegetables and some medicinal plants (Facheux et al. 2003; 
Leakey et al. 2003; Leakey et al. 2004; Tchoundjeu et al. 2006; Tchoundjeu et al. 2010).  
 
Tree domestication for example is a process whereby trees are cultivated on-farm by farmers 
themselves. It is also defined as a practice whereby species are genetically improved on 
station (Leakey and Simons 1998; Leakey 2004). Of late, scientists started using another 
innovative approach for tree improvement known as participatory tree domestication. In this 
approach, scientists act as mentors to farmers and involve them in all domestication stages 
that are carried out on-farm rather than in a research station (Leakey et al. 2003; Leakey and 
Akinnifesi 2007). Put simply, participatory tree domestication refers to the means by which 
rural communities select, propagate and manage trees according to their own needs, in 
partnership with scientists, civic authorities and commercial companies. It is usually oriented 
at specific local markets and encompasses the use of both indigenous knowledge and genetic 
selection based on scientific principles (Tchoundjeu et al. 2006). This approach is 
advantageous in that it builds on tradition and culture, and promotes rapid adoption by 
growers to enhance livelihoods and generate environmental benefits (Leakey et al. 2003; 
Simons and Leakey 2004). 
 
Integrating and growing trees on-farm is  part of  “agroforestry” (Leakey 2011). The concept 
of agroforestry is broad and has evolved over the years. The most recent and widely used 
definition is the one provided by Leakey (1996). It states that ‘agroforestry is a dynamic, 
ecologically based, natural resource management system that, through the integration of trees 
in farm and rangeland, diversifies and sustains production for increased social, economic and 
environmental benefits’. For Wiersum (1996), agroforestry systems usually result from the 
gradual modification of forests by enriching them with useful crops which may not include 
agricultural crops but in many cases will be trees producing NTFP. Other definitions of 
agroforestry are not different from the ones already stated and generally include voluntary 
planting of trees and their interactions with crops and livestock for optimal land use and 
generating benefits to farmers and the environment.  
 
Belcher and Schreckenberg (2007) recognise that NTFP encompass a wide range of products 
and that they are sometimes defined by what they are not (Belcher 2003). As a consequence, a 
lot of inconsistencies arise in existing literature. For example, many terms are used to describe 
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NTFP amongst which secondary, minor, special or specialty non-wood and non- traditional 
products (Chamberlain et al. 1998) often occur. Complications as to what constitutes NTFP 
are further exacerbated by the influence of domestication and agroforestry development. 
Domestication and agroforestry have resulted in a scenario whereby species that were initially 
collected from the wild or that were only sparingly cultivated for home consumption are now 
increasingly integrated on-farm as cash crops (Leakey et al. 2004; Tchoundjeu et al. 2006; 
Tchoundjeu et al. 2010). Above all, there is evidence that research about the poverty 
reduction role of NTFP has led to the recognition that many NTFP are no longer exclusively 
harvested from the wild but are indeed cultivated on farm (Ruiz Perez et al. 2004; Simons and 
Leakey 2004). In line with the definition of agroforestry given above, agroforestry tree 
products (AFTP) is the term put forward by Simons and Leakey (2004) to distinguish NTFP 
that have been domesticated in agroforestry systems from those collected in the wild.  
 
Early interests in agroforestry research were centred on improving soil fertility (Young 1997). 
With the recent drive towards ecological approaches to development and an increase in 
demand for NTFP, agroforestry research has made progress towards domestication of species 
in many parts of the tropics. The latter concentrates on scattered indigenous species producing 
fruits, nuts, medicinal plants and other products that was uncommon in farming systems. 
While these agroforestry species had been overlooked by agricultural and horticultural 
sciences (Leakey 2004), it is now widely accepted that agroforestry can contribute 
significantly to the achievement of virtually all the millennium development goals (Garrity 
2004) amongst which eradicating extreme poverty is one of the most important and is at the 
centre of the current international development agenda (Place and Swallow 2002; 
Schreckenberg et al. 2006a; Buttoud 2013). In Europe and America, it is now believed that 
agroforestry can improve the sustainability of farming systems, diversify farmers’ incomes, 
provide new products to the wood industry and create new landscapes (Garrett and Buck 
1997; Dupraz et al. 2004; SAFE 2004).   
 
Value chain characterisation is an integral part of tree domestication and agroforestry 
programs (Leakey and Simons 1998; Leakey and Akinnifesi 2007). Market expansion is 
considered as one of the first steps in the successful domestication of wild fruit trees 
(Akinnifesi et al. 2006) because without an expanded market for NTFP, farmers may not have 
the incentives to intensively adopt domestication technologies. For this reason, policy 
researchers are advised to conceive NTFP development approaches that include both 
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domestication and commercialisation initiatives (Leakey and Simons 1998). One way to do so 
is to use a value chain approach.  
 
A value chain describes a full range of actors and activities starting from production to 
consumption (Kaplinsky and Morris 2002). For businesses to be successful, all elements in 
the value chain must work well (Belcher and Schreckenberg 2007). Therefore, by using the 
value chain approach, actors and activities along the chain that may need policy intervention 
for pro-poor development can easily be identified. 
 
At the production level, tree domestication can be used to meet market requirements by 
developing varieties to meet product quantity and quality, product uniformity and expansion 
of the harvest seasons. In addition, only tree species with a high market potential are 
domesticated (Leakey et al. 2003; Garrity 2004; Akinnifesi et al. 2006). In this way, 
NTFP/AFTP markets can be expanded to generate increased cash income that is beyond 
opportunistic marketing of wild species (Akinnifesi et al. 2006). All of this means that 
farmers who take part in NTFP/AFTP value chains where tree domestication and valorisation 
activities are an integral part of the value chain, are expected to have better market access as 
they supply what the market requires. Improved market access is expected to enhance 
farmers’ income, and provide farmers’ incentives to cultivate and sell indigenous fruits of all 
kinds.  
 
This study focuses on NTFP and also on agroforestry development with attention to on-farm 
cultivation of indigenous species by smallholder farmers. Since the same indigenous species 
are also found in the wild, the term NTFP will be used when reference is made to wild 
provenances of indigenous fruits and leafy vegetables whereas AFTP will be used when 
referring to fruits and leafy vegetables harvested from farmers’ fields. In the case where 
reference is made to both NTFP and AFTP, the coupled abbreviation ‘NTFP/AFTP’ will be 
considered. In the same line of reasoning, collectors will be used to refer to collection from 
the wild while producers will be used for AFTP. Similarly, the joined words 
collectors/producers will be used when referenced is made to both wild and on-farm 
provenances.  
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1.2 Problem statement  
In the past three decades scholars and development actors in both developed (Garrett and 
Buck 1997; Dupraz et al. 2004) and developing countries (McGinty et al. 2008; Place et al. 
2012; Roshetko et al. 2006) have been working on strategies to develop agroforestry because 
of its livelihoods, biodiversity and ecosystems services. It has even been reported that 
agroforestry research and development can contribute to virtually all the millennium 
development goals (Garrity 2004). However, widespread adoption of agroforestry 
technologies is still hindered by numerous problems including among other things, the design 
of appropriate agroforestry technologies, institutional constraints, availability and distribution 
of production factors and lack of national policies and strategies for agroforestry development 
(Garrett and Buck 1997; Garrity 2004; Kaonga 2012; Place et al. 2012). While all these 
problems are important to address, this study will focus on the last one-lack of policies and 
strategies for agroforestry development.  
 
According to Garrity, (2004) the full potential of agroforestry to meeting MDGs cannot be 
fully met if countries do not have adequate policies and strategies that recognise the 
technology as part of their development agenda. The pertinence of agroforestry policies and a 
lack of it in many countries may justify a recent publication of an agroforestry policy decision 
guideline by FAO aimed at encouraging national governments to develop such policies 
(Buttoud 2013).  This study is thus conducted as a contribution to knowledge necessary to 
design such policies and policy instruments with particular attention to Cameroon.  
 
West and Central Africa and particularly Cameroon is one of those countries that have 
championed valorisation of NTFP as well as research on participatory tree domestication and 
on-farm integration of indigenous fruit trees and other wild leafy vegetables (Leakey et al. 
2003; Tchoundjeu et al. 2006; Tchoundjeu et al. 2010). The country is endowed with a 
variety of species found in the wild and on farmers’ fields (Schreckenberg et al. 2006a; 
Tchoundjeu et al. 2006; Ingram and Schure 2010). Despite attempts made to develop 
Agroforestry in Cameroon, the country is no exception with regards to the problems plaguing 
the uptake of the latter technologies. In fact, efforts made so far to increase adoption of 
improved agroforestry technologies and also to increase the contribution of NTFP to 
livelihoods are yet to reach satisfactory levels (Nkamleu and Manyong 2005; Schreckenberg 
et al. 2006a; Belcher and Schreckenberg 2007; Ingram and Schure 2010; Place et al. 2012; 
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Tieguhong et al. 2012a). Although the general causes of the slow up-take of agroforestry 
technologies have been presented above, there is every reason to suggest that each country is 
different or may be unique especially with regards to geographical, social, political and 
cultural issues.  
 
In Cameroon, factors linked to the low adoption of agroforestry technologies and the weak 
contribution of NTFP to livelihoods  include amongst others, climate conditions, household 
and farm limitations (resource endowment, size of household) and attributes of the technology 
such as time lag to reach maturity (Nkamleu and Manyong 2005; Place et al. 2012). Other 
constraints are related to inefficient policies which need to be addressed for agroforestry to 
meet its full potential (Ndoye et al. 1998; Russell and Franzel 2004; Nkamleu and Manyong 
2005; Schreckenberg et al. 2006a; Schreckenberg et al. 2006b; Tchoundjeu et al. 2006; 
Ingram and Schure 2010; Ndoye and Awono 2010; Ingram 2012; Tieguhong et al. 2012a). 
The importance of policy to agroforestry development is further emphasised by  Place et al. 
(2012). They report that evidences exist which suggest that the policy framework plays an 
important role in distinguishing countries and regions which have taken advantage related to 
agroforestry from those who have not. These mean that we cannot undermine addressing 
policy related constraints to agroforestry development in Cameroon.  
 
Policy-related constraints reported in the above-mentioned literature in Cameroon are 
associated with national legislation intended to conserve and preserve natural resources and 
those related to access and security of land. These studies generally suggest that: (i) existing 
legislation generally limits trade in indigenous species and is hypothesised to discourage 
farmers from planting the trees; (ii) identically, tree planting is hindered by problems related 
to access to or lack of improved planting materials even though research has adapted 
vegetative propagation techniques to indigenous species to ease replication by farmers. The 
latter is generally linked to but not limited to inefficient agricultural extension systems. Other 
problems are (iii) related to property rights over land and trees.  
 
The regulation component is significant for Cameroon, as NTFP commercialisation and 
domestication have led to the cultivation of fruit trees on farm land where the same products 
are produced as those that are gathered from the wild. This leads to situations where tree 
products harvested from farms are often subjected to state regulations intended to conserve 
natural resources in the wild. Moreover, NTFP and land are natural resources which besides 
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being subjected to formal rules are also subject to informal regulations which are often part of 
the cultural heritage of the people who use them. Unfortunately, state institutions and 
informal rules governing the same resource may contradict each other.  
 
These policy and institutional gaps simply mean that existing strategies and institutions have 
not accompanied recent developments in AFTP/NTFP research and market development, and 
thus expose areas of concern for further research. Above all, if NTFP from the wild and AFTP 
from farmers’ fields are expected to contribute to sustainable income generation whilst at the 
same time conserving the natural resource base, two issues need to be addressed: first, 
government policies should not limit market access for these products and second, NTFP 
commercialisation needs to be facilitated by appropriate institutions that guarantee access to 
natural resources, distinguish and protect property rights of agroforestry farmers and NTFP 
collectors.  
 
Following North (1990), institutions are defined as ‘the rules of the game’ which define 
incentives and sanctions affecting people’s behaviour. When dealing with institutions, key 
concerns are about how institutions operate or interact to affect property rights, information 
flows, transaction costs and risks, and market access failures for different participants 
(Williamson 1985; Doward 2001; Doward et al. 2003). While most studies on NTFP 
generally recommend interventions at policy and institutional level, only a handful 
(Schreckenberg et al. 2006a; Laird et al. 2010a; Ndoye and Awono 2010) have specifically 
studied the existing policy and institutional environment governing access and trade. 
Moreover, most of the studies pay limited attention to the impact of policies and institutions 
on agroforestry development specifically on the cultivation of trees on farmers’ fields and on 
trade in AFTP/NTFP. 
 
Whereas, regulations and legislations governing access to NTFP and land are known, little 
has been documented about farmers and traders responses to these formal institutions or their 
awareness and perception of the rules governing access to and trade in AFTP/NTFP. Whether, 
how and to what extent formal institutions affect farmers’ tree planting decisions and traders’ 
performance in the NTFP/AFTP value chain remains an open question in the literature. The 
scarcity of empirical data on farmers’ and traders’ perception and expectations of existing 
institutions is disappointing even though it is this sort of information that policy makers need 
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when developing policies or interventions to stimulate pro-poor growth that incorporates 
elements of the NTFP/AFTP value chain.  
 
1.3 Main objectives and research questions  
 
The main objective of this study is to assess the institutional environment governing 
AFTP/NTFP value chain in Cameroon. Four main themes are studied: (i) existing policies 
governing AFTP/NTFP sectors; (ii) the legal framework to accompany existing policies; (iii) 
how existing rules including informal rules governing access affect property rights to land and 
trees and finally (iv) how formal rules regulate and influence market access. In other words, 
the study examines existing policies and legislation governing exploitation, cultivation and 
trade in NTFP/AFTP and their effect on the performance of the value chain.  
 
Specific emphases are put on:  
(i) a reality check based on NTFP/AFTP collectors/producers’, awareness, 
perceptions, and attitudes towards opportunities and threats posed by existing 
formal policies and regulations governing land and trees on their incentives and 
decisions to plant selected indigenous fruit tree species. Moreover, an assessment 
is made of the interaction between formal and informal institutions in the 
management of access rights to land and trees and how they can be changed.  
   
(ii) the effect of such policies and regulations on traders’ activities with special 
attention on their decisions to operate in the formal or informal sector, and the 
consequences of their decisions on the performance of the value chain. Besides, an 
attempt is made to investigate how negative consequences can be improved upon.  
 
To better understand policy and institutional constraints and opportunities that affect the 
integration and performance of farmers and traders in the NTFP/AFTP value chain, a 
framework was developed to address the following fundamental questions:  
 
(i) What policies/strategies currently exist to address tree planting in Cameroon and do these 
policies and regulations have any (un)intended consequences on agroforestry development 
in the country?  
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(ii) What are collectors/producers’ awareness of and attitudes towards these policies and 
institutions in relation to agroforestry development?  
(iii) How do formal and informal institutions interact to manage both NTFP and AFTP 
including ownership of land on which trees grow? 
(iv) How do traders dealing in these products cope with formal rules governing trade and how 
do these rules affect their activities and performance in the value chain? 
 
These questions are answered using two sets of data. The first set consists of data collected 
from farmers involved in the collection/production of three selected NTFP/AFTP in 
Cameroon. The second set of empirical data was collected from traders dealing in similar 
products including a wild leafy vegetable. Various secondary data were obtained based on a 
review and analysis of relevant scientific and government documents and regulations.  
 
1.4 Thesis outline 
 
This research is divided into three parts. Part one sets the scene and consists of chapters one, 
two and three. Chapter one provides the general introduction and problem statement leading 
to research objectives and research questions. In chapter two, the core theories underpinning 
the research are discussed. The chapter begins with a contextual definition of the concept of 
institutions as it will be used in the study. In addition, a framework is developed based on the 
four levels of institutional analysis developed by Williamson (2000a) and the Institutional 
Analysis Development framework proposed by Ostrom et al. (1994). In between, the concept 
of value chain is also illustrated as our unit of analysis specifying parameters to assess the 
influence of the institutional environment on the performance of the NTFP/AFTP value chain. 
Chapter 3 presents the setting of the research. It starts with a general introduction of 
Cameroon and a brief description of the research area. The social and economic importance of 
the selected NTFP studied in this thesis is also portrayed in this section. Later in the chapter, 
the sampling plan that describes how research sites, products and respondents were selected is 
presented.  
 
Part two is the results section. It is made up of chapters four to eight. Chapter four presents 
the general policy and institutional environment governing trees in Cameroon.  Based on 
content analyses, the chapter analyses whether existing policies and legal instruments provide 
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incentives or disincentives for agroforestry development. Chapter five examines farmers’ 
awareness of existing policy instruments and questions their willingness to accept proposed 
policy options aimed at improving from a state’s perspective existing laws governing AFTP. 
In chapter six, the study explores farmers’ perception of land and tenure security as an 
important factor to agroforestry development. It principally focuses on the interaction of 
formal and informal rules governing land and tree property rights as both interact to manage 
natural resources in farmers’ environment. Chapter seven investigates why NTFP traders 
prefer to rent instead of applying for their own permits to sell NTFP as specified by the law. 
In this regard, sources and effects of high transaction costs in the permit system such as 
corruption and rent seeking are analysed. In chapter eight, a choice experiment is developed 
as a tool to probe options to improve the current process of obtaining permits in the NTFP 
sector in Cameroon. 
  
Part three consists of chapter nine - the conclusion. It presents the main findings of the 
research and makes recommendations to design optimal rules for agroforestry development in 
Cameroon.      
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Chapter  
2 The Theoretical and Conceptual Framework to Understand 
Policies and Institutions Governing NTFP and AFTP 
 
‘It is hard to make much progress in the study of institutions if scholars define the term to 
mean almost anything’ (Ostrom, 2005 p 820).  
Abstract  
 
The concept of institutions is broad and complex (Hodgson 1998; Williamson 2000a).  This 
contributes to the confusion that usually arises with respect to the scope of a given 
institutional analysis or the focus of a given study. In this regard, this chapter starts by 
revisiting the definition of institutions as it is understood in this thesis. Then, the theoretical 
and conceptual framework that is applied in the succeeding chapters of the study is described. 
In this case, reference is made to the four levels of institutional analysis developed by 
Williamson (2000a). In addition, the Institutional Analysis Development framework (IAD) 
proposed by Ostrom et al. (1994) and further developed by Doward and Omamo (2009) are 
also shortly described. The concept of value chain is defined in this chapter as the action 
domain within the IAD framework of action arenas which are social spaces in which actors 
interact in social and economic exchanges (Ostrom et al. 1994; Doward and Omamo 2009). 
The conceptual framework shows how actors in the NTFP/AFTP value chain interact with 
their institutional environment (both formal and informal institutions). It also shows the 
possible effects of these institutions on the performance of different actors in the AFTP value 
chain. In this respect, the link between institutions and economic performance is established.  
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2.1 Introduction 
 
The use of theories in forest policy analysis became fashionable in the past two decades prior 
to 2010, and five broad band theories are commonly used in the discipline (Arts 2011). These 
include rational policy analysis; policy network analysis; advocacy coalition framework, 
critical policy analysis and the institutional policy analysis. As introduced in chapter one, the 
New Institutional Economic framework (NIE) which falls within the scope of the institutional 
policy analysis theories as defined by Arts (2011) is used in this thesis as the main theoretical 
lens to analyse the policy environment governing NTFP and agroforestry development in 
Cameroon.   
 
The main premise of this school of thought is that institutions as rules are the key to economic 
performance. The concept of institutions is broad and complex (Hodgson 1998; Williamson 
2000a) and this  usually leads to confusion with regards to the focus of a given study where 
the notion is applied. In this regard, this chapter starts by revisiting the definition of 
institutions as it is understood in this thesis. 
 
2.2 Defining institutions 
 
Bromley (2008b) states that countries and their economic systems are made up of laws that 
indicate acceptable and proscribed domains of individual and collective action. These legal 
realms are a country’s institutions. These institutions define (Bromley 1989): 
duties: what individuals must or must not do; 
privileges: what individuals may do without interference; 
rights: what individuals can do with the aid of the collective power; and 
no rights: what individuals cannot expect others to do on their behalf. 
 
The most widely used definition of institutions is that provided by North (1990) which states 
that institutions are ‘the rules of the game’ and organisations are ‘the players of the game’. 
Institutions defined as rules, may be formal/written (legislation, regulations, constitution, 
rights, etc) or informal/unwritten (sanctions, norms of behaviour, beliefs, traditions) in nature; 
devised by humans to reduce uncertainty and control their environment (Ménard and Shirley 
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2008). According to Schmid (2004), institutions are more than just the rules of the game 
providing constraints to human behaviour. They also offer opportunities to achieve what an 
individual cannot do on his/her own. Bromley (2009) adds that ‘institutions are the means 
whereby the collective control of individual action is given effect’ (p. 31). In other words, 
institutions define fields of action for individuals in society.  
 
To better understand institutions, it is often recommended to make a distinction between 
institutions and organisations as proposed by North (1990). In most literature, institutions and 
organisations are frequently used interchangeably or as synonyms. This often leads to 
misunderstandings and misguided interventions (Lobo 2008; Bromley 2009; Kirsten et al. 
2009). Within the context of institutional analysis, institutions are a set of complex norms and 
behaviours that persist over time by serving some collectively valued purposes. Organisations 
refer to a group or association which may be formal or informal in which there are defined 
and acceptable roles, positions and responsibilities which are structured in some relationship 
to each other in order to achieve a set of common objectives (Uphoff 1986, 1992; Lobo 2008). 
Examples of organisations include trade unions, producer groups, and government 
departments.  
 
Bromley (2009) elaborates on the basic distinction between everyday use of the term 
institutions as a synonym of an organisation such as a church or a cooperation, and its use as 
will be applied in this study. He points to the fact that organisations such as a church or 
cooperation acquire their meaning from the rules (institutions) that govern them. If for 
example, one has to explain the doctrine of Catholicism to a novice or a child, the explanation 
will necessarily comprise what a catholic does and does not do as well as what Catholics 
believe in. In this case, belief constitutes commitment to the working rules of the Catholic 
Church. The same could apply for governmental departments and polity.  
 
Given the above interpretation, institutions in this study are limited to formal and informal 
laws, rules, norms or strategies (North 1990; Ostrom 2005) that can be considered as systems 
used to shape human activities or interactions amongst humans in order to reduce uncertainty 
and risk as they interact to access land, to collect NTFP, and to produce AFTP, and to trade in 
both AFTP and NTFP. Institutions are thus expected to provide incentives or sanctions related 
to access, production and trade in NTFP and AFTP.  
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Rules, norms and strategies are defined as follows:  
- Rules refer to shared prescriptions (must, must not, or may) that are mutually understood 
and predictably enforced in particular situations by agents responsible for monitoring 
conduct and for imposing sanctions (Ostrom 1998, 2005). 
- Norms are prescriptions that are known and accepted, yet tend to be enforced by 
participants themselves through internally and externally imposed costs and incentives 
(Ostrom 1998, 2005). Norms do not arise from the rulings of an authority. They are 
generally considered as daily practices we learned from our mother (Bromley 2009). 
- Strategies represent regularised plans that individuals make within the structure of 
incentives produced by rules, norms and expectations of the likely behaviour of others in a 
situation affected by physical and material conditions (Ostrom 1998, 2005). 
 
 
2.3 NIE: framework for analysing economic performance 
 
The NIE is a relatively new and multidisciplinary paradigm (Kim and Mahoney 2005; 
Williamson 2009; Ménard and Shirley 2012) that deals with aspects of economics, history, 
sociology, law, business organisation and political science (Kherallah and Kirsten 2002). Its 
origin dates back to the seminal article by Coase (1937) ‘The nature of the firm’. This new 
branch of economics holds that the cost of transacting determined by institutions and 
institutional arrangements are key to economic performance. Based on this relationship, it is 
generally argued that the institutions of a country as determined by its political, legal, and 
social systems determine its economic performance (Kherallah and Kirsten 2002). According 
to Coase (Coase 1998; 2000), it is this consideration that gives the NIE its place amongst 
economists. 
 
The phrase ‘New Institutional Economics’ was coined by Williamson to differentiate the 
subject from the Old Institutional Economics. The old institutional economists recognise that 
institutions influence human behaviour but they were anti theoretical with regards to the neo-
classical economic thinking. On their part, the neo-classical economists are strong in theory 
but do not consider that institutions matter and most often do not deal with the real world 
(Coase 1998; Kherallah and Kirsten 2002).  
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The NIE bridge the gaps left by the old institutionalists and the neo-classical economists. It 
acknowledges that institutions are key to economic performance but also states that 
institutions can be analysed within the framework of the neo-classical economics. In this 
regard the NIE consider that transactions are carried out in real world conditions. It therefore 
relaxes some of the unrealistic assumptions of neo-classical economics (such as pure and 
perfect information, zero transaction costs and full rationality). Contrary to neo-classical 
economics, NIE assume instead that individuals have incomplete information and limited 
mental capacity and because of this they face uncertainty about unforeseen events and 
outcomes and incur transaction costs to obtain information (Ménard and Shirley 2008). 
Individuals therefore create institutions to reduce risks and uncertainty. However, unlike the 
old institutional economics, NIE maintain the neo-classical assumption that individuals are 
self-seeking beings attempting to maximise an objective function subject to constraints 
(Kherallah and Kirsten 2002).  
 
North (2005) further notes that NIE attempt to answer some of the questions classical 
economics do not address such as the processes of economic, social and political changes. 
Institutionalists in contrast aim to understand change by understanding human incentives and 
intentions and the beliefs, norms and rules that they create in pursuit of their objectives. Use 
of a combination of the NIE and the neo-classical economic theories and assumptions will be 
further elaborated in chapters seven and eight where they are used to explain sources of 
transaction costs and illegal activities in the issuing of permits in the NTFP sector in 
Cameroon.  
 
Kherallah and Kirsten (2002) indentify eight main fields of the NIE. These include new 
economic history, public choice and political economy, transaction costs economics, social 
capital, property rights, economics of information, theory of collective action and law, and 
economics. Ménard and Shirley (2012) acknowledge a similar diversity and distinguish: 
transaction costs; property rights and contracts as the core ones that make the NIE paradigm 
so distinctive.  
 
As briefly explained in chapter one, the first key concept, i.e. transaction costs has its roots in 
Coase’s (1937) paper ‘The nature of the firm’ in which he questions why all transactions are 
not necessarily carried out in the market. His answer was that there are costs in transacting 
through the market. These costs exist because a given trader at any time in a given market 
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needs to find a person to whom to sell. He needs to know the prevailing price in the market 
and what price goes for what quality, bargain, and strike a deal and monitor the deal. In order 
to reduce such costs, a firm may decide to replace the cost of bargaining with some form of 
coordination by a hierarchy. The choice to transact either through the market, a firm or a 
hybrid of the two became Oliver E. Williamson’s core area of interests and formed the 
foundation of the Transaction Costs Economics (TCE). In his research, Williamson combined 
the core concepts of bounded rationality, and opportunistic behaviour (manifested through 
adverse selection, moral hazard, cheating, shrinking and other forms of strategic behaviour) to 
explain contractual choice and the ownership structures of firms.  
 
The second key concept, i.e. property right, emerges from Coase’s earlier work of 1960, ‘The 
problem of social costs’ that occur when the exercise of an owner’s rights yields costs 
(externalities) to the owners of other rights. Such externalities can be reduced in a situation of 
no transaction costs through the process of bargaining and negotiations. In such a situation, 
the trade going on between two concerned persons is the right to perform a certain action. 
This view is in contradiction with the neo-classical school that assumes that people trade 
physical or virtual commodities (Ménard and Shirley 2012). The NIE concept of property 
rights was further developed by Alchian (1965). He defined property rights as a set of rights 
to take permissible action to use, transfer or otherwise exploit or enjoy a property. There are, 
however, differences between Coase’s view of property rights and that of Alchian. While 
Coase argued that property rights are established and enforced by legal systems, Alchian drew 
to attention that rights are more enforced by etiquette, social customs and social exclusion.  
 
The third key concept i.e. Contract, like the other two, was again introduced by Coase. Two 
main assumptions are considered. Contracts are either written or unwritten agreements 
between parties that are: (i) never perfectly enforced; and (ii) are never perfectly complete. 
These two assumptions later on evolved into the two main branches of NIE (Ménard and 
Shirley 2012). On the one hand, the Northean branch focuses on the key role of contract 
enforcement and the institutions it requires, particularly the polity (form of government). This 
branch later developed into a theory of its own based on detailed analyses of the role of force 
in protecting property rights, and of the trade-off between high costs of private protection of 
property and the risk of state protection which might limit private costs but also give 
opportunities for the state to interfere on private rights (North et al. 2009). On the other hand, 
the second branch led by Williamson, focuses on the assumption of incomplete contracts. The 
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incomplete contract theory of the firm combines insights from the transaction costs theory 
with emphases on bounded rationality. The theory focuses on how different organisations 
assign property rights to resolve the issues that arise when contracts are incomplete 
(Kherallah and Kirsten 2002).  
 
In this thesis, insights from all these three fields (transaction costs, property rights, contract) 
will be used although emphasis is on the first two key concepts i.e. transaction costs and 
property rights. Use of these two concepts in institutional analysis is illustrated in the next 
section (see also Table 2.1).  
 
2.4 Levels of institutional analysis and links to research questions 
and objectives 
 
In analysing institutions reference is often made to the institutional environment and 
institutional arrangements (Williamson 2000a): 
 
the “institutional environment” defines the macro level in which organisations and 
transactions are embedded. It thus affects the behaviour and performance of economic actors 
(North 1990). The macro level analysis refers to a set of fundamental political social and legal 
grounds, rules, information flows and culture which govern and constrain production and 
exchange in a society (Williamson 2000a; Bienabe et al. 2004; Doward and Omamo 2009; 
Kirsten et al. 2009); 
 
Conversely, “institutional arrangements” refer to the micro level rules of governance 
(Kherallah and Kirsten 2002). The micro level analysis deals with the set of rules and 
structures governing a particular transaction (Doward et al. 2005). According to Williamson 
(1993), an institutional arrangement between economic units is an agreement which governs 
the ways in which these units can compete and/or cooperate. Such analysis usually includes 
individual transactions and questions regarding organisational forms.  
 
Williamson (2000a) provides an analytical framework to describe complex institutions such 
as those governing NTFP, AFTP and other natural resources. The framework identifies four 
levels of institutional analysis.  
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Level one is the Social embeddedness level and deals with aspects of the informal 
institutional environment. This level does not actually fall within the realm of economics but 
rather in the field of social theories such as anthropology and sociology. However, the fact 
that it plays a fundamental role in the economic functioning of institutions warrants that it is 
included when discussing the origins and role of institutions (Kirsten et al. 2009). For 
example, Granovetter (1985) illustrates that peoples’ economic activities are regulated by the 
norms and values they have acquired in their community and that social structures are key to 
understanding how institutions are arrived at. In other words, economic activities are 
embedded in cultures and value systems (Dimaggio 1994; Kirsten et al. 2009). This study 
adopts these arguments and analyses the social embeddedness of NTFP/AFTP collectors and 
producers characterised by cultural differences such as customs, traditions, respect for 
traditional values and other societal norms. These institutions change very slowly to the order 
of centuries and even millennia (Williamson 1998). The interaction of these slow-changing 
institutions with formal rules to govern access and use of natural resources such as NTFP and 
land is investigated in chapters five and six. 
 
Level two is the Formal institutional environment. In this thesis, the focus is on the formal 
rules governing the NTFP/AFTP sector. Institutions at this level provide opportunities for 
‘first order economising: getting the formal rules of the game right’ (Williamson 1998). 
Despite the importance of institutions for economic productivity, at this level, they do not 
change that rapidly and may generally take between decades and centuries (Williamson 
2000a). Much of the economics of property rights fall within this level of analysis. The 
economics of property rights assumes that private enterprises cannot function properly unless 
property rights to resources are effectively defined and enforced. Chapters four, five, six and 
seven of this thesis address aspects of the formal institutional environment. They will focus 
on the legislation governing access to and trade in NTFP/AFTP including how these formal 
institutions (legislation and regulations) define property rights, ownership and security of land 
and tree resources, and how they can be improved.  
 
Level three refers to Institutions of governance (play of the game). At this level, analysis goes 
beyond the rules of the game to include how the game is played. Here, institutions of 
governance or institutional arrangements are discussed including issues of contract definition 
and enforcement (Doward et al. 2005). Institutions at this level change between every, one to 
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ten years and Williamson (1998) refers to this as ‘getting the governance structure right, or 
second order economising’. The institutional environment, together with specific 
characteristics of the good or service and the contracting parties, influence the nature and type 
of institutional arrangements (North 1990; Hobbs 1995; Doward et al. 2005). In this thesis 
“governance” is not related to the play of the game between producers and traders in the value 
chain; instead, the unit of analysis is a transaction between producers or traders and their 
interaction with government procedures in order to respect formal rules governing trade in 
NTFP.  
 
Transaction costs are important in analysing this type of institutional arrangements (i.e. level- 
three institutions). The main assumption here is that actors, transacting in an economy such as 
the NTFP/AFTP value chain who are characterised by low financial resources and weak 
information flows, often face high transaction costs. These costs may influence the choice of 
the governance mechanism chosen by actors in the chain and may limit the general 
performance of the value chain (Williamson 2000a; Benham 2005). The choice of a given 
governance mechanism is in line with the efficient alignment hypothesis (Williamson 2009). 
The hypothesis stipulates that, ‘transactions which differ in their attributes are aligned with 
governance structures which differ in their cost and competences, so as to effect a (mainly) 
transaction cost economising outcome’. In chapter seven, the concept of transaction costs 
theory is used for analysing the issuing of permits to sell NTFP and to further explain the 
influence of high transaction costs on licit and illicit activities in the NTFP value chain.  
 
The last level of institutional analysis (level 4) deals with Resource allocation and 
employment (prices and quantities, incentive alignment, marginal analysis). This thesis does 
not go deep into this type of analysis that puts emphasis on the neo-classical school of 
thinking. However, since part of the objectives of this study is to evaluate the effect of 
institutions on value chain performance, cost-benefit analysis is used in some chapters to 
assess the decisions of actors as a result of their interaction with other levels of institutions.  
Table 2.1 gives a summary of the four levels of institutions and their link to the core chapters 
of this thesis.  
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Table 2.1: Summary of the four levels of institutions and links to thesis chapters  
 
Levels Core elements  Application in the thesis Theory Core chapters 
Level 1:  
Social  
embeddedness / 
Informal 
institutions  
Informal rules, 
customs, culture, 
norms, ethnicity, 
value    
The interaction of 
informal institutions with 
formal rules to govern 
access and use of natural 
resources such as NTFP 
and land  
Social theory 
Four, five and 
six 
Level 2: 
Institutional 
environment  
Formal rules of the 
game-especially 
property rights, 
polity, judiciary, 
bureaucracy 
Formal institutional 
environment with focus on 
the legislation governing 
access to and trade in 
NTFP/AFTP including 
how these formal 
institutions (legislation 
and regulations) define 
property rights, ownership 
and security of land and 
tree resources and how 
they can be improved 
Economics of 
property rights 
Level 3: 
Governance  
Play of the game 
especially contract, 
aligning 
governance 
structure with 
transactions  
How do traders dealing in 
the studied species cope 
with formal rules 
governing trade and how 
do these rules affect their 
decisions to operate in the 
formal or informal sector; 
what are the consequences 
of their decisions on the 
performance of the value 
chain? how best can we 
reduce transaction costs in 
the permit system  
Transaction costs 
Seven and eight 
Level 4: Resource 
allocation and 
employment  
Prices and 
quantities, incentive 
alignment  
 
Neoclassical 
economics/ , 
Agency theory 
Source: Adapted from Williamson (2000a) 
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2.5 Conceptual framework for analysing the institutional 
environment of the NTFP/AFTP value chain in Cameroon  
 
The study of institutions lies on three essential foundations: frameworks, theories and models 
(Ostrom 2011). A framework depicts elements and relationships that one needs to consider in 
a given institutional analysis and may be made up of different theories. In section 2.3, the four 
levels of institutions and related theories were discussed as the basis of major assumptions 
that are made in this thesis. The objective of this subsection is to describe the AFTP/NTFP 
value chain as the action domain in a conceptual framework to understand policies and 
institutions governing, access, production and trade in AFTP/NTFP in Cameroon.   
 
The importance to illustrate the action domain is founded on the conceptual framework for 
institutional analysis used by Doward and Omamo (2009) and inspired by the Institutional 
Analysis Development framework (IAD) developed by Ostrom et al. (1994). In the IAD 
framework, action arenas are defined by social spaces in which actors interact in social and 
economic exchanges (Ostrom et al. 1994; Doward and Omamo 2009).  
 
Theoretically there are four sections in the action domain (Ostrom 2005; Doward and Omamo 
2009; Ostrom 2011). These are institutions, activities, actors and outcomes. Above all, the 
action domain is made up of institutions ruling activities; the activities that actors engage in; 
and the actors performing the activities. The interaction between institutions, actors and 
activities involves actions that lead to outcomes. The outcomes of the actions may reinforce or 
change the institutional environment, institutions, activities and actors. The resulting impact 
of these interactions may be an increase or decrease in the volume or value of a resource, the 
wealth and aspiration of actors, all of which may lead to institutional change. 
 
The analytical framework for this thesis therefore identifies specific institutions governing the 
AFTP/NTFP value chain, the activities that are influenced by selected institutions and the 
actors operating within the given institutional environment. The framework also shows the 
relationships between actors in the AFTP/NTFP value chain and explains how they network 
with the formal and informal rules governing NTFP/AFTP and the possible effect of these 
interactions on the performance of the value chain.  
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2.5.1 The action domain-AFTP/NTFP value chain 
 
A value chain was defined in chapter one as including a full range of activities starting from 
production to consumption (Kaplinsky and Morris 2002). Pietrobelli and Saliola (2008) add 
that a value chain involves a set of activities from conception to production and beyond. 
According to Belcher and Schreckenberg (2007), some authors use supply chains or market 
chains as synonyms for value chains. Lazzarini et al. (2001), for example, define a supply 
chain as ‘a set of sequential, vertically organised transactions representing successive stages 
of value creation’. Value in this case represents the amount consumers are ready to pay for 
what is produced (Van Der Vorst 2006). A similar concept to value chain is ‘filière’ 
commonly used by French scholars to describe the flow of physical inputs and services in the 
production of a final good or service (Kaplinsky and Morris 2002).  
 
Belcher and Schreckenberg (2007) describe an AFTP/NTFP value chain as made up of a 
‘chain or network of different types of organisations, from loose individuals to associations, 
to shareholder companies’ who collect the products from the forests, or planted fields to end-
consumers. Based on this description and for analytical purposes, the multiplicity of actors in 
the NTFP/AFTP production-to-consumption value chain in Cameroon can be grouped into 
direct and indirect actors. Direct actors are those who make a living from these products 
whereas indirect actors are those who regulate the sector or who enforce regulations. Direct 
actors include collectors/producers, traders and consumers. Indirect actors in the chain may 
include the government that defines policies and also formal institutions that oversee access to 
resources, and lastly national and international NGOs and research organisations that work at 
different levels to influence either policies or institutions governing access and trade. 
 
Figure 2.1 describes schematically the AFTP/NTFP value chain in Cameroon and its 
interaction with the institutional environment. It shows the interactions and linkages in the 
action domain mainly between actors, their activities, resources and institutions in the chain. 
In the middle of the figure are the direct actors of the value chain and the activities they 
perform. The illustration depicts collectors who may either source NTFP from the wild 
(forests) or producers who harvest AFTP from their farms. These producers then sell to 
traders. These traders may be wholesalers, retailers, or exporters. With regards to the 
objective of this study, traders will generally be defined to be those who travel to producer 
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villages to buy and later on sell to either exporters or retailers. The latter may then sell to 
consumers.  
 
According to Williamson (1993), an institutional arrangement between economic units is an 
agreement which governs the ways in which these units can compete and/or cooperate (see 
section 2.1). In a value chain, the institutional arrangement deals with coordination between 
actors in the chain when they exchange goods for money (Bienabe et al. 2004). 
Understanding how actors in a value chain coordinate their activities is important in defining 
performance of the chain (Schreckenberg et al. 2006b). However, the focus of this research is 
more on how formal and informal institutions govern the value chain and influence these 
interactions and less on how arrangements between the actors are established. This is 
manifested by the broken arrows linking producers, traders and consumers in the diagram.  To 
understand institutional arrangements between producers and traders in the AFTP/NTFP 
value chain in Cameroon see (Foundjem-Tita 2009; Foundjem-Tita et al. 2011; Foundjem-
Tita et al. 2012a) 
 
The representation (Figure 2.1) shows that these actors do not operate in a vacuum. Their 
activities are constrained within an institutional environment defined by formal (policies, 
regulations, strategies) and informal institutions (norms, cultures, beliefs) generated by 
government and customary structures, respectively. These institutions are commonly beyond 
the influence of producers and traders but they (institutions) influence their activities, i.e. 
production and collection of AFTP and NTFP, respectively (Bienabe et al. 2004; Doward and 
Omamo 2009). Institutions are expected to define the conditions of access to NTFP and AFTP 
including land and/or to provide necessary incentives to stimulate planting and/or 
management of trees. The actors have almost no direct influence on the way formal 
institutions are designed. By being part of local communities, one could assume that actors 
may impact on informal institutions. Yet, because norms, cultures and beliefs are embedded 
and slow to change, the impact of an individual actor is probably also here neglected.   
 
Within the institutional environment, we have actors who work with either government or 
local communities to maintain, enforce or influence institutional change (both formal and 
informal) governing natural resources. These actors may be NGOs involved in valorisation 
activities and therefore they advise farmers to collect and sell NTFP for their livelihoods. As a 
result, they lobby for government to ameliorate existing rules which limit economic rights to 
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NTFP. Other actors may be research centres, both national and international, that explore 
ways to ameliorate planting materials and thus provide incentives to increase adoption of 
domestication and agroforestry technologies.  
 
The government of Cameroon has the responsibility to provide the necessary incentives for 
the uptake of new technologies by devising policies and strategies for farmers to take 
advantage of existing technologies and opportunities to improve their livelihoods. The 
government also has the prerogative to develop regulations to meet other objectives like 
conservation of the existing resource base. However actors operate in an environment 
characterised by cultural and ethnical differences. These cultural habits and values are deeply 
held by the actors and resilient to change, and may thus affect their’ perception and 
behaviours relative to formal institutions as they both interact to manage natural resources 
(Williamson 2000a; Ostrom 2005; Doward and Omamo 2009). The interaction between 
actors, institutions and activities determines the outcome which in this study is the 
performance of the value chain.  
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Figure 2.1: Conceptual framework indicating AFTP/NTFP value chain within Williamson’s       
four levels of institutions   
 
 
2.5.2 Outcome of the interaction of actors, and institutions in the value 
chain  
 
To evaluate how the above interactions between actors and institutions affect performance of 
the value chain, it is first of all important to identify factors against which the value chain can 
be evaluated. This may include government policies and actors’ objectives. 
 
Different actors with varying objectives operate in a value chain. It is thus important to 
identify performance measures to suit the objectives of each actor (Janssen and Van Tilburg 
1997; Beamon 1999; Aramyan et al. 2006). For a given government, the performance 
indicators could be the relevant agriculture, NTFP and forestry sector policies (Crawford 
1997; Janssen and Van Tilburg 1997). Indicators targeted by such policies may include: 
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acceptable producer income obtained through reasonable prices to producers; stable income 
and food supply; employment creation; access to capital; positive contribution of agriculture 
to balance of payment; and environmental issues.  
 
Farmers may evaluate a value chain based on the capacity of the latter to offer them higher 
prices for their produce, quality inputs (Crawford 1997) and a secured market outlet for their 
produce (Swinnen 2005). Traders may be more interested in obtaining higher profits or 
market share (da Silva and de Souza Filho 2007). 
 
The Technical Centre for Agriculture and Rural Cooperation (CTA) organised an 
international expert workshop to identify performance/outcome indicators to evaluate 
agricultural science, technology and innovation systems, in the African, Caribbean and Asian 
countries (Daane et al. 2009). The findings of the workshop confirm and summarise the above 
mentioned indicators. Those specific to value chain performance and which may be related to 
valorisation and domestication of AFTP/NTFP include: growth in productivity of 
AFTP/NTFP and traded volumes in existing and new markets; product diversification; better 
organised value chain (efficient logistics, low transactions costs, high speed transactions); 
growth in value added; fair distribution of value added and profit margins amongst chain 
actors; increased competition of value chains; reduced poverty rate; and income growth 
resulting from innovation. On the environmental end, indicators include: conservation and 
enhancement of biodiversity; improved agro-ecosystems; and improved management of soil 
fertility.  
 
Based on the above literature on existing performance indicators, producers’ and traders’ 
performance/outcome in the ATFP/NTFP domestication/valorisation chains in Cameroon can 
be evaluated based on the following indicators:  
 
- Government of Cameroon: 
 poverty alleviation; 
 sustainable exploitation and management of natural resources  
- NTFP/AFTP producers:  
 secure property rights to land and trees; 
 incentives to plant NTFP; 
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 increased revenue from AFTP/NTFP; 
- Traders: 
 profits /net margins; 
 reduced corruption; and  
 reduced transaction costs.  
 
2.6 Unpacking the institutions governing access and trade in 
AFTP/NTFP 
 
Figure 2.2 gives an outline of the thesis with emphasis on the specific institutions that are 
analysed i.e. the diagram unpacks the formal and informal institutions that were broadly 
defined in figure 2.1 and shows how they are treated in each chapter of the thesis. These 
institutions consist of political goals and rules that establish the basis for production, 
exchange and distribution of NTFP/AFTP in Cameroon.  
 
Political goals are related to government strategies for poverty reduction and conservation of 
natural resources; they are covered in chapter four.   Legal rules deal with laws to allocate and 
enforce property rights to trees on natural stands and on farmlands; and conditions to access 
permits. They are thus prerequisites to understand access rights to land and trees, and efficient 
interactions within the AFTP/NTFP value chain. These legal rules are thus considered as 
policy instruments to meet government policy aim at reducing poverty and conserving the 
natural resource base. The relevant policy instruments targeted by this thesis are the 1994 
forestry law and its 1995 text of application, and also the 1974 Land Ordinance governing 
ownership and security of land. 
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Figure 2.2: Outline of the thesis based on specific policies and institutions analysed  
 
For producers, it is assumed that if the given policy instruments do not clearly secure property 
rights to land and trees, farmers will not take advantage of market opportunities, whereas 
transaction risks and transaction costs will increase whereby these may reduce farmers’ 
incentives to take up new technologies (Bienabe et al. 2004) such as domestication and 
agroforestry; these are treated in chapter five. It is further supposed that farmers’ perceptions 
of formal institutions are influenced by customary norms (Granovetter 1985) governing 
access to and trade in these products. The interaction of formal and informal rules in the 
management of land and trees are treated in chapter six. For traders, the study analyses 
whether access to permits as defined by the law generates corruption, high transaction costs 
and rent seeking behaviour. The latter are covered in chapters seven and eight.   
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Research propositions  
 
Based on the given theories, this thesis develops the propositions that the given policy and 
institutional environment may have two effects: 
i) an anti-development effect, whereby institutions are misused by actors in the value chain 
to create rents and to fan out corruption; and  
ii) a development effect whereby institutions are shaped and adopted to reduce costs and thus 
increase investments in NTFP/AFTP activities. 
 
2.7 Summary of the theoretical and conceptual framework  
 
In this chapter we have explored the concept of institutions and limited the definition used in 
this study to the one of North (1990) which refers to formal and informal rules used in the 
management of AFTP/NTFP including land. Coupled with this definition, the four levels of 
institutions as developed by Williamson (2000a) have been expanded upon. By doing this, we 
mentioned theories (property rights, transaction costs and cost-benefit analysis) that will be 
employed in different chapters to diagnose, explain and predict the effects of institutions on 
the performance of the AFTP/NTFP value chain.  
 
Taking into consideration numerous actors in an AFTP/NTFP value chain (Ndoye et al. 1998; 
Belcher and Schreckenberg 2007) with varying activities and objectives, the framework 
identifies actors and their objectives for participating in the chain (da Silva and de Souza 
Filho 2007). For each of these groups of stakeholders, their objectives for participating in the 
chain are highlighted as indicators against which to measure performance. In the context of 
this study, the framework includes three main stakeholders: 
 
(i) Government of Cameroon is included in order to evaluate its policies for poverty 
reduction and forest resource conservation that affect AFTP/NTFP trade and possibly 
farmer’s and traders behaviour and decision making in the value chain. These policies and 
policy instruments are theoretically analysed in chapter four. 
 
(ii) Producers who collect and sell NTFP and are expected to adopt agroforestry practices 
when value chains are conducive to production and trade. The importance of existing 
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institutions and policies as incentives or disincentives for farmers to exploit NTFP, 
domesticate them and also integrate the same species on their farms are assessed in 
chapters four, five and six.  
 
(iii) Different categories of traders are involved in the NTFP chain. In chapter seven, sources 
and effects of high transaction costs in the permit system are analysed as to whether they 
generate corruption or rent-seeking behaviours. In chapter eight, the framework attempts 
to investigate ways to reduce transaction costs and corruption in the NTFP value chain in 
Cameroon so as to increase self compliance with the law on permits. 
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Chapter  
3 Study Area and Research Approach  
 
Abstract  
 
This chapter describes the setting, the type and sources of data required to answer the main 
research questions. Specifically, the geography of Cameroon is described together with the 
historical evolution from pre-colonial through colonial to contemporary Cameroon. All of 
these are helpful in understanding how formal and informal institutions interact to manage 
natural resources such as land and trees. The procedure to select regions, species and 
respondents is also described in this chapter.  
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3.1 Geography of Cameroon and development indicators 
 
Empirical data for this study were collected in Cameroon which is located between West and 
Central Africa on latitude 6 00 N and longitude 12 00 E. It has a surface area of 475,442 km
2 
(CIA 2012). It is bounded in the north by the Republic of Chad, in the south by Equatorial 
Guinea, Gabon and the Congo, in the west by the Federal Republic of Nigeria and in the east 
by the Central African Republic (Figure 3.1). 
 
In July, 2012 the population of the country was estimated at about 20 million with a 
population density of 41.6 people per km
2 
(CIA 2012). The 2012 World Development 
Indicator report ranks Cameroon as a lower middle income country with a Gross National 
Income (GNI) per capita of 1,180 USD and an annual 2.6% growth in its Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) between the years 2009-2010. About 9.6% of the population is estimated to 
live below the international poverty line of 1.25 USD a day.  When the two USD international 
poverty line is considered, the number more than triples to 30.4%. About 58% of 
Cameroonians live in urban areas, meaning that about 42% are in rural areas. A majority of 
the rural population depends on the agricultural sector for their livelihoods. Natural resources 
contribute about 9.3% to total GDP and forests contribute about 1.8%. Agriculture constitutes 
19.7% of GDP and represents 25% of the major exports of the country (CIA 2012; World 
Bank 2012).  
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Figure 3.1: Map of Cameroon and its location in Africa  
Source: adapted from CIA (2012) 
 
3.2 The sampling process  
 
Taking into consideration the objectives of this study, each empirical chapter has a 
methodology section in which the specific research designs and data are further explained and 
situated within specific elaborated conceptual frameworks and economic theories. As a result, 
only generalities are described in this section. The data collection process was organised in 
two parts. The first part of the data were collected in 2011 sourcing  information from 
NTFP/AFTP collectors/producers on formal and informal institutions governing access to 
land and NTFP/AFTP. These data are specifically used in chapter five and six. The second 
part of the data was collected in the first quarter of 2012. The latter data collection phase 
focused on traders and sought information about procedures required to obtain permits and 
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N 
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how to design optimal solutions for forestry law compliance. These data are exploited in 
chapters seven and eight.  
 
The sampling process is summarised as follows:  
-  choice of products (based on project objectives1); 
- choice of regions where the products are collected/produced and are marketed by 
collectors/producers; 
- purposeful selection of divisions/subdivision/villages ; and 
- random selection of individuals who collect/produce and sell the produce from the 
selected villages. 
3.3 Agro-ecological zones and climate  
 
Average annual rainfall in Cameroon is estimated at 3,890 mm in the coastal lowlands with 
highest precipitation recorded along the slopes of Mount Cameroon (10,000 mm per year). 
This huge precipitation decreases to an average of 600 mm in the dry savannah region. 
Average daily temperatures in the southern part of Cameroon is 25° C; 21° C in the Adamawa 
plateau and increases to an average of 32° C in the northern regions.  
 
Cameroon is generally referred to as an “African miniature” due to its six ecological zones, 
which include: coastal lowlands, humid forests, western highlands, adamawa plateau, the 
Benoue valley (hot tropical) and the dry savannah (semi-arid tropical). The country can be 
further divided into five agro-ecological zones (Takow and Ebai 1996) namely: Sudan 
Sahelian or the dry savannah (North and the Far north regions); Guinea savannah highlands 
(Adamawa, and parts of the Eastern regions), Western highlands or the humid savannah 
(West and the Northwest regions), Humid bimodal forest (East, Centre and the South regions) 
and the Humid forest monomodal zone (Southwest, Littoral and a small portion of the South 
regions).  
 
About 42% (approximately 22 million ha) of land in Cameroon is covered with forests. 
Between the years 2000 and 2010, Cameroon lost a total of about 220,000 ha of its forests 
                                                 
1
 Project objectives refer to the Agroforestry Tree Products for Africa (AFTP4A) funded by the Belgian 
Development Cooperation. The objective of the project was to develop economically viable and ecologically 
sound tree product value chains in order to increase producers’ participation in and benefits from tree products. 
This project targets four main products as listed in section 3.4. Funding for this thesis was secured through this 
project.  
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with an annual deforestation rate estimated at 0.9% (Mongabay.com 2012). The forests are 
exploited for lumber, timber and firewood, as well as a number of NTFP. Income generated 
from forest-related activities by households living around some forest communities account 
for almost 44% of their average annual income (Tieguhong and Nkamgnia 2012). The focus 
of this thesis is on NTFP. The specific species studied and their economic and cultural values 
are described in the next subsections.  
 
3.4 Selection and description of NTFP 
 
Cameroon is host to an estimated 181 plant species that are regularly sold in markets and 
which can be classified as NTFP (Betti 2007a). A number of these species have been 
identified by farmers as priority or key NTFP to meet their livelihoods needs due to their high 
market potential and also for their food, nutritional, social and economic values. This is the 
case for about 30 plants classified as “key species” (Ingram and Schure 2010). These priority 
or key species have been the target of domestication and agroforestry development in 
Cameroon for close to 15 years now (Franzel et al. 1996; Tchoundjeu et al. 2006). Four 
species: Ricinodendron heudelotii, Cola spp, Irvingia gabonensis and Gnetum spp will be 
particularly studied. These four NTFP are the target of a project under the funding of which 
this study was executed. The biological, cultural and economic importance of these four 
species is described below.  
 
3.4.1 Ricinodendron 
 
Ricinodendron heudelotii commonly called njansang in Cameroon is an endemic, African tree 
species. It belongs to the family of Euphorbiacae. It occurs from Senegal to East Africa and 
Madasgascar. The tree grows fast and may reach a height of 40 m and a trunk diameter of 
about 120 cm. At maturity, fruits drop from the trees and are processed to obtain the kernels 
(Ayuka et al. 1999). The seeds of the fruits and the trunks are used for different purposes in 
the communities where they grow and beyond.  
 
The wood of the tree is hardly used for construction, but is widely used for carving masks, 
spoons, cups and the production of musical instruments due to its high resonant capacity 
(Shiembo 1994). The roots, bark and leaves of the tree have strong medicinal properties. In 
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Nigeria for example, the roots are ground with pepper and salt and used as a laxative. In 
Gabon, the roots are used to treat blennorrhoea and painful menstruation, while in Liberia 
pregnant women use either the bark or the leaves as pain killers and to prevent miscarriages 
(Burkill 2000). 
 
The focus of this study is on the njansang kernels. These kernels are used in Cameroon for 
preparing soup and a variety of dishes due to their appetizing aroma (Photo 3.1). The 
chemical properties of njansang have been studied by Tiki et al. (2000). They report that the 
kernels are rich in fatty acids and essential oils (49.2 to 63.5%) and proteins (49.9 to 65.2 %) 
and low in carbohydrates (4.9 to 6.4 %).  
 
 
Photo 3.1: Njansang kernels   
Source: author 
 
Annual trade and consumption of njansang in Cameroon is estimated at 730,325 USD 
(Ingram and Schure 2010). The produce is traded both within and outside Cameroon. In 2007, 
out of a total of 75 households interviewed in Yaounde, 70% consumed njansang at least three 
times a week. Based on Manirakiza (2007), annual consumption of njansang for Yaounde 
alone can be estimated at 735 tons. Nigeria is one of Cameroon’s biggest export destinations. 
In 2003, a total of about 1,300 tons of njansang were exported to Nigeria (Ayeni et al. 2003). 
With an increasing African diaspora in Europe and America, trade in njansang is progressing. 
The only available data shows that a total of about 4 tons of njansang were exported to 
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Europe in 1998 (Tabuna 1999). Besides providing income to producers, commercialisation of 
the species provides employment to about 1,120 Cameroonians most of whom are women 
(Ndoye et al. 1998).  
 
3.4.2 Kolanuts  
 
Kola is a tropical tree that belongs to the family of Sterculiaceae. About 125 species of 
kolanuts are known to exist and many of them are cultivated. The kolanut tree is evergreen 
and grows to a height of about 25-30m. Three species: Cola anomala, acuminata and nitida 
are common in Cameroon. They are distinguished by the number of cotyledons. C. nitida has 
two cotyledons while C. acuminata and C. anomala have between 3 and 7 (Tachie-Obeng and 
Brown 2004). The species of concern treated in this thesis is C. anomala that grows in the 
western highlands of Cameroon (Photo 3.2).  
 
Kolanuts are reported to contain the following: 13.5% water, 9.5 %t crude protein, 1.4 % fat, 
45 % sugar and starch, 7.0 % cellulose, 3.8 %t tannin and 3 % ash. It is also rich in caffeine 
and theobromine (Purseglove 1968). Its caffeine content is apparently higher compared to that 
of cocoa and coffee (Moloney 1887, cited by Obeng and Brown 1994). 
 
Kolanuts are consumed in West and Central Africa as a masticator to counteract fatigue and to 
curb thirst and hunger. It is also understood to boost intellectual capacity (Tachie-Obeng and 
Brown 2004). These properties may explain why kolanuts chewing has become very popular 
among students, drivers and many other consumers who need to stay active for abnormally 
long hours (Jayeola 2001). Its industrial uses date back to the seventies and early eighties. 
During this time, kolanuts extracts were used for the production of varied cola soft drinks 
(Beatie 1970). Kolanuts were also used in the pharmaceutical industry as a source of caffeine 
and essential oils (Oluonloyo 1979). In the confectionary industry, it was used in the 
production of heat-resistant chocolate bars (Williams 1979). Furthermore, kolanuts are 
reputed for assisting in weight loss (Blades 2000). 
 
The disappearance of kolanuts from current industrial use may explain the absence of current 
literature on this species. It is one of the few indigenous African cash crops that have not yet 
attracted international sympathy to improve production. As a consequence, it is often referred 
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to as an orphan crop (Asogwa et al. 2008). However its high medicinal and cultural values 
make it a priority agricultural species in most African countries. For example, C. nitida can be 
used as a natural fertility regulator because the stem bark extract inhibits the release of 
luteinizing hormones (LH) from pituitary cells (Benie et al. 1987). Other medicinal properties 
of the species can be found in the stems, leaves, twigs, flowers, fruit follicles and the bark of 
C. nitida, C. anomala and C. acuminata. They can be used in the production of concoctions to 
remedy dysentery, coughs, diarrhea, vomiting, etc (Benie et al. 1987). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Photo 3.2: Kolanuts parcelled in baskets 
Source: author 
 
One of the greatest attributes of kolanuts is their socio-cultural importance. In Cameroon for 
example, it is offered in birth, naming and death ceremonies as well as for the 
acknowledgment of appreciation to visitors (Mbile et al. 2004). It is also shared to 
demonstrate peace and agreement after settling disputes between conflicting parties. Due to 
its high cultural value some communities in the Northwest region of Cameroon have put 
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special rules to preserve the species by attaching significant financial sums before the tree is 
felled after prior authorization from local authorities (Foundjem-Tita 2009).  
 
Based on FAOSTAT (2012), total kolanuts production in Cameroon today is estimated at 
38,000 tons. Other FAO statistics show that exports of kolanuts out of Cameroon reached 
their highest ever in 1984 when 583 tons were exported. Recent data estimate exports of 
kolanuts at about 87 tons per year. These data suggest that almost all kolanuts produced in 
Cameroon are consumed within the country. Very little is imported as figures from the same 
source show that in 2006 about 3 tons were imported into Cameroon with the highest ever of 
1,020 tons worth 165,000 U.S. dollars recorded in 1978 (FAOSTAT 2012). These figures 
reveal the strong domestic market potential of kola, chiefly due to its cultural value.  
 
3.4.3 Gnetum  
 
The name of Gnetum spp in this study refers to two evergreen, leafy vines i.e. Gnetum 
africanum and Gnetum. buchholzianum that grow throughout the Congo basin (Photo 3.3). 
They survive in forests openings, secondary forests, and fallow farmlands; at times they occur 
in active, mixed cropping fields. The vines may grow up to a height of 10 m. The two species 
are superficially very similar, but differ in leaf shape and reproductive organs (Clark et al. 
2004).  
 
In most cases, the leaves are sliced into small pieces, cooked and consumed as vegetables. 
They accompany the intake of starchy food stuffs, particularly from cassava. These vegetables 
are rich in proteins, essential amino acids and mineral elements. They are distinctively rich in 
sodium, potassium, calcium, magnesium and iron (Okafor et al. 1994). Their high nutritional 
value makes them a good substitute for meat in many households. In Nigeria, the leaves are 
occasionally distilled into alcohol (Nkefor et al. 2000). In addition to nutrition, they are also 
used as medicines to treat infections such as haemorrhoids and high blood pressure (Okafor 
1997; Schippers 2000). The leaves are also used as an antiseptic on wounds and are believed 
to enhance blood production (Nkefor et al. 2000). 
 
Estimates of national production of Gnetum are scarce. However, survey results reported by 
Ingram et al. (2012) show that 18 villages in Cameroon harvested a total of 2,324 ton of 
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Gnetum annually between 2007-2009. Of this volume, 83% was sold whereas the remaining 
17% was either consumed (11%) and the rest were given out as gifts or left to deteriorate 
(6%). The same study estimated annual trade between Cameroon and Nigeria, based on three 
sea routes in the Southwest region of Cameroon, to be 3,518 tons worth about 10.5 million 
US dollars. Analysis of the value chain from two regions in Cameroon shows that the sector 
directly employs about 2,150 people while another 400 people are indirectly employed. 
Unsustainable harvesting practices and low rates of adoption of domestication techniques 
have resulted to Gnetum being classified as an endangered species by the Government of 
Cameroon (Clark et al. 2004).  
 
Photo 3.3 Genetum spp  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Photo 3.3: Gnetum spp   
Source http://www.google.be/search?q=Gnetum+spp&hl 
 
3.4.4 Irvingia (Bush Mango) 
 
Irvingia gabonensis and I. wombolu are two species of the Irvingiacea family. They are 
common in the humid forest zone of Cameroon. Both species are difficult to distinguish from 
herbarium specimens alone. Most of the time, they are distinguished based on palatability of 
the fruits (Harris 1996). The sweet edible pulp of the fresh fruit of I. gabonensis is consumed 
while the sweet-bitter taste of the pulp of I. wombolu fruit makes it inedible. The two species 
can be found in the humid forests of Central and West Africa. They are planted and 
maintained in farms and home gardens in most areas where they occur (Ainge and Brown 
2004).  
 
Domesticted Gnetum spp Gnetum spp parcelled for shipment 
to Nigeria  
Market women processing Gnetum spp for 
retail  
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The juicy fruit of I. gabonensis is rich in vitamin C and is often consumed as a dessert. The 
pulp can be used in making jam, jelly and juice (Ejiofor 1994). The nut of both species is 
cracked to obtain the kernel. The kernels are used as a soup thickener and in some cases as 
substitute to groundnuts and melon seeds (‘egussi’) in soup. They are highly appreciated for 
their slimy consistency in soup. The kernels of Irvingia spp. are classed as oil seeds (Leakey 
and Newton 1994) and provide carbohydrates and proteins to their consumers (Onyeike et al. 
1995, cited in Ainge et al., 2004). The kernels have also been reported to have uses in the 
cosmetic, confectionary and pharmaceutical industries. The kernels are specifically described 
to contribute to body weight loss in humans (Ngondi et al. 2005; Egras et al. 2011).  
 
Irvingia spp are an important source of cash income to farmers and traders in the humid forest 
zone of Cameroon. Their annual production value is estimated at 8,089,580 USD. Annual 
production of Irvingia spp from the Ejagham forest reserve for example is estimated at 
154,989 tons (Nkwatoh et al. 2010).  
 
 
                                  Photo 3.4: Irvingia spp:  
Source: http://www.google.be/search?q=irvingia+gabonensis+picture&hl=en&tbo 
 
 
Fruit on branch 
Harvested fruits  
Extracted kernels 
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3.5 Criteria for choosing case study subjects: regions, villages and 
respondents 
3.5.1 Choice of regions 
 
Because of differences in biophysical conditions, and ecology between different regions of 
Cameroon and growth requirements, the selected species grow abundantly in some of the 
regions and are completely absent from others. In other cases, some of the species may be 
available in one area but are not considered important by the local people. As a consequence, 
it was difficult to find a species that was abundant as well as important for collection and sale 
in all the regions of the country. In this respect, a different species was considered in each of 
the selected regions. Only regions where the species grow and farmers are actively involved 
in collection and trade were selected. 
 
Choice of regions: based on pre-colonial, colonial history, and traditional forms of 
leadership  
To capture the first level of Williamson’s institutional analysis framework (Williamson 
2000a), we go down to the layers of institutions from pre-colonial, colonial and contemporary 
Cameroon. This is in conformity with the thought that the particular history of Africa which 
dates back to the pre-colonial times and the manner in which its institutional environment has 
been shaped over the years, may help in understanding present weaknesses in African 
institutions and development (Platteau 2009).  
 
Besides using species occurrence, as a choice criterion, regions were therefore selected in 
order to capture the cultural and historical diversity of Cameroon. Before colonisation, 
different ethnic groups had migrated to and settled in the country. Most of these ethnic 
clusters have the same origin but different lifestyles due to different initial dwelling places. 
As they settled, they created cultures which today affect the way they manage natural 
resources, especially land and trees (ADB 2009).  
 
Before the colonial period, the people of Cameroon were divided into three categories based 
on the local systems of government (Yahmed et al. 2006). These include: 
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- People with a hierarchical system of government which today refers to people of the 
North West, West, parts of Adamawa, North and Extreme North regions of Cameroon.  
-  People with a decentralised system of government. This concerns people from the forest 
zones (South, Centre and Eastern regions).  
- People with a mixed system of government characterised by western cultures. This groups 
people from the coastal zones (Littoral and South West regions).  
 
Cameroon has experienced German, French and English colonial rules. Before the Germans 
colonised the country in 1884, the Baka and Fulani ethnic groups were the first to settle there. 
After the First World War in 1919, the country was divided between the French and the 
English. In 1960, the French part of Cameroon gained independence as the Republic of 
Cameroon. In the following year, the English part also gained independence and voted to join 
the French Cameroon through a Federal State. In 1972, through a new constitution, the 
federation was replaced by a unitary state called the United Republic of Cameroon. The 
country was again changed from the United Republic of Cameroon to the Republic of 
Cameroon in 1984 (United Nations 2004; CIA 2012).  
 
About 200 ethnic groups can be counted in Cameroon, each of which has its own dialect, 
culture, and tradition. Administratively, the country is divided into 10 regions (Figure 3.2). 
Two of these regions (Northwest and Southwest) were colonised by the English and the rest 
by the French. With respect to its colonial history, the state has two official languages i.e. 
English and French. 
 
The people of Cameroon are thus characterised by different cultures and speak different local 
and international languages which have been influenced by both colonial and modern political 
systems. The importance of cultural diversity is to study the interaction between formal and 
informal institutions in the management of natural resources.  
 
Based on the above, the choice of regions was purposeful and guided by the following 
criteria:  
- occurrence and abundance of at least one of the selected case study species either in the 
wild or on farmland; 
- farmers in the regions market the species; and  
- cultural and political diversity.  
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Figure 3.2: Map of Cameroon indicating study sites and products selected per site   
Source: Ngakum Precilia and author 
 
For each selected region, divisions/subdivision, villages were chosen based on expert and 
local knowledge about abundance, distribution and use of the species. In this case, local NGO 
assistance was crucial in guiding the choice of sites. These local NGOs are basically those 
which have been working with the World Agroforestry Centre (ICRAF) to either domesticate 
or valorise the selected species in each selected region.  
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3.5.2 Choice of respondents 
 
Producers  
Individuals were chosen from each selected village for interview. The choice of respondents 
was random after having purposively established a list of those farmers who are actively 
involved in the collection/harvest and marketing of the selected species. By doing so, the 
chances of interviewing farmers who are not involved in the collection and commercialisation 
of the species were eliminated.  
 
Table 3.1 gives a summary of the sampling plan and number of producers interviewed per 
species and per region.  
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Table 3.1: Summary of sampling frame indicating sites and species selected for producers survey  
 
Research Questions Selected regions
a
 
 
Form of 
leadership and 
colonial history  
Divisions/ 
subdivision
b
 
 
Species
c
 
 
 
Villages 
 
Number of 
respondents/region
d 
 
 
Research questions 1 
to 3 targeted to 
producers 
Formal and informal 
institutions 
governing access to 
land and trees 
 
North West 
 
Hierarchical 
English   
Momo, Bui Kolanuts 
Random sampling from 
a list proposed by local 
NGOs. Most important 
criteria being resource 
abundance and 
marketing activities 
99 
West 
 
Hierarchal  
French 
Nde, Bayangam Kolanuts  99 
Centre 
 
Decentralised  
French  
Lekie Njansang 51 
South 
Decentralised  
French  
Mvila Irvingia/Njansang 69 
East 
Decentralised  
French  
Yokadouma Irvingia/Njansang 76 
Total     394 
Note  
a. Purposeful: only regions where species grow are selected 
b. Purposeful sampling of regions where species grow based on available literature and presence of a local NGO to ease access to the area 
c.  Purposeful sampling: species targeted by domestication and may be collected from the wild or harvested on farm (N/B Gnetum spp was not part of the 
producers survey) 
d.  Random sampling: from a list of farmers actually involved in harvesting/collecting and marketing 
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3.5.3 Traders and markets  
 
Traders were selected in some export, urban and local assembly markets. Due to their high 
mobility and often busy nature, traders’ participation was most of the time based on 
availability and willingness to take part in the interview (Table 3.2). 
 
Table 3.2: Markets visited during traders’ surveys  
 
Research Question  Species Selected Markets  Number of respondents 
per species  
Research question 4 
Institutional 
arrangements related to 
permits  
Targeted to traders 
Gnetum spp 
Idenua, Bota waft, Tiko port, 
Bamenda, Douala  
21 
Irvingia spp Ebolowa 22 
Cola spp Ashong, Bafoussam 18 
Ricinodenron 
heudelotii  
Yaounde, Douala,  
Bafoussam 
9 
  Total = 70 
 
 
N/B Please contact author at: dftita@yahoo.com for the questionnaires and data if required.  
The questionnaire and data will subsequently be made available online at: 
http://dvn.iq.harvard.edu/dvn/dv/icraf 
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Chapter  
4 Policy and Legal Frameworks Governing Trees: Incentives 
or Disincentives for Smallholder Tree Planting Decisions 
in Cameroon?  
Abstract 
 
Agroforestry and planting trees on farmers’ fields have been reported as important elements in 
a strategy to meet the millennium development goals of poverty reduction and climate change 
mitigation. However, their uptake seems to be constrained by factors both internal and 
external to the household and often related to the policy and legislative environment. In this 
chapter, we use qualitative content analyses to examine whether existing policies and 
legislation governing trees in Cameroon support or discourage tree planting. We found that 
although their mission papers and statements suggest that most national government policies 
related to agricultural, forestry and general poverty reduction sectors address tree planting and 
agroforestry, actual legislation designed to follow up the policies mostly contradicts poverty 
reduction goals. Often legislation and regulations are more conservation-oriented and do not 
provide a clear procedure to distinguish between products from trees found in the wild and 
those gathered from farmers’ fields. We found out that there is no government program or 
strategy specific to guide agroforestry development in Cameroon and thus recommend for 
such a scheme to be put in place.  
 
Keywords: agroforestry, poverty reduction, millennium development goals, ecosystem 
services, policies and legislation 
 
This chapter is based on: 
Foundjem-Tita, D., Tchoundjeu , Z., Speelman, S., D’Haese, M., Degrande, A., Asaah, A., van Huylenbroeck, 
G., van Damme, P. Ndoye, O. 2012. Policy and Legal Frameworks Governing Trees: Incentives or Disincentives 
for Smallholder Tree Planting Decisions in Cameroon? Small Scale Forestry. Accpted Nov. 2012 
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4.1 Introduction  
 
It has been recognized that agroforestry technologies can contribute significantly to the 
achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) (Garrity 2004) at the core of 
which is eradicating extreme poverty (Schreckenberg et al. 2006a). These technologies can, 
amongst others be used in rehabilitating degraded land (Asaah et al. 2011). Furthermore, 
agroforestry is gaining recognition in the climate change debate (Garrity 2004; Robiglio et al. 
2010). For example, scientists in ASB (Alternatives to Slash and Burn Partnership for the 
Tropical Forest Margins) argue for a whole landscape approach – i.e. Reducing Emissions 
from all Land Uses (REALU) – as the most appropriate move towards reducing carbon 
emissions and providing financial co-benefits to local populations (Robiglio et al. 2010). 
However, when trees are concerned, much emphasis is still placed on forests (mostly natural 
regeneration), while it has been reported that even though forests are being severely degraded, 
the number of trees on farms is increasing. About 1.2 billion people are using agroforestry 
technologies (FAO 2005) to integrate trees into their production systems. In addition a recent 
global assessment of tree cover reveals that 48% of the Worlds agricultural land had at least 
10% of tree cover. These figures demonstrate the importance of trees on-farm in the provision 
of environmental services.  
 
Integrating trees on farms and rangeland is within the concept of agroforestry and targets 
diversification and increased sustainability of agricultural production for increased social, 
economic and environmental benefits (Leakey 2011). As mentioned in the introduction of this 
thesis, the focus in this chapter is on indigenous fruit trees and farmers’ fields, although 
reference will be made in some cases to tree planting in general.  The main reason is that the 
principal actors who can create a positive contribution to tree planting are farmers 
(Westergren 1996) whereby their on-farm tree planting decisions are influenced by the 
market, food, medicinal, cultural and other social values of the tree species they would choose 
to plant (Westergren 1996; Garen et al. 2009).  
 
Despite the social, economic and cultural importance of trees and especially indigenous 
species on farms (Schreckenberg et al. 2006a), they are poorly addressed in existing 
government policies dealing with poverty reduction (Schreckenberg et al. 2006b). In addition, 
research on agroforestry policies that include indigenous species is scarce. Consequently, 
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most countries do not have policies that govern these trees on farmland, nor do they specify 
how to deal with products from on-farm tree plantations. Typically, these policies only pay 
attention to exotic species such as mangoes, avocados and citrus (Schreckenberg et al. 
2006b), and other export cash crops such as rubber and cocoa. On the other hand, trees on 
farmland, especially indigenous species, are subjected to policies and regulations from the 
forestry sector which are often highly normative (Westergren 1996; Schreckenberg et al. 
2006a; Laird et al. 2010b; Ndoye and Awono 2010). This has motivated the World 
Agroforestry Centre to encourage countries to develop specific agroforestry policies as was 
discussed during the 23
rd
 World Congress of the International Union of Forestry Research 
Organisations (Langford 2010). Leakey et al. (2005) made similar recommendations. Some 
African countries, including Kenya, have taken the lead to develop special regulations for 
farm forestry (Government of Kenya 2009). Furthermore, FAO is interested in developing 
guidelines aimed at encouraging national decision makers to promote agroforestry.  
 
The development of agroforestry measures is not only limited to Africa. For example, the 
European Union (EU) under regulation 2080/92 developed on-farm forestry measures with 
specific programs to support afforestation activities, to improve existing woodlands and to 
reoccupy marginal lands by planting trees. Even though the EU’s principal objective is to 
reduce agricultural overproduction, it also recognises the contribution of forestry resources in 
providing greater ecological balance and combating greenhouse gas effects by absorbing 
carbon (Lawson et al. 2002).  
 
In the case of Cameroon, the justification to develop specific policies and legislation that 
address trees and especially indigenous fruit trees on farms is that many AFTP produced by 
smallholders on-farm are from indigenous tree species whereas these species are also found in 
the wild. For example, Degrande et al. (2006) found that 52% of a total of 9,202 trees 
inventoried on farmers’ fields in the humid forest zone of Cameroon were indigenous; 73% of 
the 73 farmers interviewed were shown would prefer to plant indigenous fruit trees compared 
to exotics. However, legislation and regulation governing trees in Cameroon are enshrined 
within the 1994 forestry law and its 1995 text of application (Ngwasiri et al. 2002). This law, 
for the most part deals with indigenous species that farmers plant on their farms. Hence, there 
exists a clear need to make a comprehensible distinction between the same products from 
trees found in the wild and on farmers’ fields. However, new policy and legislative initiatives 
cannot be taken without a clear understanding of how existing policies may affect farmers’ 
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decisions to plant trees on-farm. In this regard, the main objective of this chapter is to answer 
research question one, i.e what policies/strategies currently exist to address tree planting in 
Cameroon and whether these policies and regulations have any unintended consequences on 
agroforestry development in the country?  
 
The study is designed to contribute to the current process of formulating specific public 
policies, legislation and regulations to govern the agroforestry sub-sector in Cameroon and 
other countries.  
 
 
4.2 Conceptual framework for understanding farmers’ tree planting 
decisions  
 
The conceptual model applied examines factors that may affect farmers’ tree planting 
decisions and explains why incentive-driven policies may add an additional impetus for tree 
planting (Figures 4.1 and 4.2). At the centre of the framework is the outcome: the rational-
strategic decision of farmers to plant trees based on the highest expected, individual benefits 
and lowest cost. The model depicts that the decision to plant trees is influenced by a number 
of factors that are either internal or external (the environment) to the household. Within the 
household, age of the household head, number of adult males, overall level of education of the 
farmer and amount of land owned are reported to influence the decision to plant trees (Knox 
et al. 2002; Zubair and Garforth 2006). Factors external to the household that may trigger tree 
planting decisions include presence/absence of market opportunities for AFTP, ecological and 
technical factors, and the opportunity cost of tree planting. Indeed, farmers would plant more 
trees if the opportunity cost of forgone benefits on the land used were lower than the benefits 
derived from planting trees.  
 
Rational farmers do not operate in a vacuum. Their activities are conditioned by a set of 
norms, rules and regulations defined as ‘institutions’ (North 1990) (see Chapter 2). This 
means that the decision of a rational farmer to plant trees on a given piece of land is not only 
influenced by the highest expected utility, but also by what is possible within a given 
institutional environment comprising government policies and a conducive legal framework 
(both formal and informal). The policy and legal framework in this study refers to the whole 
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set of political strategy or vision and regulations that establish the basis of production, 
exchange and distribution of trees and tree products in Cameroon (see Chapter two).  
 
As shown in Figure 4.1, the household’s internal, ecological and economic factors, and 
incentive-oriented policies act directly, while those related to formal and informal rules and 
regulations may work both directly and indirectly. Direct, incentive-oriented policies such as 
improving AFTP quality through provision of high quality planting material, renewing aging 
plantations through tree domestication and vegetative propagation, and paying for 
environmental services may encourage farmers to plant trees. Without incentive-oriented 
policies, a rational farmer with a particular plot size will plant a given number of trees, say Q1 
(Figure 4.2), to meet his/her personal, economic, cultural and ecological needs. This rational 
decision will take into consideration the potential alternative benefits from planting other 
types of plants to meet other economic and social needs. The marginal benefits (MB1) of 
planting one additional tree on any given piece of land decrease as more trees are planted. A 
farmer will thus compare the benefits of planting one extra tree to the benefits he will forego 
(opportunity cost of tree planting) by not planting another plant type on this land. Thus, 
farmers may plant more trees as long as the marginal benefits from doing so exceed marginal 
costs of not planting another plant type (MC1). For farmers to plant Q2 trees, it is argued that 
there should exist additional motivating factors beyond what they may obtain from their 
individual benefits. It is suggested that this additional stimulus may come from incentive-
oriented policies which may include society’s willingness to pay for environmental services, 
provision of an adequate number of well-trained nursery operators to supply seedlings of high 
yielding tree species at affordable prices, or increase the value of indigenous fruit tree 
products through improved marketing. These incentive-oriented policies are expected to 
increase the competiveness of indigenous fruit trees with regards to other plant species and 
will thus shift the marginal benefits to MB2.  
 
The rational farmer’s choice is conditioned by policies and regulations governing the 
agroforestry sector. This means that, depending on the way the policies and regulations are 
drafted, they may provide any combination of incentives, disincentives, sanctions or 
information to promote a particular type of behaviour (North 1990; Doward and Omamo 
2009). In the context of this study, these institutions may be both formal and informal 
legislation and regulations that influence farmers’ decisions to plant trees through their 
control on farmers’ perceived (secured) property rights to land, trees and tree products (see 
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Chapter two). In the absence of clear property rights with regards to access to land and tree 
products, farmers will not take advantage of market opportunities. Also, in the absence of an 
adequate policy framework, transaction risks and costs will be high (Bienabe et al. 2004). 
This may further reduce farmers’ and traders’ motivation to plant and market trees and tree 
products. This means that if property rights (use and economic rights) to trees and tree 
products are supportive, they may also contribute to making on-farm tree planting more 
competitive, thus pushing the marginal benefits to MB2. Otherwise, poorly defined rights may 
serve as a disincentive to on-farm tree planting, thereby pushing the marginal costs to MC2 
leading to less trees on farm (Q3).  
54 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1: Conceptual framework for analysing farmers’ tree planting decisions 
 
Informal institutions: 
Customary, rules, norms and beliefs 
governing access to land, land security, tree 
planting and rights to trees  
 
 
 
Outcome: decision to plant trees on farm  
Formal institutions:  
legal rules conferring access to land, 
land security and rights, to trees and 
tree products  
Incentive-oriented policies:  
Availability of high quality planting 
materials  
Payments for Environmental Services 
(PES)  
 
 
 
 
Market opportunities  
Accessible farm-to-market roads 
Attractive prices 
Market opportunities 
Processing opportunities 
Level of income from trees  
 
 
Secured property rights to land, 
trees and tree products  
Ecological and technical factors:  
Complementary reasons (e.g. trees 
provide shade, fodder, soil fertility) 
Tree research and extension programmes  
Risk and uncertainties related to trees  
 
 
Factors internal to the household  
age, gender, household size, labour, 
income, adult males, number of plots, 
alternative sources of income 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
55 
 
 
Figure 4.2: Effect of incentive-oriented policies on the number of trees planted  
 
MB = marginal benefits; MC = marginal costs, Q = number of trees and FCFA = currency 
used in Central Africa and stand for ‘Fédérations des Communautés Francophone et 
Acadienne’. 1 € = 650 FCFA  
 
 
4.3 Research method 
 
A qualitative content analysis was performed on policy statements, legislation and regulations 
of the responsible ministries and departments in the agricultural, forestry and environmental 
sectors in Cameroon. Content analysis is defined as a technique for determining meaning by 
objectively and systematically identifying specified characteristics of messages (Holsti 1969). 
The methodological procedure is based on Stemler (2001), Mayers and Bass (2004b) and 
Dlamini (2007), and is detailed as follows:  
 
Step 1: inventory of existing national strategic documents, mission statements of relevant 
ministries in charge of forestry, environment, agriculture and rural development in order to 
select relevant policy statements, laws and official texts that relate to trees, forests, 
environment and farmers’ livelihoods that may either encourage or discourage tree planting 
on farmers’ fields and other agroforestry initiatives (see Table 4.1 for list of documents 
analysed). 
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Table 4.1: National policies or programs relevant to poverty and rural development in 
Cameroon 
 
National policy or program  Mentions 
elements of 
NTFP
a
 or AFTP
b
 
Extent integration of 
trees on farm is 
addressed
c
 
Poverty reduction strategic paper (PRSP) – (August, 2003) Yes 1 
Growth and employment strategic paper  
(GESP) – (August, 2009) 
Yes 1 
Rural development strategic paper (RDSP)-(undated)  Yes 2 
Forest and environment sector program (PSFE) – (Dec, 2003) Yes 0 
National forestry policy – (June, 1995) Yes 2 
National agricultural policy – (May, 1999) No 0 
National NTFP policy (mission statement) n/a
 
n/a 
a. Non-Timber Forest Products  
b. Agroforestry Tree Products  
c. 0: not at all addressed; 1: inadequately addressed; 2: adequately addressed; n/a: not available. 
 
 
Step 2: although word frequency count is widely used in content analyses, the more advanced 
method used here condenses a great number of words of text into fewer content categories 
based on precise coding rules (Stemler 2001). The justification is that for stylistic reasons, 
synonyms of some words may be used and this may lead to an under-estimation of some 
concepts if only specific words are counted. To overcome this problem, a more contextual 
approach to the meaning of some keywords is used. The context is whether the policy or legal 
statement serves as incentives or disincentives to tree planting. The keywords adopted here 
were: NTFP, agroforestry, trees, farms, conservation, sustainable management, planting 
materials, tree domestication, marketing and indigenous species. Based on this precept, a 
matrix of the selected policies and texts has been built to explore if the policy statements and 
legal text mention promoting NTFP or AFTP which could be interpreted as incentives for tree 
planting, or else directly discourage tree planting. A binary attribute of yes or no was used. If 
the policy is positively labelled through a yes, then another column within the matrix 
investigates if the issue of tree planting is adequately or inadequately addressed (see Table 
4.1). An issue is:  
 
- adequately addressed, if the policy document or mission statement mentions and 
elaborates on action plans and implementation strategies regarding agroforestry, tree 
domestication and integration of trees on farm, and is then labelled 2;  
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- inadequately addressed implies the policy document or mission statement just mentions 
agroforestry and tree planting without further details on any implementation strategy, and 
is labelled 1;  
- not at all addressed if the policy document does not treat or include any element related to 
the integration of trees on farm, and is labelled 0.  
 
Step 3: the analyses have been designed to investigate which components of tree planting on 
farmers’ fields and domestication of indigenous species and agroforestry are adequately or 
inadequately addressed. To do this, the policies and mission statements that received a yes (in 
matrix 1) were later scored again via another matrix. At this stage, the criteria of analyses 
modified and used elements of policy recommendations, emerging from the works of several 
authors including Westergren (1996), Ndoye et al. (1998), Garrity (2004), Russell and Franzel 
(2004), Simons and Leakey (2004), Degrande et al. (2006), Schreckenberg et al. (2006b), 
Tchoundjeu et al. (2006) and Garen et al. (2009) geared at including agroforestry, AFTP, 
indigenous fruits and NTFP in combating hunger and poverty (MDG 1). The policy 
recommendations are also aimed at meeting Cameroon’s poverty reduction strategic paper 
(PRSP), the growth and employment strategy and other climate change mitigation issues. 
Some elements that are of policy advice (e.g. institutional support to improve market 
infrastructure) may extend to other sectors. For that reason, analyses concentrated on those 
specific to the AFTP or NTFP subsectors. The elements of policy recommendation adopted 
are listed into four groups below.  
 
Production and sustainable management  
A. The policy and legislation addresses production and distribution of planting materials of 
indigenous NTFP or AFTP.  
B. The policy and legislation encourages integration of trees on farm.  
Access, harvest and post-harvest  
C. The policy and legislation gives usufruct rights to farmers.  
D. The policy and legislation addresses harvest and post-harvest technologies.  
E. The policy and legislation addresses sustainable management exploitation, production 
and/or domestication of indigenous species from the wild. 
Marketing  
F. The policy and legislation confers economic rights to farmers.  
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G. The policy and legislation encourages marketing activities, farmer enterprises or research 
on marketing of indigenous tree products.  
Research and extension  
H. The policy and legislation or organisation addresses research on agroforestry and/or 
domestication of indigenous species.  
I. The policy and legislation or organisation provides or makes provision for agroforestry 
incentives, access to planting material and/or extension services on tree planting. 
 
Step 4: inconsistencies are highlighted in the policy and legal documents in relation to 
meeting national development goals (poverty reduction strategic paper) and international 
development goals (specifically MDG1: poverty and hunger) and also general climate change 
mitigation objectives.  
4.4 Results  
 
The various government policies, legislation and regulations are presented and evaluated in 
this section with a focus on their impact on farmers’ tree-planting decisions. Results are then 
discussed, followed by conclusions and policy implications.  
4.4.1 Analysis of policy statements  
 
Analysis of the major government policy documents related to agricultural development, 
forestry and poverty alleviation reveals the commitment of the Government of Cameroon 
(GOC) to include elements of NTFP and AFTP in its natural resources management and 
poverty reduction policies. This commitment is manifested in the country’s 2003 Poverty 
Reduction Strategic Paper (PRSP), the 2008 Growth and Employment Strategic Paper (GESP) 
which replaced the previous PRSP, the Rural Development Strategic Paper (RDSP) and the 
National Forestry Policy (Table 4.2).  
 
In all these documents, the GOC identifies managing natural resources in a sustainable way as 
one of the four pillars to diversify and raise income in rural areas. Of these documents, the 
Rural Development Strategic Paper and the National Forestry Policy rate highest in 
addressing agroforestry through on-farm integration of indigenous species as one of the 
options to support farming development, in order to boost production, diversify rural income 
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and maintain the natural resource base (Table 4.2). These two policy documents also 
emphasise the importance of promoting agroforestry-based production systems by integrating 
trees on-farm to improve soil fertility.   
  
The national agricultural policy does not use the agroforestry terminology but elaborates on 
the development of some major cash crops (coffee, cocoa, rubber, oil palm) designed for 
promoting exports in the national agricultural diversification strategy. Although these efforts 
again reflect the intent of the GOC to include trees, AFTP and related agroforestry 
technologies in its poverty reduction strategy, it should be noted that the national agricultural 
policy neglects indigenous species which are targets for tree domestication and confirms 
common opinion that these species are overlooked by the ministry in charge of agricultural 
development. Unlike for other crops such as maize, cotton, rubber, roots and tubers, cocoa, 
coffee and sugarcane, for which specific directives exist in the national agricultural policy, no 
directives exist for indigenous fruit species in general and those studied in this thesis in 
particular,  i.e  Irvingia gabonensis (bush mango), Dacryodes edulis (safou) or Ricinodendron 
heudelotii (njansang). The assumption of this is that, in the absence of appropriate policies 
from the agriculture ministry, indigenous fruits species are in reality highly regulated by the 
forestry department.  
 
Both national forestry policy and its institutional support instrument, the PSFE, address most 
of the elements of policy recommendations identified from existing literature. However, 
Table 4.2 reveals that efforts are still needed to tackle the availability, accessibility and 
affordability of improved planting materials for indigenous trees. 
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Table 4.2: Scoring matrix for relevant policies in relation to trees on farm 
 
Policy/Organisation/Legislation 
of sector relevant policies  
A B C D E F G Total 
score 
PRSP  1 1 0 0 1 0 0 3/7 
GESP 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 3/7 
RDSP 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 6/7 
PSFE 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 6/7 
National forestry policy  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7/7 
National agricultural policy  1 1 0 0 0 0 0 2/7 
National NTFP policy
a
   n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Total  6/6 5/6 4/6 4/6 4/6 3/6 1/6  
 
 
A. The policy, legislation or organisation mentions or encourages tree planting in general; Yes = 1, 0 otherwise. 
B. The policy, legislation or organisation mentions domestication or agroforestry or encourages the planting of 
indigenous species on farmers’ fields Yes = 1, 0 otherwise. 
C. The policy, legislation or organisation gives or encourages usufruct rights to farmers Yes = 1; 0 otherwise. 
D. The policy, legislation or organisation gives economic rights to farmers Yes = 1; 0 otherwise. 
E. The policy, legislation or organisation encourages farmer enterprises on indigenous NTFP or AFTP Yes = 1; 
0 otherwise.  
F. The policy, legislation or organisation encourages research on indigenous, NTFP or AFTP Yes = 1; 0 
otherwise. 
G. The policy, legislation or organisation makes mention/encourages production/distribution of indigenous 
NTFP or AFTP planting materials Yes = 1 ; 0 otherwise 
a. n/a means no information available.  
 
 
4.4.2 Legislation governing trees and other forest products in 
Cameroon 
 
The latest legislation governing the forestry sector in Cameroon is the 1994 Forestry Law and 
its decree of application (Ngwasiri et al. 2002). In the absence of separate laws governing 
trees on farmers’ fields and the NTFP sector in Cameroon, some elements in the 1994 
Forestry Law address NTFP, and indirectly affect planting and management of trees in 
farming systems. The emphasis in analysing this legislation is placed on the following 
elements: clear definition of what is meant by forests and forestry and agricultural products; 
ownership and access to forest resources (with emphases on NTFP); their exploitation for 
personal and commercial uses; and how they may affect trees outside forests and the decision 
to plant trees. Section 6 of the 1994 Forestry Law states that rights to trees are also restricted 
by the regulations governing land tenure and state land. The definition of NTFP and AFTP 
will be treated in the next paragraph whereas use and economic rights will be analysed in 
section 4.5.  
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- Definition of forests, NTFP and AFTP  
 
Sections 2 and 9 of the 1994 Forestry Law respectively define forests and forest products, and 
emphasise that forest products are different from agricultural products. The law defines forest 
products as ‘mainly wood and non-wood products as well as wildlife and fishery resources 
derived from forests’. The law, however, does not define what agricultural products are, nor 
does the appropriate Ministry of Agriculture in Cameroon provide any formal definition of 
agricultural products. The implication of this lack of definition is that confusion arises as to 
whether products harvested from farm trees should be considered as agricultural products or 
forestry products. Similar questions have been posed by Belcher (2003) who questioned 
whether a given product is a NTFP even if it is derived from a farming system and thus 
subjected to the same regulations as NTFP products gathered from the wild. The reality in the 
field is that forest officials harass producers and especially traders who deal in such products 
based on forestry regulations. This practice is common for example in the case of Cola spp 
and Irvingia gabonensis, Ricinodenron and Gnetum (Betti 2007b)  
 
4.4.3 Laws and regulations related to land in Cameroon  
 
Land and tree tenure rights have been identified as important factors that affect everyday 
decisions of farmers as to what crops to grow, the type of investments to make and the 
adoption of new and promising agricultural technologies for climate change mitigation 
amongst which agroforestry (Knox et al. 2002; IFAD 2008). In Cameroon, specific provisions 
of the 1994 Forestry Law – for example, ownership of forests and aquaculture establishments 
– refer to the regulations governing land tenure and state land. Rights to land in Cameroon are 
torn between traditional property rights and modern laws (Tchapmégni 2007).  
 
The traditional property or customary land tenure system varies between regions and between 
ethnic groups (Schreckenberg et al. 2002; Tchapmégni 2007; ADB 2009; Oyono 2009; 
Platteau 2009). In pre-colonial times, land in Cameroon was perceived as community property 
and was handed down from one generation to another. It was thus difficult to talk about 
private ownership of land during this time.  
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Formal rights to land by individuals were introduced during the colonial period. As was 
mentioned in chapter three, Cameroon has gone through German, French and British colonial 
regimes. Consequently, the current legislation and regulatory framework (ordinances N° 74-1 
and N° 74-2 of the 6
th
 of July 1974) are influenced by these colonial masters (ADB 2009; 
Platteau 2009). The 1974 law also created a framework for private ownership of land 
sanctioned by registration and a title. Following the law, the customary rights (use rights) give 
the possibility to occupants of national land to register a piece of land and receive private 
ownership. Unfortunately, due to the complicated procedures involved in obtaining land 
certificates (van den Berg and Biesbrouck 2000), many Cameroonians have resorted to using 
the traditional or customary system to acquire land, especially in rural areas. The complicated 
procedures involved may explain why only 2% of the Cameroonian territory has been issued 
with land certificates (ADB 2009). For rural land, only approximately 3% has been registered 
and in most cases by owners of large commercial farms. Small-scale farmers who usually 
secure land under local agreements have difficulty taking advantage of the opportunity 
presented by the law.  
 
4.5 Possible impact of current legislation on farmers’ and traders’ 
decisions: a theoretical analysis  
 
An assessment of the legislation governing trees in Cameroon (1994 Forestry Law and the 
1974 Ordinance on Land Tenure) reveals that it potentially limits smallholder producers’ 
economic rights to exploit NTFP and in reality limits their rights to the trees they plant on 
their farms:  
 
Usufruct and economic rights to exploit and sell NTFP  
Ngwasiri et al. (2002) elucidated access rights for local people based on the 1994 Forestry 
Law and the 1995 decree of application. Based on their analyses, local populations are 
conferred usufruct rights to forest resources, which constitute the right to exploit NTFP for 
personal use, but not for commercial purposes. On the other hand, some NTFP are defined as 
special products in the law (section 9 (2)), meaning that interested parties are expected to 
obtain permits to exploit such special products. To obtain these permits, interested parties 
have to go through the same procedures as those dealing with commercial timber exploitation 
(Djeukam 2006a; Betti 2007b). Because the whole concept of NTFP is poorly defined, the 
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laws meant to govern the forestry sector impact directly on the same species found on 
farmers’ fields (AFTP). The resultant effect is that farmers’ property rights are poorly defined 
as the products which come from their farmland are subjected to forestry legislation and 
regulations. This means that policy makers need to enact subsequent legislation and 
regulations to adapt to current shifts in agricultural and conservation practices where 
originally wild tree species are now planted on farm. 
 
Rights to trees 
Following the 1994 Forestry Law, trees planted on land without a title deed belong to the 
state. Also, all naturally growing trees belong to the state, even if they grow on cultivated 
land. In other words, trees growing on private land will only be considered property of the 
individual if the person claiming rights to the trees has a deed. This means that if the laws 
were to be properly enforced, most farmers would lose their rights to the trees on the land for 
which they are claiming ownership under customary rules. The 1994 Forestry Law also 
stipulates that owners of private forest need to draw up management plans with regards to the 
trees they plant. The law clearly states that orchards are not considered as forests, but no 
provisions were identified to differentiate between these or to define what an orchard is, nor 
did they distinguish between products harvested from orchards and those from the wild. The 
procedures to obtain management plans to exploit own trees incur both transaction and 
operational costs, and can result in disincentives to farmers planting trees on private land.  
 
Although the 1974 land ordinance confers the right on every citizen to own land, some 
customary regimes limit this right for women and some social groups, including pastoralists 
in some nomadic areas. In the Northwest region of Cameroon (for example) only 3.2% of 
registered land certificates representing 0.1% of all registered land surface, belong to women 
(ADB 2009). This customary regime may thus have a negative effect on women’s rights and 
their ambitions to plant trees. However, these customs are dynamic and may not necessarily 
stop women from planting trees if they are exposed to opportunities. For example, experience 
of ICRAF reveals that women in Ngali II (a village in the south of Cameroon) actually 
planted Irvingia spp. on their farms when they were introduced by research into tree 
domestication techniques.  
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4.6 Discussion 
 
It is clear that no mechanism, laws nor regulations exist that identify or separate species 
harvested from the wild from those that could also be found on farmers’ fields in Cameroon. 
If the existing laws were properly enforced, they could act as disincentives for farmers to 
plant those highly regulated species on their farmland. This situation is similar to the one in 
Indonesia where export restriction for raw materials officially designed to protect natural 
rattan stands, resulted in the total collapse of their cultivation (Fried 2000). Another 
Indonesian example is that harsh reinforcement policies concerning sandalwood collection on 
the Island of Timor forced local people to start uprooting the species that had regenerated 
naturally on their land (Michon 2005). In Nepal, there is evidence that the government 
imposes a levy whenever it becomes aware of a NTFP utility; when farmers become aware of 
these changes they lose interest in investing in the products (Gautam and Devoe 2002).  
 
In Cameroon, a similar case was documented in the ministerial decisions of 2005 that listed 
products classified as forests products of special interests to the state; two species (Aniegeria 
spp and Eucalyptus spp) were added in 2006 restricting their exploitation to special permits. 
This conservation measure may have the unintended negative consequence that farmers in 
Cameroon will no longer invest in these and other species on their farm. This may be a major 
setback to the income diversification strategy as defined in the RDSP, especially as ASB 
(1998) reported that enriching cocoa farms in Cameroon with fruit trees (indigenous and 
exotic) can increase revenue from cocoa farms by up to USD 500 per year.  
 
Existing legislation and regulations in Cameroon are unclear and result in forest and police 
officials to seek rent from traders in the form of bribes and other informal taxes. Ndoye and 
Awono (2010) estimated these informal taxes for a car transporting 1.5 tons of Gnetum spp; 
from the Centre region to Idenau in the Southwest region (distance of about 450 km) to be 
about 530 USD. This rent-capture may prevent new traders from starting a business and 
discourage existing traders from expanding on their operations. Also, traders may be forced to 
pass on the extra charges in the form of lower purchase prices to farmers and higher selling 
prices to consumers (Ndoye 2005). A clear distinction between AFTP and NFTP in legislation 
would decrease the rent-seeking behaviour of forest and police officials, and increase farmers’ 
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incentives to formally harvest, handle and process the products, eventually leading to an 
increase in state revenues (Schreckenberg et al. 2006a).  
 
To avoid confusion between NTFP collected from the wild and from farmers’ fields, scientists 
at the World Agroforestry Centre working on tree domestication and agroforestry propose and 
use the term AgroForestry Tree Products (AFTP) to identify timber and non-timber forest 
products that are harvested from trees cultivated outside forests. This distinguishes them from 
NTFP extracted from natural systems (Simons and Leakey 2004). Subsequent legislation can 
thus adopt this definition and further introduce certificates of origins to distinguish or 
differentiate products harvested from trees in agroforestry systems from those that are 
collected from the wild.  
 
Because Cameroon law implies that trees planted on land without a title deed belong to the 
state, the law can be viewed as a disincentive to tree planting. However, empirical evidence 
on the relationship between tenure security (especially measured by land title) and tree 
planting in Sub-Saharan areas has been contradictory. Where proven, the evidence has not 
been sufficiently robust and widespread (Bromley 2008a; Arnot et al. 2011).  
 
4.7 Conclusions and policy implications 
 
It can be concluded from this case study that despite good intentions to include agroforestry in 
most rural development programs, the differential location of trees in different land uses in 
Cameroon may favour contradictory policies and legislation. Westergren (1996), for example, 
argued that the variety of names defining trees on farms is a reflection of the confusion among 
laymen and experts concerning the possibilities of traditional forestry to intervene on land 
where agriculture plays a dominant role. This suggests that trees outside forests could be 
under the control of forestry or agricultural legislation or a combination of both, or may be 
totally ignored by either or both.  
 
The Cameroon case reflects a neglect of indigenous species by both the forest and agriculture 
ministries. It also demonstrates the need for an inter-ministerial committee to revise existing 
laws and regulations governing cultivation of indigenous trees on farms. This committee 
should also include representatives from the ministry of land tenure because beside forest 
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regulations, land tenure regulations affect decisions to plant trees and rights to trees. This 
inter-ministerial committee should recognise that exploitation, transport, import and export of 
indigenous fruit crops from farmers’ fields do not pose any threat to conservation 
(Schreckenberg et al. 2006b), suggesting that those agroforestry products should be treated 
like conventional farm products. However, the policies and legislation should distinguish 
species from which harvesting practices are a threat to their sustainability, such as Prunus 
africana and Gnetum spp.  
 
In designing policies for indigenous trees on farms, policy makers should consider that: 1) 
most NTFP in the wild with high economic value have the potential of being planted on 
farmers’ fields in the medium to near future, as research is currently developing technologies 
to domesticate them;  and 2) most development projects in the field of climate change (REDD 
and REDD+) may encourage tree planting by farmers. Thus, a boundary needs to be set to 
define when a product ceases to be a forest product and becomes an agricultural product. In 
this context, it is proposed that the inter-ministerial committee considering the revision of 
laws governing trees in Cameroon should not only consist of foresters with strong drive 
towards conservation as was the case with the 1994 Forestry Law (Ekoko 2000), but also of 
experts in the agricultural field as well as in land tenure and climate change. Agricultural 
experts would thus provide insights on an appropriate definition of agricultural products and 
agroforestry, identify the most productive ways to introduce trees on farms in order to 
guarantee product quantity and quality, as well as improve the competitiveness of 
agroforestry as an appropriate land use system for farmers.  
 
In order to encourage farmers to plant trees, the law would also need to make provision for 
incentive mechanisms such as making planting materials more accessible to farmers or some 
form of payments for environmental services. Evidence of incentive-oriented policies is 
reported in Europe, where policies such as direct aid for afforestation, direct aid for the first 
five years of plantation maintenance, compensatory payments for a farmer’s loss of income, 
have contributed to the afforestation of one million hectares of agricultural land within a 
period of five years (Lawson et al. 2002). In cases where farmers do not need to plant 
indigenous fruit trees because they naturally grow in existing farming systems, policies can be 
designed to encourage farmers to retain and manage these trees. As an example for Africa, 
government support for farmer-managed regeneration of indigenous trees on agricultural land 
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implemented by the Government of Niger and international NGOs has resulted in the spread 
of indigenous trees on more than 5 M ha (Haglund et al. 2011).  
 
Since it is difficult to differentiate fruits harvested from wild trees from those harvested from 
farmers’ fields, there is a need for forest and agricultural extension services with research 
support to facilitate certificates of origin based on the origin of the resource as either wild or 
from farmers’ fields. In the long run, through the continued efforts of tree domestication 
research to develop high quality planting materials with high market potential, fruit from trees 
on farmers’ fields may out-compete wild fruit as harvesting costs are reduced and the fruit 
quality becomes more uniform and higher. This would reduce the pressure on natural stands, 
thereby also meeting conservation objectives.  
 
4.8 Recommendation for further research and link to the next 
chapter 
 
Most of the conclusions drawn in this chapter stem from examining laws and regulations as 
they exist and are currently being applied in Cameroon. However, there are no studies that 
provide any empirical evidence about farmers’ awareness and perception of these regulations. 
A study of this kind is thus necessary. The principal research question in this case will be 
whether Cameroonian farmers are aware of existing legislation and whether properly enforced 
regulations would affect their tree planting decisions. Another interesting research question 
would be whether farmers are willing to accept certificates of origin to distinguish farm trees 
from wild ones. These questions are addressed in chapter 5.  
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Chapter  
5 Can Properly Enforced Forestry Regulations Affect 
Farmers’ Decisions to Plant Indigenous Fruits Trees? 
Insights from Cameroon 
 
Abstract  
 
Forestry laws and regulations are theoretically reported to affect the adoption of agroforestry 
technologies, specifically with regard to planting indigenous fruit trees that are important 
sources of nutrients and income to thousands of farmers. However, data on farmers’ 
perception and behaviour towards these policy instruments are scarce and contradictory. 
Based on data collected from 394 households in Cameroon, using a structured questionnaire, 
farmers’ awareness, perception and willingness to accept policy instruments governing on-
farm trees were assessed. The study further investigated whether these policy instruments 
would affect their decisions to plant selected indigenous fruit trees on their farms. The 
analysis found that a majority of farmers are unaware of the laws governing access and trade 
in indigenous fruit tree species. Furthermore, if effectively applied, the regulations would not 
discourage a significant majority of farmers (60%) from planting the trees on their farms, 
because the practice constitutes part of their traditional farming system. Yet we argue that 
planting of indigenous fruit tree species could increase with simpler rules as 40% of the 
farmers would refuse to plant such trees if existing regulations are effectively enforced. The 
study therefore concludes that there is a need for new policies to attract more farmers to 
integrate indigenous fruit trees on their farms.  
 
Key words: policy instruments, NTFP, farmers’ perception, tree planting, indigenous fruit 
trees, Cameroon  
 
This chapter is compiled and based on:  
Foudjem-Tita D., D’Haese M., Degarnde A. ,Van Huylenbroeck G. ,Van Damme P., Tchoundjeu Z, Speelman 
S (2012).  Farmers’ perceptions and attitudes towards national legislations governing trees: effects on their on-
farm tree planting decisions. Paper presented at the IUFRO/FORNESSA Congress, Nairobi, Kenya. June 25
th
-29 
2012 (Oral presentation). Revised version re submitted to Food policy.  
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5.1 Introduction  
 
Indigenous fruits are important sources of nutrients for thousands of farmers and consumers 
living in rural and urban communities around the world. They provide micronutrients or 
constitute safety nets during periods of scarcity. Fruit trees diversify agricultural systems and 
provide income to rural communities, especially women (Schreckenberg et al. 2006a; 
Bharucha and Pretty 2010; Leakey 2012). Yet, only little attention has been paid to the 
domestication of a wide range of indigenous fruit species that provide food, nutrition, 
medicines and other (environmental) services to humans (Leakey 2012). In Cameroon, there 
is evidence that farmers are interested in the domestication and integration of indigenous fruit 
trees in existing farming systems (Leakey et al. 2004; Tchoundjeu et al. 2006). However, the 
institutional environment governing their exploitation and sale may not be conducive as the 
species are not recognised as conventional farm crops, at best they are considered as wild 
Non-Timber Forest Products (NTFP) (Schreckenberg et al. 2006b; Betti 2007b). In effect, the 
exploitation and sale of indigenous NTFP are governed by the 1994 Forestry Law which 
requires that commercial exploitation of NTFP is submitted to a permit system (see Chapter 
four). Meanwhile, the World Bank amongst others, defines agriculture to include agroforestry 
(i.e AFTP) and cites the integration of fruit tree crops into farming systems as one option to 
increase food production (World Bank 2007). 
 
While some variables affecting farmers’ tree planting decisions such as farm size, land tenure, 
access to labour, capital, education, etc. have been studied in detail (Adesina et al. 2000; 
Degrande 2001; Denning 2001; Nkamleu and Manyong 2005; Tchoundjeu et al. 2006), 
numerous aspects of the institutional environment have been overlooked in agroforestry 
research,  despite their increasing prominence in fields like forestry and agriculture (Kant and 
Lehrer 2005). The few studies (Belcher et al. 2002; Scherr et al. 2004) that address the 
institutional environment discuss how access to land and tenure security affect farmers’ 
decisions in general and to plant trees in particular. To the best of our knowledge there are no 
studies that look at the consequences of policy instruments such as legislation on farmers’ 
decisions to plant indigenous fruit trees. In cases where formal regulations and legislations 
governing trees were analysed (Laird et al. 2010b; Ndoye and Awono 2010) emphases are put 
on access and economic rights to Non-Timber Forest Products (NTFP). In the rare case where 
attempts are made to address how existing legislation affects farmers’ tree planting decision 
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such as in Foundjem-Tita et al. (2012b), the analyses are basically theoretical without any 
empirical evidence coming from farmers. Other authors, for example Schreckenberg et al. 
(2006a), without any data to substantiate their statement, report that farmers who plant or 
manage NTFP on-farm are often not aware of the policy and legislative environment 
governing access and trade. Therefore, it cannot be concluded whether these policies or 
legislation affect their decisions to plant indigenous species. In such a situation, it is difficult 
to analyse the relevance of policy instruments or to explain their effect on farmers’ 
livelihoods. Hence, rigorous analyses that can provide predictive understanding of farmers’ 
decisions if these policy instruments are effectively applied are required (Kant and Lehrer 
2005; Kaine et al. 2010).  
 
The rigour of a rule depends on how it is interpreted by individuals and society as a whole 
(Kant and Lehrer 2005). Also, as discussed in chapter two, in the process of institutional 
change, each individual calculates his/her expected benefit from any proposed changes in 
existing rules before deciding on whether to make a shift under the new rules or not (Greif 
and Kingston 2011). This means that the impact of policy and policy instruments governing 
access to and trade in trees and tree products on farmers’ tree planting behaviour depends on 
the individual’s perception of the institutions. When perceived as illegitimate, compliance 
will be low and efforts to enforce laws will be costly (Kuchta-Helbling 2000).  
This research seeks to: (i) provide evidence about the level of farmers’ awareness of existing 
legislation governing access and trade in selected indigenous fruit trees in Cameroon; and (ii) 
answer the question whether effectively enforced regulations would affect their hypothetical 
behaviour to plant indigenous trees on their farms. The study also assesses (iii) the 
determinants of farmers’ willingness to accept new policy instruments, such as a certificate of 
origin meant to distinguish AFTP from NTFP. 
The rather novel contribution of this study to the literature analysing farmers’ adoption of 
agroforestry technologies is that it focuses on policy instruments and more specifically on 
legislation governing trees and tree products which other studies have not included or that are 
often generalised under the canopy of the institutional environment. The importance of 
analysing such legislative instruments is that they may be (come) the focus of amendments in 
subsequent policy reforms. 
 The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. The next section describes the institutional 
environment governing on-farm trees in Cameroon based on the 1994 Forestry law. Then, the 
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conceptual framework that describes the assumed relationship between farmers’ attitudes and 
intentions to plant trees is described. The methodology for data collection and the type of data 
gathered are also described, after which results are presented and discussed. The chapter ends 
with a number of conclusions and policy implications. 
 
5.2 Research framework and hypotheses  
 
The research framework rests on the assumption that farmers’ attitudes i.e. positive or 
negative feeling towards existing regulations (Fishbein and Ajzen 1975) are only one of the 
factors that may affect their tree planting decisions, whereas in a particular situation other 
factors could be more influential. The study also relies on the assumed relationship between 
attitudes and actual behaviour, and agrees with some researchers (Fishbein and Ajzen 1975; 
Vanslembrouck et al. 2002; Cooper and Schindler 2006) that stated attitudes are a good 
approximation of actual behaviour. The study assumes that besides socio-economic and 
demographic factors that are often used to understand farmers’ decisions to adopt agroforestry 
technologies in developing countries, it is important to consider specific elements of the 
institutional environment, especially when they are properly enforced. It is thus supposed that 
farmers’ on-farm tree planting decisions will vary depending on the specific policy and 
existing policy instrument. A breakdown of how the institutional environment, specifically 
legislative instruments governing access and trade in trees and tree products, may affect 
farmers’ tree planting decisions leading to the hypotheses of the study is described in the next 
section.  
 
5.3 Policy instruments governing access and trade in tree and tree 
products 
 
A detailed description of the policy instruments governing trees was discussed in chapter four. 
One of the main conclusions of that chapter with regards to on-farm trees and tree products is 
that the 1994 Forestry Law and its 1995 Decree of Application governing trees in Cameroon 
fail to distinguish between indigenous species harvested from the wild and those that may be 
found on farms, as also reported by  FAO et al. (2010). Based on this institutional gap, 
indigenous AFTP from farmers’ fields are subjected to licenses and permits that are intended 
72 
 
to conserve and protect NTFP from the wild or from the forests. It is therefore argued that 
farmers’ rights to such indigenous trees and tree products that are found on their farms but 
may also occur in the wild are poorly defined.  
 
In reality, virtually all indigenous species of high commercial value are affected by either 
legally or illegally forestry controls irrespectively of their origin; on-farm or from the wild 
(Betti 2007b). The argument put forward by some forest officials is that even though some of 
the species are collected from farmers’ field, they are self-propagated and thus need to be 
conserved. Since it is difficult to distinguish AFTP from NTFP and in order to continuously 
conserve forestry resources, government may not change existing regulations governing 
access and trade in NTFP. This will continue to indirectly impact farmers’ rights to exploit 
and sell AFTP. We thus formulated the following hypotheses:  
 
H1. A majority of farmers would disagree that AFTP are subject to the same regulations as 
NTFP (i.e. requiring an exploitation permit and payment of a regeneration tax.  
H2.  A majority of farmers would refuse to plant indigenous AFTP if the latter are subjected 
to an exploitation permit.  
 
Conclusions from different studies (Djeukam 2006a; Betti 2007b; FAO et al. 2010; 
Foundjem-Tita et al. 2012b) suggest that the GOC should make it possible to distinguish or 
ease the process of tracing species that may be found in the wild and also on farmers’ fields. 
One possible method of distinction is for the Ministry of Agriculture to issue a certificate of 
origin to proof that a farmer planted a given indigenous tree or if it is self-propagated, that it 
is being actively managed by the farmer. From a preliminary discussion with farmers, some 
find it illegitimate and absurd to go through the process which they judge would be arduous 
and ridiculous because of corruption issues. This leads us to the third hypothesis:  
 
H3. A majority of farmers would reject the proposition of a certificate of origin to prove that 
they planted trees belonging to a given indigenous species 
 
It was assumed that farmers’ awareness and willingness to accept certificates of origin and 
their contingent decisions to plant indigenous trees subject to permits and payment of a 
regeneration tax would depend on the agro-ecological environment and on their socio-
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economic characteristics. The effect of the agro-ecological environment is discussed in the 
subsection that follows.  
 
5.3.1 Agro-ecological, demographic and socio-economic diversity of 
NTFP farmers  
 
As discussed in chapter three, in a heterogeneous society like Cameroon, people differ along 
agro-ecological, demographic and socio-economic characteristics. This means that people 
from different agro-ecological settings, with varying demographic and socio-economic 
characteristics are likely to have different attitudes and behaviours with respect to a number of 
issues including on-farm tree planting. This is because of the main assumption that people’s 
attitudes are embedded in their culture and/or the environment in which they live (see Chapter 
two). It is therefore necessary to assess how these variables may affect farmers’ intentions to 
plant indigenous trees subject to permits and certificates of origin. This variability is 
discussed below:  
 
b. Agro-ecological and cultural diversity 
 
The target population for this study were farmers involved in either on-farm cultivation or 
gathering from the wild or from their farms, indigenous fruits species that are a subject of 
debate as to whether they are forest or agricultural products (Belcher 2003). The case study 
species Ricinodendron heudelotti, Cola anomala and Irvingia gabonensis were described in 
chapter three. As a recall, for practical reasons, Gnetum spp collectors were not involved in 
the survey.   
 
A description of the administrative and agro-ecological setup of Cameroon was given in 
chapter three. Taking into consideration the distribution of the three species studied, villages 
from five regions grouped into two different agro-ecological zones were selected. The regions 
cover: the humid savannah (Northwest and Western regions) and humid forest (Southwest, 
South, Centre and East regions). For details on choice of regions and villages, see chapter 
three, sections 3.3 to 3.4. The decision to choose farmers from two agro-ecological zones was 
made in order to test the effect of ecological diversity on farmers’ perception of existing 
legislation and intentions to plant trees.  
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In the humid forests trees grow naturally and are more abundant compared to the humid 
savannah. Thus, farmers from forest zone may have more negative attitudes towards policy 
instruments that infringe on their property rights to on-farm tree products compared to those 
from the savannah who, because of fewer trees occurring in the wild, may bear the policies 
and still plant trees. This leads us to the next set of hypotheses. Compared to farmers from the 
savannah regions,   
 
H4a. Farmers from the forest regions are more likely to have an overall negative attitude 
towards permits.   
H4b. Farmers from the forest regions are more likely to have an overall negative attitude 
towards certificates of origin.  
H4c. Farmers from the forest regions are more likely to refuse to plant indigenous trees 
subject to permits.  
 
c. Socio-demographic characteristics  
 
Some studies have tried to relate the decision to plant trees to famers’ socio-demographic and 
socio-economic characteristics. Among the latter figure age, experience of a farmer in 
handling the selected species, respondent’s sex and level of education, total land owned, 
household size and distance to market (Gould et al. 1989; Adesina et al. 2000; Degrande et al. 
2006; McGinty et al. 2008). It is also argued that these characteristics may affect farmers’ 
perceptions of existing legislation governing trees, and consequently their hypothetical 
decisions to plant trees subject to these legislations.  
Age is often studied as a factor that significantly influences farmers’ decisions. The argument 
for age is related to the longer planning horizons of tree planting (Gould et al. 1989). As 
compared to elderly farmers, young and less-experienced farmers are more risk takers 
(McGinty et al. 2008) and would thus more easily accept to plant trees subject to existing 
legislation.  
 
H5.Younger farmers are more likely to accept policy instruments than older ones.  
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The importance of human capital for technology adoption has been highlighted by Schultz 
(1964). Quoting Blaug, (1974), Casey (2004) reports that farmers with higher human capital 
are generally more flexible and more motivated, and adapt more easily to new challenges than 
those with less human capital. Relating this to our, case it is postulated that farmers with 
higher human capital are more likely to understand and accept specific policy instruments and 
to plant indigenous trees compared to those with lower human capital.  
 
Several parameters were used in measuring the level of human capital. They include formal 
education, experience of a farmer in marketing the specific species and membership in NTFP 
or AFTP producer groups. Other factors not directly related to human capital but linked to 
experience include the number of the respective trees planted by the farmer, or the number 
inherited by the farmer. The argument put forward here is that farmers with previous 
experience in marketing the selected species, who already have the selected species on their 
farms (inherited or planted) and who belong to producer groups are more likely to accept 
policy instruments and to plant the selected species because they are already aware of the 
benefits of on-farm trees for their livelihoods.  
 
H6. Farmers with higher human capital and experience , characterised by: H6a: higher 
education, H6b: experience in handling the species, H6c: number of trees inherited, H6d: 
number of trees planted, H6e: membership in producer organisations are more likely to 
accept policy instruments governing trees 
 
It is often reported in literature that women compared to men have less secured land property 
rights and less access to other resources such as labour and information, and are thus less 
likely to accept to plant trees compared to men. Even though men are the nominal owners of 
most NTFP or AFTP, women are the main beneficiaries of their sale and often decide on how 
the income is used (Schreckenberg et al. 2006a). It is thus hypothesised that:  
 
H7. Formal legislations would have less negative effect on women’s decisions to plant the 
selected species than on men’s decisions.  
 
Literature on the impact of farm size on farmers’ decisions to engage in agri-environmental 
services is contradictory (Defrancesco et al. 2008). In some cases, large farm size is 
considered as a potential to encourage farmers to adopt agri-environmental measures. As they 
76 
 
have abundant land, they can give up some to plant trees without compromising food 
cropping. Yet, studies, from four communities in Cameroon show that density of on-farm fruit 
trees increases as farm size decreases (Schreckenberg et al. 2006a). Within the context of this 
study, it is hypothesised that:  
 
H8. The less land farmers have, the more they develop negative attitudes towards any 
regulation that may infringe on their rights to trees.  
 
5.4 Methodology  
5.4.1 Sample and sample size 
 
The target population for this study consists of farmers from the humid forest and the humid 
savannah of Cameroon. In order to involve farmers who have experience in dealing with our 
study’s species, study sites in each agro-ecological zone were chosen to represent areas where 
the target species are known to grow and where farmers are actively involved in their 
exploitation and commercialisation.  
 
Based on the World Agroforestry Centre’s experience and with the assistance of community-
based organisations working with farmers either on production and/or the commercialisation 
of each of the selected species, and of traders who buy from farmers in production villages, a 
number of major production zones (Divisions or Subdivisions) were selected (see chapter 
three). Degrande et al. (2006) report high levels of site-specificity of species distribution in 
Cameroon and further note that species with high commercial importance were best- 
represented in all the local farming systems. For these reasons, major supply villages were 
chosen for each of the selected species in each of the major production zones in each agro-
ecological region. For similar reasons, Brown and Lassoie (2010) selected different fruit 
species in each of the areas where they collected data to study the interaction between market 
forces and the management of NTFP in Cameroon.  
 
In each selected village, a list of farmers most involved in either production or collection of 
the targeted wild species was drawn based on local experts’ knowledge. From each list, the 
required number of farmers (see Table 3.1) based on targets fixed for the total study and per 
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village was randomly selected for an interview. The choice of respondents in any given 
household was either the husband or the wife depending on who was most actively involved 
in handling the respective species. In all, the procedure resulted in a sample of 394 farmers.  
 
5.4.2 Questionnaire design 
 
A questionnaire with close-ended questions was used to collect the required information. The 
questionnaire was structured as follows: a first series of questions measured farmers’ 
cognitive attitudes towards existing policies and legislation governing access and trade in 
NTFP. The questions sought to know whether farmers were aware of formal definitions 
dealing with the studied species as used in the 1994 Forestry Law, if they were aware of the 
legislation and regulations that govern access and trade in the species, and about their 
knowledge of the reasons why the Government of Cameroon imposes regulations on the 
selected species. The answers measuring their awareness took a dichotomous format (yes or 
no).  
 
The second series of questions consisted of three items. The first item wanted to know if 
farmers accept the present provision in the law whereby on-farm indigenous trees are 
classified as NTFP. This means that their commercial exploitation is subjected to obtaining 
trade permits (special or mutual) and to the payment of a regeneration tax as if the products 
were collected from the wild. The second item in this series wanted to know if farmers would 
be in favour of the introduction of certificates of origin. The purpose of the latter is to trace 
indigenous trees on-farm as agricultural products in order to avoid harassment from police 
and forestry officials who consider them as forestry products. To measure farmers’ attitudes 
towards these items, they either had to agree or disagree with each statement.  
 
The third item in the series examined the conditional behaviour of farmers to plant the 
selected species if these would be subjected to permits which automatically confer on them 
the obligation to pay a regeneration tax before exploitation. In this case, farmers were asked if 
they would continue to plant indigenous trees on their farm if government would effectively 
enforce the permit system. In order to avoid acquiescence bias (risk of saying yes without 
proper reflection) the statement used in this case was negatively keyed and farmers either had 
to agree or disagree with it.  
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Other sections of the questionnaire addressed socio-economic and demographic information 
related to respondents’ sex, age, experience in handling the respective species, experience 
with training in tree planting, education, total surface of land cultivated, the number of trees 
found on-farm before taking over the farm and total number of trees planted by respondents 
themselves. Data collected were entered and analysed in the Statistical Package for Social 
Sciences (SPSS .17). Descriptive statistics of all socio-economic and demographic variables 
are presented in table 5.1.  
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Table 5.1: Descriptive statistics of socio-demographic variables used in the empirical model (n = 394) 
 
Variable  Description  Percentage    
Farmer characteristics  
  Age_class Age  group of respondent  (years) 
  
 
1= < 35 21 
 
 
2= [35-55[ 48 
 
 
3= 55+ 31 
 Edu Educational level of the respondent  
  
 
0= None  21 
 
 
1= Primary  42 
 
 
2= secondary/University  37 
 Sex Sex of respondent  
 
 1= Male  51 
 
 
 0 = Female  49 
 Hhsizgrp Household size  (number) 
  
 
1= [1-5[ 33 
 
 
2= [5-10[ 40 
 
 
3= 10+ 27 
 
Expfarmer  
Number of years respondent has been exploiting the selected 
species 
  
 
1=[1-5] 22 
 
 
2=[5-19[ 42 
 
 
3=20+ 36 
 
Gp_membr 
Membership in a producer group specialised in the selected 
species  
  
 
1= Yes  16 
 
 
0= No  84 
 Tot_landsizeg Total land size owned by the respondent (ha)  
  
 
1=[0.5-3[ 34 
 
 
2=[3.5-5[ 30 
 
 
3=[5.5-8[ 17 
 
 
4=8+ 19 
 
Tot_specfoundg Total number of target  species inherited by respondent 
 
 
0=0 12 
 
 
1=[1-10[ 41 
 
 
2=[10-50[ 39 
 
 
3=50+ 8 
 
Tot_treeplantedg Total number of specimens planted by respondents  
  
 
0= 0 60 
 
 
1= [1-10[ 18 
 
 
2= [10-50[ 16 
 
 
3= 50+ 6 
 Community characteristics  
  Agrecologie Agro-ecological zone                                                                
 
 1= Savannah 50 
 
 
 2 = Forest  50 
 
TranMkt 
 
Transportation cost to closest market (proxy for distance and 
nature of roads)  
  
 
1= [1-500[ 20 
 
 
2= [500-999[ 45 
   3= 1000+ 35  
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5.5 Analytical framework  
 
Frequencies for categorical answers were computed and analysed. Logistic regression was 
used to test whether farmers’ willingness to accept policy instruments and their intentions to 
plant indigenous fruit trees contingent to permits were related to socio-economic, 
demographic and agro-ecological characteristics. 
 
5.5.1 Description of the logistic regression model 
 
Following the approach of logistic regression, each dependent variable (Table 5.2) used in the 
model was transformed into a dummy. For example, a farmer was assigned a code of 1 if he 
agreed with an item and given a value of 0 otherwise.  
 
Table 5.2: Dependent variables used in the logistic regression model 
 
Variables  Measure 
Willingness to accept policy instruments 
 
 
1= agree,  
0= disagree 
 
 
If farmer agrees that AFTP and NTFP should be governed by the same  
legislation (issuing of permits) 
If farmer agrees that he should be issued a certificate of origin to distinguish  
AFTP from NTFP 
Intentions to plant indigenous fruit trees contingent to permits 
If farmer agrees that he will no longer plant selected species if government  
introduces and enforces permits for commercial exploitation 
 
Logistic regression is a multivariate technique which allows estimating the probability of an 
event occurring or not occurring based on a binary, dependent variable like the ones shown in 
table 5.2 and a set of one or more categorical or continuous independent variables (Peng et al. 
2002) as those in table 5.1. This means, for example, that predicting whether or not a farmer 
with a given socio-demographic characteristic will accept a given policy instrument implies 
calculating the probability of the farmer accepting the policy instrument. When relating one 
independent variable x to a qualitative dependent variable y, the logistic regression model is 
written as shown in equation 5.1:  
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          x10             x10            (eqn 5.1) 
 
where 0 and  1  are coefficients estimated based on the data:        probability of the event 
y coded with 1 happening instead of the event coded as 0.  
In case of more than one independent variable, the logistic model is written as shown in 
equation 5.2: 
 
                        ;       (eqn 5.2) 
 
where    nn XXX   ........22110                   (eqn 5.3) 
 
i = coefficients estimated on the basis of the data, making use of the maximum likelihood 
method, and Xi = i
th
 independent variable.  
It is worth noting that the central mathematical concept behind a logistic regression is the 
logit, the natural logarithm of an odds ratio (Peng et al. 2002). This means that the logit is the 
natural logarithm (ln) of the odds of y. The odds of y is the likelihood of y occurring. In terms 
of probability, the odds is the ratio of the probability of y, i.e P(y) occurring versus the 
probability of y not occurring (1 – P(y)). The model thus predicts the occurrence of y subject 
to X.  
A simple logistic model can thus be written as shown in equation 5.4:  
 
                                             0  
 
       (eqn 5.4). 
Expanding the simple logistic model to one having relevant independent variables, as in our 
case brings us to equation 5.5 as shown below  
 
           nnxxxyp
yp  






....
)(1(
)(
ln 22110     (eqn 5.5).  
 
The null hypothesis of the model is that all s  are equal to zero. A rejection of the null 
hypothesis means that at least one   is different from zero. 
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Based on the number of dependent variables employed in this study, three logistic models 
were estimated subject to socio-economic and demographic characteristics of the respondents. 
Suitability of the models was determined using the model chi square, -2 log likelihood and 
percentage of correct prediction.  
 
5.6 Results and discussions  
5.6.1 Respondents awareness of existing legislation 
 
Survey results show that a significant majority of farmers dealing with the target indigenous 
fruit species (88%) do not know what the government refers to as “Non-wood Forest 
Products” (NWFP), which is the official term used in the 1994 Forestry Law. Another 96% 
does not know what is meant by the term special products (Table 5.3).  
 
When the terminology was explained to the farmers, they all acknowledged they had been 
exploiting the species for years but were not aware of the official terminology. When asked if 
they knew the official regulations dealing with exploitation and sale of the selected species, 
29% responded affirmatively. Amongst the latter 29%, 25% correctly stated that their rights 
to the trees and tree products are limited to usufruct rights, while 75% were confused about 
personal and commercial rights. Only 3% correctly said that they would need to obtain 
permits and pay forestry taxes if they were to go beyond their usufruct rights. Multiple 
responses were possible, so the above total sums up to more than 100 percent.  
 
At this point, the regulations were explained to those who were not aware of their existence 
and all respondents were further asked if they knew or could suggest why government 
restricts or regulates exploitation and sale of the species. Under scrutiny, some 87% percent 
claimed they were not aware of any such reasons. Narrative discussions revealed that they 
think government actions infringe on their legitimate rights to exploit and sell what they 
perceived is theirs. The 13% who said they knew why government is restricting exploitation 
gave several reasons to explain the latter state decisions. About 43% of them said that forestry 
officials had explained to them that the NTFP are animal feed and if they are not restricted, 
animals will suffer and die from starvation. Another 43% explained that government’s 
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decisions are meant to conserve the species, while 14% think it is a strategy installed by the 
state to make money.  
 
Table 5.3: Awareness of formal definitions  of NTFP  and special products as used 
in the 1994 Forestry Law (N= 394) 
 
 
    
Percentages  
  
Questions 
   
Yes 
 
 
   
Do you know what the government refers to as Non-Wood 
Forest Products in the 1994 Forestry Law? 
12 
    
Do you know what the government refers to as special 
products in the 1994 Forestry Law? 
4 
    
Do know why government regulates or would want to 
regulate exploitation of the studied species? 
13 
    
Do you know why government imposes regulations on the 
sale of the studied species? 
28 
    
 
In order to highlight the influence of socio-demographic characteristics on farmers’ level of 
awareness of existing legislation and policies, a chi square (X
2
) analysis was performed. 
Dependent variables were farmers’ awareness of NWFP and special forest products as defined 
in the 1994 Forestry Law. Age, level of education, gender, and agro-ecological zone were 
chosen as independent variables.  
 
Due to the low proportion (4%) of respondents who were aware of special products, it was not 
possible to statistically characterise them. Results show that the agro-ecological zone and 
level of education were significantly associated with farmers’ awareness of NWFP (both p-
values < 0.05). Crosstab analyses illustrate that 15% of farmers in the forest zone as against 
8% from savannah knew what NWFP are. Also, 7% of farmers with secondary or university 
education as against 3% with primary or no education claimed awareness of NWFP. Results 
therefore suggest that farmers who had received either secondary or university education or 
those who originated from the forest zones were more likely to be aware of forestry 
regulations compared to those with only primary or no education and who originate from the 
savannah, respectively. The higher level of awareness of forest zone respondents may be 
related to the intensity of conservation activities that are applied there as compared to what is 
done in the savannah. This makes it possible for the forests dwellers to come in contact with 
conservationists who may likely explain the content of the law to them.  
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5.6.2 Willingness to accept policy instruments and intentions to plant 
trees subject to permits  
 
It was hypothesised that since NTFP regulations in the 1994 Forestry Law infringe on 
farmers’ rights to indigenous fruit tree products on their farms (AFTP), they would prefer 
products from the two origins to be clearly distinguished by law. This means that they would 
reject permits and would refuse to plant indigenous species on their farms, if the law on 
permits were effectively enforced. They would also accept certificates of origin to distinguish 
on-farm trees from those harvested from the wild. Figure 5.1 shows farmers’ responses to the 
various statements assessing their willingness to accept these policy instruments. 
 
                     
                    
                   Figure 5.1 Farmers’ willingness to accept policy instruments regarding AFTP 
 
 
X
2
 analysis confirms hypotheses one and three, as a significant majority (P= 0.00) of 
respondents (76%) disagree that AFTP should be subjected to the same regulations as NTFP 
from the wild. A significant majority (61 %, P < 0.001) accepted the proposition of a 
certificate of origin, whereas the remaining 39% refused. The main argument put forward by 
those rejecting a certificate of origin is that they would not want to have anything to do with 
government procedures because the process, as with most government modus operandi, may 
be very complicated. A significant majority (59% P < 0.001) would continue to plant the 
selected species if they wanted to do so. This finding thus seems to reject hypothesis two. 
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However, a substantial proportion (41%) confirmed they would stop planting the selected 
indigenous trees if permits were enforced (Figure 5.1). 
 
5.6.3 Analyses of agro-ecological and socio-economic factors affecting 
willingness to accept policy instruments (regression models)  
 
The factor, agro-ecological zone had significant negative effects (P < 0.05) on farmers’ 
willingness to accept permits to sell AFTP and also on their willingness to accept certificates 
of origin (P < 0.05). Contrary to hypotheses 4a and 4b, farmers from the savannah were less 
likely to accept permits and certificates of origins compared to their counterparts from the 
forest zones. This may be because they might have planted the trees and would not want any 
procedures to interfere with their rights. With regards to the intention to plant trees subject to 
permits, no significant difference was observed between farmers from the savannah and those 
from the forest zone, thereby rejecting hypotheses 4c.  
 
Model 1 (Table 5.4) shows that education (P < 0.05) and household size (P < 0.10) had 
significant effects on farmers’ willingness to accept the requirement of permits to sell AFTP. 
The log odds of a respondent to accept a permit for AFTP was negatively related to his/her 
level of education and positively related to household size. In other words, respondents who 
had received either secondary or university education were less likely to accept permits than 
those who had not been to school (P < 0.05). This contradicts the hypothesis H6a which 
stipulated that higher-educated farmers would be more likely to accept AFTP permits 
compared to the less-educated ones. A possible explanation may be that educated farmers are 
better placed to understand the implications of transaction costs in obtaining permits and 
would thus refuse to accept them. Taking farmers with more than ten household members as a 
reference, results showed that the odds of a household with less than five members to accept 
permits were 2.5 times greater than for households with more than ten members. This may be 
related to the fact that, as family size increases, their dependence on the species increases, 
whereby they would want to avoid any interruption on their sources of livelihoods.  
 
The second model (Table 5.4) shows that farmers’ experience in handling the selected 
species, together with household size, all had significant positive effects on farmers’ 
willingness to accept certificates of origin. This supports hypothesis H6b.  As expected total 
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land size (H8) had negative significant effects. In terms of odds ratio, the results indicate that 
the odds to accept a certificate of origin are 2.16 times higher for a farmer with less than five 
years selling experience than for those with more than 20 years of experience. The same is 
true for households with less than five members compared with households of more than 10 
dependents. In other words, results suggest that smaller households and those with fewer 
years of experience with exploiting the species are more likely to accept certificates of origin 
compared to bigger households with many years of experience. This may be explained by the 
fact that farmers who are new in the business may be less worried by a certificate of origin 
compared to farmers who have been exploiting the species for more than 20 years without 
such complications.  
 
Model three (Table 5.4) was used to characterise those farmers who would refuse to plant 
trees if a permit system would effectively be enforced. Results show that the log odds were 
positively and significantly related to group membership, level of education, household size 
and distance to market and were negatively related to farmer experience (number of years 
farmers have been exploiting the species for commercial purposes). The odds of a farmer to 
claim that he will not plant the selected indigenous trees because of permits were 2.8 times 
higher for farmers belonging to NTFP/AFTP producer groups, as compared to non-members. 
It was 1.8 times higher for secondary or university graduates compared to those who had not 
been to school and 2.02 times higher for households with between five and ten members 
compared to those with more than ten members. Finally, it was 1.2 times higher for 
households that pay between 0-500 FCFA for transport to get to the closest market compared 
to those who pay more than 1000FCFA with price being a proxy for distance and nature of 
roads.  
 
The effect of higher, formal education on farmers’ tree planting intentions in the case of 
permit introduction is similar to the effect of membership in AFTP/NTFP groups. This may 
be explained by the argument that organisations in the field of agroforestry work closely with 
farmer groups. In this regard, such structures might have empowered group members on their 
legitimate rights to indigenous trees and forest resources, resulting in a higher reluctance to 
planting trees contingent to permits. Another explanation may be that members of producer 
groups are more aware of the value of indigenous tree products and are more dependent on 
tree products than non-members. This means that while group membership may positively 
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affect farmers’ decisions to plant indigenous trees in Cameroon (Nkamleu and Manyong 
2005), it would constrain such an intention if exploitation would be subjected to permits.  
 
Results of the likelihood that smaller households will refuse to plant indigenous trees subject 
to permits corroborate results from other studies such as those by Nkamleu and Manyong 
(2005) for Cameroon and Ayuka et al. (2011) for Kenya, showing that farmers’ tree planting 
decisions increase with family size. However, the latter two studies, households were not 
constrained by permits. Unlike reported by Nkamleu and Manyong (2005), households who 
live closest to urban markets were more likely not to plant the selected species compared to 
those farther away. Again, this may be related to the perception of constraints posed by 
permits. Villages close to urban areas may thus refuse to plant trees because of the weak 
competitiveness with other crops such as vegetables.  
 
Results also show that the longer farmers have been exploiting the species for commercial 
purposes, the less likely it is that they will refuse to plant the selected species in case of the 
introduction of permits. This can be explained by the fact that such farmers know the benefit 
they make from the species and would not want to give up these benefits. This result is 
consistent with that of Casey (2004) and suggests a positive attitude to permits by those who 
have been benefiting from the species. However, it may also suggest that the introduction of 
permits may be a major constraint for new farmers to enter into the business, as farmers who 
have no experience in exploiting the species were more likely not going to accept to plant 
trees if permits were introduced. Unlike hypothesised, gender was not found to have any 
significant effect on tree planting decisions. Finally, age was not found to have any significant 
effect in any of the three models.  
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Table 5.4: Coefficients per modality for each variable in logistic regression models 1-3 and 
suitability of model  
 
Variable  Category  
Model 1: Willingness 
to accept permit to sell 
AFTP 
Model 2: 
Willingness to 
accept certificates 
of origin 
 
Model 3: 
Respondent will not plant 
indigenous AFTP if 
government enforces 
permits 
 
Gp_membr Yes  -0.025 (0.479)  0.210(0.344) 1.047(0.375)** 
Expfarmer  
Ref cat 20+ 
1= [1-5] 0.113 (0.507)  0.772(0.366)** -0.345(0.358) 
  2= [5-19[ 0.234 (0.393)  0.476(0.274)* -0.588(0.274)** 
Age_class  
ref cat : 55+ 
1= < 35 -0.003 (0.531)  -0.111(0.397)  -0.287(0.397)  
  2= [35-55[ 0.155(0.421) 0.372(0.281)  0.067(0.284)  
Edu  
ref cat: no 
education  
1= Primary  -1.560 (0.802)  -0.325(0.426)  0.304(0.427)  
  2 = secondary/university  -0.754 (0.319) ** 0.099(0.254)  0.602(0.253) ** 
Sex Male  -0.267(0.423)  0.098(0.321)  -0.015(0.309)  
Hhsizegrp  
ref category 10+ 
1= [1-5[ 0.952(453) ** 0.801(0.310)** 0.417(0.305) 
  2= [5-10[ 0.446(450)  0.101(0.290)  0.703(0.296)** 
Tot_Landsizeg 
(ha)  
ref cat: 8+  
1=[0.5-3[ -0.071(0.498)  -1.012(0.390)** 0.433(0.375)  
  2=[3.5-5[ 0.301(0.451)  -0.965(0.373)** 0.122(0.362)  
  3=[5.5-8[ -0.388(0.537)  -0.276(0.432)  0.547(0.400)  
Tot_specfoundg 
ref cat = 0 
1= [1-10[ 1.486(1.253)  0.099(0.606)  -1.209(0.630)* 
  2= [10-50[ 1.206(1.253)  -0.334(0.544)  -0.542(0.572)  
  3= 50+ 1.450(1.176)  -0.346(0.520) -0.775(0.537)  
Tot_treeplantedg  
ref cat  = 0 
1= [1-10[ -0.833(0.939)  -0.857(0.623) 1.187(0.646)* 
  2= [10-50[ -0.950(0.984)  -0.672(0.638) 0.795(0.663) 
  3= 50+ -0.640(0.969)  -0.706(0.585) 0.992(0.614)** 
Agroecologie 
Ref cat: Forest 
zone  
Grass fields  -0.995(0.508) ** -1.264(0.361)*** 0.563(0.351)  
TranMkt 
ref  cat: 1000+ 
[0-500[ -0.443(0.448) 0.081(0.345)  0.913(0.343)** 
  [500-999[ -0.286(0.364)  0.301(0.273)  0.541(0.273)* 
Constant Constant -1.819(1.320)  1.609(0.701)** -3.067(0.758)*** 
  -2Log-Likelyhood 288.666 464.266 473.942 
  Chi-square 37.05** 63.88** 59.02*** 
  Sample size  394 394 394 
  % of correct prediction  86 68.5 70.00 
*** Significant at 1%, ** = significant at 5%, * significant at 10%, standard errors are in parenthesis, 
coefficients represent log-odds or logistic regression coefficients  
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5.7 Discussion and conclusions  
 
The purpose of this study was to examine farmers’ awareness and perception of existing 
legislation governing on-farm trees in Cameroon and to further investigate whether proper 
enforcement of the law would affect their decisions to plant indigenous fruit trees on their 
farms. Results confirm the findings of Schreckenberg et al. (2006a) that a majority of farmers 
are not aware of the legislation governing NTFP in Cameroon. They are also not aware of the 
rational of government’s impetus to impose restrictions on the exploitation and sale of the 
species.  
 
Results also demonstrate that the few respondents who claim awareness do not have a good 
understanding of the regulations as they are actually confused about their real meaning and 
intentions. Low levels of awareness of regulations at producers’ level could also indicate low 
level of enforcement of the regulations. This may be explained by the fact that permits are 
usually controlled along major highways. They are thus most felt by traders who transport 
produce from village markets to major urban and export markets. The danger of farmers’ 
ignorance about existing regulations is that they cannot respect what they do not know. This 
makes the legal and regulatory system to lose credibility (Kuchta-Helbling 2000). Weak 
enforcement of laws governing access and trade in NTFP that impact on AFTP is a clear 
reason to question the relevance of these regulations.  
 
Despite the low levels of awareness by Cameroonian NTFP/AFTP producers, our results 
show that forest dwellers were more informed about regulations than their savannah 
counterparts. This means that, although still much has to be done to develop informational 
instruments to make current and future laws governing trees known to local communities 
throughout Cameroon, efforts have to be multiplied in the savannah compared to forest zones. 
We base this conclusion on the fact that farmers in forests zones are more likely to be 
informed of regulations through other activities (conservation programs piloted by NGOs and 
the government) compared to their counterparts in savannah regions.  
 
Based on Fishbein and Ajzen (1975) there is a normal assumption that the more favourable a 
person’s attitude towards an object the more likely that person will behave positively towards 
that object and vice versa. The results of this study indicate that a significant majority of 
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farmers interviewed would not want AFTP to be subjected to the same regulations as NTFP 
which suggest negative attitudes towards NTFP regulations. Despite having negative attitudes 
towards these regulations, a significant majority declared that they will continue to plant the 
selected indigenous species even if the laws on permits were properly enforced. This is 
therefore in contradiction with the assumed strong relation between positive attitudes and 
positive behavioural intention as mentioned above. However the results are in line with other 
authors who hold that the situation in which one finds oneself would condition or constraint 
his behaviour (Diekmann and Preisendorfer 1998; Kaiser and Schultz 2009). In essence, a 
person’s attitude would condition his behaviour in a general manner if the situational costs 
involved are low and when such behaviours are easy to make (Diekmann and Preisendorfer 
1998). These results thus suggest that farmers will continue to plant the selected species 
despite adverse regulations because the species are important sources of livelihoods to them 
as has been reported by several authors (Russell and Franzel 2004; Schreckenberg et al. 
2006a; Tchoundjeu et al. 2006). That is, it may be more costly in terms of livelihood needs 
for a majority of the sampled farmers to stop planting the species than if they had tolerated the 
regulations governing them.  
 
Nevertheless, a good proportion (41%) declared they may stop planting the selected species if 
the laws on permits were properly enforced. This suggests that if permits were properly 
enforced, it would add to the bunch of physical, agro-ecological and socio-economic factors 
that may negatively affect farmers’ on-farm tree planting decisions. This may be a negative 
incentive to current efforts aimed at encouraging farmers to include indigenous fruit trees, 
especially in their cocoa and coffee fields, as food and income diversification options.  
 
The decision of farmers to accept permits and certificate of origin, and also the fact that they 
will not plant the selected species subject to obtaining permits, were found to be related to a 
number of socio-economic and demographic variables. However, the factors were not the 
same for different policy instruments, suggesting that these differences need to be taken into 
consideration in devising policies that may affect farmers with different socio-economic, 
ecological and demographic backgrounds. For example, even though it was found that 
farmers from the savannah compared to those from the forest zones were less likely to accept 
permits to sell AFTP or certificates of origin, no significant difference was observed between 
the intentions of respondents from the two zones to plant trees subject to permits. This means 
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that farmers, no matter their geographic origins, perceive property rights to planted trees in 
the same way whereby a common legislation would be binding for both regions.  
 
The results demonstrate that, if a majority of farmers were to be aware of the legislation and if 
the regulations were to be properly enforced, it would not affect their tree planting decision.  
However we argue that the number of farmers who will not plant trees subject to legislation is 
large enough to be neglected. This is especially relevant at this period in time when on-farm 
tree planting is being encouraged, particularly to address food and climate change issues.  
 
The main policy recommendation that can be derived from this study is that the Government 
of Cameroon together with development NGOs should develop informational instruments or 
other extension services to sensitise local communities of existing and new laws. Future laws 
should also carry agroforestry incentive-driven elements rather than being too prohibitive as is 
the current case with permits. 
  
The importance of this study for future research is that it clearly demonstrates how specific 
elements of existing regulations can have an effect on farmers’ decisions to plant indigenous 
fruit trees. Therefore, there is a need to integrate such elements in models studying farmers’ 
decisions to adopt agroforestry technologies with a focus on indigenous fruit trees rather than 
generalising them under the framework of an institutional environment. By doing so, specific 
policy instruments that hinder tree planting can be properly identified and addressed.  
 
One major limitation to this study is that it focused on indigenous fruit trees in farming 
systems. It would be interesting to know how farmers would react if the trees were timber 
species with no food and nutritional value. Furthermore, this study used the “stated preference 
approach” with one weakness being that intentions may sometimes not reflect actual 
behaviours. It is therefore recommended that in countries where specific policy and other 
regulatory instruments addressing trees on-farm have already been developed, empirical 
studies should be carried out to see how these instruments affect farmers’ actual tree planting 
decisions. This can be very useful in understanding how tree planting regulations and 
incentives can contribute to, for e.g. climate change solutions. We however acknowledge that 
regulations are just one of a number of factors that may affect farmers’ tree planting 
behaviour and should not be considered as a panacea to fully understand farmers’ on-farm 
tree planting decisions.  
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Chapter  
6 Farmer Perceptions and Preferences about Land and Tree 
Tenure Security in Southern Cameroon 
 
Abstract   
 
Tenure security is often cited as an important factor that conditions farmers’ decision to 
adopt/reject agroforestry technologies. Although some authors criticise the potential of land 
titles as an option to guarantee tenure security, others argue that evolving cultures and 
competition over land will create increased demand for land titles. Up till now, there is no 
information on whether farmers prefer either formal or customary institutions, as both 
compete to regulate access to, and ownership and security of, land and natural resources. This 
study attempts to provide such information by examining the case of farmers from two 
cultural backgrounds in Cameroon characterised by different levels of population density and 
intactness of indigenous local institutions. Results show that, even though existing traditional 
institutions provide enough security to encourage tree planting, a significant majority of 
respondents were in favour of land titles as a means to guarantee private ownership of land in 
the medium to long term.  
 
Key words: formal/informal institutions; land titles, tenure security, farmers’ preferences 
NTFP 
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6.1 Introduction  
 
There exists hardly any literature on the adoption of agroforestry technologies that will not 
examine access to land and tenure security as limiting factors (Adesina et al. 2000; Place and 
Swallow 2002; Pattanayak et al. 2003; Nkamleu and Manyong 2005; Place et al. 2012). To 
emphasise the point, a recently published agroforestry agenda by FAO (Buttoud 2013), based 
on lessons learned from mix workshops, structured interviews with experts and detailed 
national studies from developed and developing countries, identifies land security amongst 
four critical factors that need to be addressed in order to advance agroforestry. While the 
relationship between tenure security and investment in agriculture is an open debate in land 
tenure literature, this chapter addresses the problem of tenure security through the lens of 
institutional change.  According to Aldashev et al (2012) positive analysis of institutional 
change remains a fundamental gap in the research agenda of the New Institutional Economics. 
An essential aspect of the problem is the degree of interaction between formal and informal 
institutions in the management of land and natural resources in developing countries. 
 
 In essence, many studies in developing countries show that formal institutions, especially 
those governing land, fail to take root because informal institutions represented by traditional 
chiefs do not wish to enforce them or simply because local people belief that custom is a more 
natural way of regulating the society (Firmin-Sellers and Sellers 1999; Platteau 2009; 
Aldashev et al. 2012). Within this context, the World Bank (2007) acknowledges the 
complexity involved in designing appropriate institutions that take into consideration efficient 
land use and multiplicity of rights for land users. As noted in chapter two, following 
Williamson (2000a) and Ostrom (2005), formal institutions are easier to change. But, in an 
environment where informal institutions play an important role in determining economic 
behaviour and interactions amongst individuals, the welfare effects of changes in formal 
institutions depend on the effect of these reforms in formal rules and regulations on informal 
institutions (Greif and Kingston 2011; Aldashev et al. 2012). In other words, if formal laws 
run counter to people’s beliefs and customs they are unlikely to be followed.   
 
Land reform is a broad term that comprises both land redistribution and land tenure reform. 
Land redistribution is an effort by governments to modify the distribution of land ownership, 
whereas land tenure reforms are aimed at changing the legal and institutional framework for 
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land administration (Binswanger-Mkhize et al. 2009).  In sub-Saharan Africa, issues of land 
reforms principally centre on a redefinition of the provisions under which land is allocated 
and used. As a consequence, land redistribution only occurs in a few countries (Bruce 1986). 
In general, land tenure reforms are geared at increasing tenure security as shaped by the 
institutions governing land (World Bank 2007). The coexistence of formal (statutory laws) 
and informal (customary) institutions governing land in most African countries leaves doubts 
as what is the most acceptable institution for providing farmers’ security over the land they 
exploit.  
 
In this study, registering and issuing of land titles is considered as a formalisation of tenure 
security. There are arguments both for and against land reforms that aim at formalising tenure 
through land titles as an option to secure land. Bromley (2008a) describes formalisation of 
land as ‘the wrong prescription for the wrong malady’. West and Wiley (1992) report that 
‘while titling is important in many cases, it is not appropriate in many others’. The examples 
they give suggest that farmers may not need individual titles to secure their land. Buttoud 
(2013) recommends government intervention to secure land rights through ‘legal standards” 
but caution that formal land titles may not be appropriate.  Cotula (2004) noted that some 
actors may have preferences for one form of institution while others may prefer another set-
up. For example, urban dwellers may prefer formal land titles while rural people may feel that 
the traditional tribal system gives them enough land tenure security. It is clear that the role of 
formal institutions is being exaggerated by proponents of formalisation and underestimated by 
opponents. However, research has so far failed to assess from farmers’ perspective whether 
and which of the systems and in what form gives them more security over their land and the 
resources generated from it. Put in another way, the question exists as to whether farmers 
believe that the land they are using is really THEIR land and whether they wish they were 
more secure? Or, do they feel that it is now unclear to whom the land really “belongs” and 
different people wish for a title to “prove” that it is theirs?  
 
Cameroon, with an average annual population growth rate estimated at 2.08%, for 2012 ranks 
amongst the top 50 countries in the world with the highest annual population growth rates 
(CIA 2012). This may eventually lead to high pressure on land resources with a potential 
increase in land conflicts (ADB 2009). This may explain recent calls for major agrarian 
reforms in the country as announced by the head of state in his speech at the 2011 agro-
pastoral show in Ebolowa (President of the Republic of Cameroon 2011). Therefore, 
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assessing the issue of land security may be timely to address relevant land policy problems in 
Cameroon especially as little has changed in the land tenure rules since the laws of 1974.  
 
One of the areas where issues of tenure security are most complex is the forest environment. 
As illustrated in Chapter four, forest products may be both timber and NTFP but NTFP are 
also harvested from farms (AFTP). In addition, there is evidence that trees on farmers’ fields 
do not only stem from natural regeneration, but some farmers are actually planting them. So 
there is a grey line whether NTFP are really wild forest products or privately owned crops i.e 
AFTP (Belcher 2003; Leakey 2011; Foundjem-Tita et al. 2012b). In this regard, when issues 
of land are discussed, analysis is not only limited to the land itself but extends to the resources 
on it. For this purpose, NTFP and their direct relationship to agroforestry development are 
also studied in this chapter. 
 
 The purpose of this chapter is therefore to explore the concept of land tenure security as an 
incentive for agroforestry development. On the one hand, the study assesses how farmers 
from different cultural backgrounds perceive ownership of land within the context of a dual 
tenure-system of land governance in Cameroon. At this stage, it is important to recall the 
importance of the tribal environment (social embededness) in devising informal institutions 
regulating rural land and trees, as discussed in chapter two i.e. the conceptual framework as 
well as the research setting in Cameroon characterised by its different pre-colonial, colonial 
and cultural backgrounds (see chapter three). On the other hand, farmers’ preferences for 
either formal (state issue land title) or customary institutions as mechanisms to enhance their 
rights over land for which they claim ownership are elicited. In meeting these objectives, the 
study also attempts to explain whether farmers’ resistance to register their land despite 
opportunities provided by the law is a reflection of their preference for informal customary 
systems over formal land titles.  
 
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows: first, background information on formal and 
informal institutions governing land and trees (NTFP) in Cameroon is presented. This is 
followed by a presentation of the concept of ownership and possession of land leading to a 
discussion of arguments in favour of and against land title programs. It goes on to present 
arguments why customary systems have to evolve to land titling. The methodology and 
outline of the study area comes next, followed by a discussion of results and conclusions.  
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6.2 Institutions governing land and NTFP resources in Cameroon  
 
6.2.1 Institutions governing land  
 
Rights to land in Cameroon are defined in two possible ways i.e. traditional (customary) 
institutions and state law (Tchapmégni 2007). Prior to the colonial period, land in Cameroon 
was assigned and managed by community chiefs or land managers. It was also reassigned 
when new circumstances dictated. Chiefs were considered as ‘owners’, guardians or trustees 
of the land under their jurisdiction (Fisiy 1992; IFAD 2008; USAID 2010). Land was 
considered as an inalienable community asset that was handed down from one generation to 
another. It was difficult to talk of private ownership of land during this period, as individuals 
only had a right of enjoyment to satisfy their food and housing needs (ADB 2009).  
 
Individual ownership of land was introduced during the colonial period. As already described, 
Cameroon alternately went through German, French and English colonial regimes. Each of 
these colonial occupiers introduced a different land registration system in their occupied zone 
in order to serve their specific interests (ADB 2009). The Germans had primarily initiated 
registration in the so-called ‘Grundbuch’ as a principle to secure tenure. The French 
introduced the transcription system, together with the customary land rights recognition 
system and the land registration systems.  The British enacted the rights and native ordinance 
which constituted the right of occupancy and gave each and every Cameroonian the right to 
occupy and use land. Because of resistance from traditional forms of leadership in the British 
territory, all unoccupied land was later declared as customary land in which case traditional 
authorities became custodians of the land (Fisiy 1992; ADB 2009; USAID 2010).  
 
After unification of British and French Cameroon in 1972, the 1974 Land Ordinance was 
passed to harmonize the different land tenure systems in the country. The 1974 reform had the 
merit that it detribalised access to land and granted full ownership right of land to all 
Cameroonians (ADB 2009). Section 2 (1) of the 1974 Land Ordinance of Cameroon states 
that ‘the state shall be the custodian of all land’. This can be interpreted as an attempt to 
overthrow the chiefs as ‘custodians’ of the land under their control. In this context, Fissy 
(1992) asked how effective the state can be as custodian of all land.  
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Based on the 1974 Land Ordinance, private ownership of land is only granted if a person 
claiming rights to a piece of land has a title deed. It stipulates that all individuals who had 
peacefully occupied and productively used land prior to 1974 may register and receive legal 
title deeds for that land. The law further specifies that all unregistered land belongs to the 
state. By 2008, only about 125,000 land title certificates had been issued (USAID 2010). This 
represents barely 2% of all land in the country. With respect to rural land, only about 3% of it 
is registered and mostly in the names of large commercial plantations (ADB 2009; USAID 
2010). Therefore, based on the 1974 Land Ordinance, a majority of Cameroonians, especially 
those in rural areas, can be considered to be tenants or to be using national land because they 
do not have land titles. 
 
Despite the major amendments made through the 1974 Land Ordinance, customary systems 
of managing land still prevail in rural areas and registration of land is subject to customary 
recognition (Firmin-Sellers and Sellers 1999). This means that community members and 
chiefs have to testify that a given piece of land belongs to a given person before a land title is 
delivered. It is evident that besides the state that guarantees ownership through title deeds, 
there exist analogous customary systems that people consider legitimate.  
 
6.2.2 Institutions governing natural resources, specifically NTFP 
 
In contemporary Cameroon, resources on land, especially forestry resources are governed by 
provisions in the 1974 Land Ordinance as well as the 1994 Forestry Law. The latter considers 
the forests as state property while customary regimes regard the forest as a common or 
communal resource. The 1974 Land Ordinance grants users’ rights to local people on all 
national lands, but such rights can be withdrawn to serve the “public interest.” In this regard, 
Wily (2010) concludes that the state has failed to recognize the property rights of local 
communities over forest resources although they had been ascribed to them by the customary 
regime.  
 
Based on customary systems, NTFP are considered as common pool resources. Access is free 
for all members of the community, but may be restricted to non-members of the community 
(Brown and Lassoie 2010). Members of the community access the resource on a ‘first come, 
first serve basis’. However, with increasing commercialisation, most holders of customary 
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land titles being groups or individuals are also considered as owners of the NTFP resources 
located on the land and will thus try to limit access by others to the latter.  
 
A fair number of studies have addressed issues of land tenure and property rights of forests 
and forest resources in Cameroon (Ashley and Mbile 2005; Nguiffo et al. 2009; Oyono 2009; 
Oyono et al. 2012). Only a few (Nkamleu and Manyong 2005; Kaziangaa and Masters 2006; 
Van den Berg et al. 2007) have actually attempted to compare land tenure of forest with other 
land use systems, particularly farmland. The general perception that NTFP, especially 
indigenous species, are not planted but harvested from the wild, usually from distant fields 
with less- secured rights (Belcher and Schreckenberg 2007) may undermine the importance of 
agroforestry as a source of some species that originally existed only in the wild. It may also 
divert attention to solve property rights issues of AFTP. Additionally, such misconception 
may contribute to the development of negative policies or regulations governing AFTP.  
 
6.3 The debate about formalisation and customary tenure as 
measures of secure tenure  
 
6.3.1 The difference between possession and ownership of land 
 
According to Bromley (2008a), understanding the concept of formalisation requires that one 
first understands the difference between possession (use) and ownership of a resource. It is 
generally accepted that tenure security forms the basis of ownership. In this regard, one of the 
major criticisms of land policies in Cameroon (Wily 2010) and some other African countries 
(Burnod et al. 2012) is that occupied land without a title deed is possessed and not owned. For 
Cameroon such occupied land without a title deed is termed “national land” (ADB 2009). 
 
 According to Bromley (2008a), ownership is sanctioned by an authority or a larger 
community that recognises that an asset belongs to somebody, while possession is guaranteed 
by evidence of continuous use. The example he cites is that the mere fact that one uses a 
rented car everyday (possession) does not guarantee that s/he owns the car. He argues that 
there should be empirical evidence distinguishing the owner from a user; such evidence can 
be a title deed. However, Bromley (2008a) complicates his analysis with the conclusion that a 
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title is meaningless without the full backing of the authority that issues it. In other words, this 
means that the strength of a title to claim property/ownership is as strong as the legitimacy of 
the authority issuing the title.  
 
Proponents of titles, such as de Soto (2000), claim that the lack of a title reduces incentives to 
invest in land or land improvement. It is also assumed that formalisation of land ownership 
guarantees security over it and would transform rights of possession to rights of ownership. 
ODA (1996) asserts that in many situations, the most reliable way to secure all other rights 
over land is to secure the “rights of ownership”. Furthermore, proponents of titling of land 
claim that having a title facilitates access to loans (used as collateral), even though it may be 
useless in cases, where loans are not available or where land is not or cannot be used as 
collateral (West and Myers 1992).  
 
Opponents of formalisation, on the contrary, argue that titles weaken or block secondary, 
women’s or community rights (Place and Swallow 2002; World Bank 2007; IFAD 2008; 
Mwangi and Meinzen-Dick 2010). Bromley (2008a) adds that ‘formalisation erodes and 
displaces existing social networks and arrangements’. Additionally, empirical evidence on the 
relationship between formalisation of land tenure and increased investments is contradictory. 
Some literature shows that access and secured rights to land are presumed handicaps that limit 
investment on land, especially in developing countries (Besley 1995; Place and Swallow 
2002; World Bank 2007). Other studies, however, have failed to bring out this relationship 
(Migot-Adholla et al. 1991). In general, evidence on the relationship between tenure security 
and investment on land is not so robust (Bromley 2008a).  
 
Customary land tenure refers to the system through which most rural African traditional 
communities own, possess, access, regulate, use and transfer land rights. Unlike statutory 
laws, such rights originate from and are sustained by a community (Wily 2011). Advocates of 
customary tenure argue that it provides a solid foundation for development within a given 
economic, political and sociological context. Opponents of customary tenure systems hold 
that although these systems have stood the test of time across Africa, they have evolved to 
grant increasingly narrow and less specific rights to landholders. In other words, this means 
that customary systems should evolve towards a form of titling (Migot-Adholla et al. 1991).  
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The preceding section demonstrates that in Cameroon, just like in many other African 
countries, land tenure systems are influenced by customary, colonial and post-colonial rules. 
As a consequence, there also exists a dual system of formal and customary institutions 
governing access to and security of land and resources. At this stage, it is important to come 
back to the general introductory question and contextualise it for Cameroon. That is: how do 
Cameroonian farmers perceive and interpret ownership and security of land it is claimed they 
possess instead of own? Do they feel they own the land and do they feel they have security 
over the land they possess? If not, what are the sources or determinants of insecurity and does 
this insecurity limit them from making investments on the land? Under what circumstances 
would farmers prefer land titles to customary system as a means to guarantee their tenure 
security?  
 
6.3.2 Measuring tenure security 
 
The concept of tenure security is complex. It is defined and measured in different ways (Place 
and Swallow 2002; Arnot et al. 2011). It is even argued that it is the variation in measuring 
the concept that makes it difficult to find appropriate empirical evidence on the relationship 
between tenure security and investment in land (Arnot et al. 2011). Sjaastad and Bromley 
(2000) state that security of tenure is determined by the assurance of rights rather than its 
substance. The notion of assurance, as used and measured in most empirical studies, refers to 
the probability or perceived risk of eviction and cases of conflict with adjacent neighbours 
(Mendelsohn 1994; Kung and Liu 1997; Sjaastad and Bromley 2000). It is worth noting that 
even in developed countries, owners can be evicted. The essential difference is that they 
receive compensation. This may not be the case in African countries because they do not have 
formal/state land titles. Substance captures: the degree to which rights are transferable; legal 
land title; type of land tenure and/or the method of acquisition (Arnot et al. 2011). The latter 
authors also report that the fact that most researchers use both substance and assurance 
measures to address tenure security suggests a correlation between the two to exist. However, 
this assertion has not been tested empirically. In this study, both the aspects of tenure 
assurance and substance are assessed through a survey (see questions in section 6.5.2). 
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6.4 Factors that may influence farmers’ choices for formal or 
customary tenure security  
6.4.1 Increasing population and the evolutionary land rights theory 
 
Legal anthropologists and sociologists argue that the custom of a people is far from being 
static and continuously evolves under the pressure of a changing environment (Aldashev et al. 
2012). Based on this precept, this study adopts the evolutionary theory of land rights by 
Platteau (1996) to explain factors that may cause farmers’ preferences to shift from customary 
tenure to land titles. The analytical assumption of the latter theory is that the combined effect 
of population pressure and increased land scarcity will somehow push people to develop, 
adopt or freely choose new institutions to protect and also secure their rights to land. In other 
words, when land becomes scarce, landholders begin to feel uncertain about their customary 
rights and disputes of ownership of land, inheritance, and land boundaries increase. In such a 
situation, Platteau (1996) assumes that the population turns to claim private ownership of land 
and consequently will demand for formalisation. Under these circumstances it is assumed that 
farmers faced with a situation of high population density or who have had a conflict will abide 
to government policies of formalising land titles in order to reduce transaction and social costs 
(enmity between neighbours) involved in settling disputes in the absence of such a proof.  
 
The population of Cameroon has evolved from 10.5 million inhabitants in 1986 to 19.5 
million in 2010. Population density has increased from 22 to 41 inhabitants/ km
2 
over the 
same period. These absolute figures, however, mask substantial variability within the country. 
Regional population densities vary from 7 inhabitants /km
2
 in the East region to 125 in the 
West region of Cameroon. Since population densities of regions not necessarily reflect actual 
situations in the villages studied, the densities of the divisions (smaller administrative units) to 
which the villages belong were used in order to test the effect of population densities on 
respondents’ perception and preferences.  
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6.4.2 Cultural and political/historical diversity  
 
In the development literature, diversity is often measured with regard to language differences 
(ethnicity), as well as agro-ecological differences (Place and Swallow 2002; Alesina and La 
Ferrar 2004). Ethnicity is important to understand land tenure because informal rules 
governing land under customary regimes are seldom binding beyond a given ethnic group 
(Wily 2011). Thus, it is important to capture how cultural diversity affects farmers’ 
perception of land ownership and security. Cultural diversity in Cameroon can be traced as far 
back as to the country’s pre-colonial and colonial history.  
 
Platteau (2009) described the indirect rule system used by colonial masters to influence the 
social and political structures of African societies. The colonial masters manifested their 
influence by increasing the power of local-level authorities over communities at the expense 
of pre-existing centralised political institutions such as kingship. Enhancing the power of 
local-level authorities meant that they were charged with maintaining law and order on behalf 
of the colonial state to which they became directly accountable. In this respect, local-level 
authorities were expected to advance the economic agenda of the colonial leaders. In some 
cases therefore, these local authorities were appointed to replace the local chiefs when 
indigenous chiefs did not exist or were not sufficiently compliant. The latter is characteristics 
of the French forest regions in Cameroon.   
Cameroon has about 250 ethnic groups with an ethnic fractionalisation score of 0.89 which is 
higher than the sub-Saharan African average of 0.65 (Posner 2004). The higher this score, the 
lower the probability that two individuals drawn from the same population will speak and 
understand the same language. However, this great diversity of ethnic groups in Cameroon 
can be clustered into three main groups based on their history and form of leadership 
(Yahmed et al. 2006). These groups are: 
 
- people with a hierarchical system of governance which groups inhabitants from the North 
West, West, parts of Adamawa, North and Extreme North regions;  
- people with a decentralized system of governance consisting of people from the forest 
zones (South, Centre and Eastern regions); and  
- people with a mixed system of governance influenced by western cultures made up of 
people in the coastal zones (Littoral and South west regions).  
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We assume that belonging to one of these groups affects people’s attitudes towards land 
tenure. It has been documented that while many customary systems have been over time 
eroded by social, economic and political factors, others have been very dynamic and 
responsive to changes (Cotula et al. 2004; Platteau 2009) whereas others resisted cultural 
erosion. In Cameroon, only people with a traditional hierarchical system with strong 
leadership and characterised by descendants from savannah regions (West, Northwest and the 
three Northern regions) are recognised to have powerful leaders or chiefs whose source of 
legitimacy is vested in myth and ritual powers (Fisiy 1992; Aletum 2004). This is in 
contradiction with the mixed and decentralized systems of traditional authority which are 
described by anthropologists as ‘acephalous’ whereby the latter traditional chiefs were 
appointed by the colonial administrators.  
 
 Due to colonisation and administrative influence which has eroded the cultural values 
bestowed on traditional chiefs from the forest regions, they often have difficulties to impose 
their power as village leaders to manage their subjects, land and natural resources (Van den 
Berg et al. 2007). Opposed to this, traditional leaders with a hierarchical form of leadership 
have succeeded to maintain firm spiritual and moral authority over their people. This has 
created a symbiotic relationship between the leaders in the savannah and their subjects. 
However, with the existence of the State as an additional source of power and control over the 
traditional authorities in the savannah, their authority has also gradually been eroded (Fisiy 
1992). This is, however, less the case for the leaders in the savannah compared to forests 
leaders as the two sources of authority (customary and statutory) compete to regulate the 
society (Fisiy 1992; Aletum 2004).  
 
The above theoretical, historical and cultural arguments give rise to the following hypotheses:  
a. farmers from areas with high population density will have a higher preference for formal 
land titles over customary rights in comparison with farmers from low density areas;  
b. farmers who have had land conflicts will rather have land titles compared with those who 
have not had such experiences;  
c. farmers from the savannah with a traditional hierarchical system of governance will opt 
more for the customary system rather than for formal land titles compared with those from 
the forests zones where there is lower respect for the traditional system; and 
d. there exists a correlation between variables of tenure assurance and substance. 
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6.5 Data and description of questionnaire 
  
6.5.1 Choice of sites and respondents  
 
Data were collected from five administrative regions in Cameroon located in two major agro-
ecological zones and clustered around two major ethnic groups: the savannah comprised of 
the West and Northwest regions, and the humid forests made up of the Centre, South and East 
regions (Table 6.1). The savannah regions were chosen to represent respondents who have 
undergone less cultural erosion compared to the forest zones where respondents have been 
subjected to high cultural decay. Respondents were chosen from these two areas to test 
whether people from cultures that have undergone less cultural erosion will have preference 
for customary tenure as custodian of tenure security compared to those that have undergone 
high cultural erosion and who are hypothesised to prefer land titles to customary tenure. For 
details about the choice of regions and sampling technique, see chapter 3.  
 
Table 6.1: List of villages, population density, historical and cultural characteristics  
 
Region Division Divisional 
population 
density 
(inh/km
2
) 
Regional 
Population 
density 
(inh/km
2
) 
Agro-ecological 
zone 
Colonial 
history 
Form of 
leadership 
North West 
Bui 140  
 
100 
Humid Savannah 
English  
 
Hierarchical 
 
 
Momo 77 
 
West 
Nde 62 
 
125 
French 
 
 
Bayangam 
 
184 
Centre Lekie 95 50 
Humid Forests 
 
Decentralized 
 South Mvila 20 17 
East Yokadouma 4 7 
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6.5.2 Data collection tools 
 
A questionnaire was designed to capture various aspects of land ownership and tenure 
security. In order to assess farmers’ perceptions of land ownership, they were asked to 
indicate who among predefined choices (individuals, government and community or chiefs/ 
ancestors) they consider to be the owner of land in their community. Proof of individual 
ownership was measured by asking if a farmer or a given household has any evidence to show 
that a given piece of land belongs to an individual/household. This could be a sale certificate, 
land title or community recognition.  
 
It was also assessed whether farmers had exclusive rights over the land they possessed by 
asking respondents whether they could sell any part of their land without seeking approval 
from members of the family or community other than their immediate household. Following 
Migot-Adholla et al. (1991), the right to sell in this case was considered to represent a bundle 
of rights as it was assumed that if a household has the right to dispose of land it can also have 
the right to decide to rent or choose whatever crop to plant on it. Excludability on NTFP 
resource was assessed by asking respondents if they could harvest or gather NTFP for either 
personal or commercial consumption from a piece of land that they considered to belong to 
another household.  
 
In order to assess farmers’ attitude towards land titles (like or dislike), they were directly 
asked to indicate if they accept the current disposition where land ownership is guaranteed by 
a title. Tenure security was assessed by asking questions related to fear of eviction (Sjaastad 
and Bromley 2000; Arnot et al. 2011) by either the Government or traditional authorities. 
Farmers were also asked to indicate what their choice would be if they were given an 
opportunity to choose between either the customary or the formal system of securing land. In 
latter case, they were asked to justify the reasons for their choices. Incidences of conflict were 
also recorded as a measure of tenure insecurity.  
 
Data were entered and analyzed in SPSS version 17. Descriptive statistics were used to 
describe the various responses. Logistic regression was used to test the hypotheses. Because 
of multicolinearity, several variables were excluded from the logistic models.  
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6.6 Results and discussions  
6.6.1 Method of obtaining land 
 
Results show that 68% of households possess between two and three farm plots. The plots 
(940 in total) were principally crop fields (36%), cocoa/coffee fields (28%), home gardens 
(21%), fallows (11%) and eucalyptus/oil palm fields (5%). Transfer of land between family 
members was the principal mode of acquiring land, as 71% of the plots had been inherited, 
whereas only 13% had been newly created (persons who clear land and claim ownership 
through customary regimes). Land purchase (6% of plots) was uncommon in all investigated 
areas, as were gifts (7%) and land leasing (3%).  
 
There was a significant relationship between region of origin of the respondent and method of 
obtaining land [X
2
 (20, N= 940) = 501.18, p= 0.000]. More plots had been newly created in 
the East and South regions and to a lesser extent in the Centre than in the West and Northwest 
(Figure 6.1). The first two regions are those with the lowest population densities. So, the 
practice of opening new farms is an indication that one can still find unoccupied land in these 
areas. No plot was recently created in the two regions with the highest population densities. 
Purchasing land was relatively common in the Northwest and Centre regions compared to the 
others. These are also areas of high population density. Although the West region has the 
highest population density, only a few plots were bought here compared to villages in the 
Northwest and Centre. This may be related to the fact that the customs of the Bameliké 
(people from the western region of Cameroon) oblige family heads to preserve land for the 
family (Firmin-Sellers and Sellers 1999). Although this is common in Cameroon and Africa, 
it may be more strictly applied in the Bameliké territory, probably because of the great 
pressure on land following high population density which is estimated at 125 inh/ km
2
.  
 
107 
 
 
Figure 6.1: Method of acquiring land as a function of region of origin  
 
Regarding farmers’ rights to sell land, 81% of the plots could not be sold without receiving 
approval from members outside of the household. This suggests that even though households 
have use rights over land, the right to sell is a more regulated decision as relatives within the 
households immediately concerned by this decision have to be consulted. There was a 
significant positive relationship between the right to sell and the method of land acquisition 
[X
2 
(N= 932, 5) = 48.99, P= 0.000]. Plots that were initially bought were indeed more likely 
to be sold than those that had been inherited (Figure 6.2). The method of land acquisition can 
thus be considered as a proxy for transferability.  
 
 
Figure 6.2: Farmer decision to sell land as a function of method land was initially acquired  
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6.6.2 Perception and proof of ownership of land 
 
In this part, we assessed who, according to farmers, owns and assures the rights over their 
respective land. Results show that a majority of respondents (76%) did not consider 
themselves as owners (Figure 6.3). That is, 43% perceived land as the property of the 
community, ancestors or gods represented by the chiefs. Thirty-three percent thought that the 
government is the owner of all land while a significant minority (24%) believed that it is the 
private property of the individual exploiting the land.  
 
There was a significant relationship between respondents’ region of origin and their general 
perception of land ownership [X
2 
(8, N=394)
. 
= 60.37, P = 0.000]. A significant higher 
proportion of the farmers from the South and Centre regions compared to those of the other 
three regions believed land belongs to individuals. As expected, more farmers from the West 
and Northwest regions held that land belongs to either their ancestors, chiefs or the 
community (Figure 6.3). Unlike expected, a higher proportion of farmers from the East 
believed that the Government is the owner of all land.  
 
 
Figure 6.3: Farmers perception of who owns their land  
 
The high proportion of farmers ascribing land ownership to the State in the East region when 
compared to the other two forest regions may be related to the intensity of Government 
activities there. The East, is considered the richest in natural resources, but is paradoxically 
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generally known as the least-developed region in Cameroon. As such, local communities still 
live very close to forests and protected areas with frequent government activities monitoring 
access into the forests. Such government activities may have influenced their perception of 
ownership of land. As mentioned earlier, people from the savannah with a hierarchical system 
still have high attachments to and respect for traditional institutions. In this part of the 
country, all land is claimed to belong to the traditional rulers. In later sections, we will verify 
whether farmers who feel they own land also feel more secured over the land. 
 
The logistic regression results (Table 6.2, model 1) show that population density and the 
traditional form of leadership had significant positive effects on farmers’ perception of land 
ownership. Odd ratios show that farmers from the forests regions (Centre, South) with a 
traditionally decentralized system of government were 2.2 times more likely to accept that the 
land they are exploiting belongs to them, compared to those from the savannah with a 
traditional, hierarchical system. In the same line of thinking, farmers from densely populated 
areas were 1.10 times more likely to claim individual ownership compared to those from 
areas with low population density.  
 
Table 6.2: Results of  logistic regression analysis indicating beta coefficients and 
standard errors in parenthesis  
 
Variable  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
  
 
Belief of 
ownership = 
individual 
Positive attitude 
to land title  
Preference for 
customary 
system  
     
Land Conflict (1= Yes, 0= No)  1.55 (0.274)* 3.67 (0.437)*** -0.42 (0.254)* 
Political history (1= French, 0= English)  1.44 (0.427) 0.71 (0.411) -0.23 (0.345) 
Form of leadership (1= Decentralised, 0= 
Hierarchical)  
2.22 (0.401)**  1.36 (0.431) -1.01(0.339)*** 
Population density (Mean : 65, s.d = 58)  0.01(0.003)**  0.99 (0.004) 0.405(0.260) 
Constant    -2.47 (0.488)*** 1.79(0.148)*** -0.714(0.416)* 
-2Log-Likelihood    365.400 277.353 440.755 
Chi square 
 
13.63*** 19.599*** 17.105*** 
Sample size  
 
338 338 338 
% of correct prediction    75 84 60 
*** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * significant at 10%, N/B base category are in 
bold  
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6.6.3 Farmers’ attitudes towards and preferences for tenure security 
 
(i) Attitudes towards land titles and preferences between customary security and land titles  
Ninety-one percent of the plots had no land certificates, 7% had sale certificates
2
 and only 2% 
had land titles. As mentioned above, introducing land titles was part of the 1974 land 
ordinance, which gave all Cameroonians the opportunity to own land. In this section, we 
verify if and whether the low percentage of land titles means that farmers are not in favour of 
land titles and why. 
 
When asked whether or not they like the policy of promoting land titles to secure ownership 
of land, 84% percent answered yes and 16% no. A more interesting question is whether 
farmers would change their views if the option of land titles was presented as a hypothetical 
choice. In this regard, respondents were asked what would be their choice if they had to 
choose between statutory laws with emphasis on land titles and customary regimes 
characterised by community recognition and testimony of ownership, with amongst others the 
planting of trees on a given piece of land as a means to guarantee security. Although a 
significant majority (59%) went for the formal system [X
2
 (N= 338, 1) =10.1, P = 0.001] 
compared to 41% who chose the customary system, results indicate that 25% changed from 
land title to customary system when they were subjected to a choice scenario. A larger 
proportion of those who shifted to the customary system was farmers from the savannah 
region as shown by logistic regression analysis. The logistic regression results (Table 6.2 
model 3) show that compared to people from the savannah region, those from the forest zones 
were less likely to accept customary forms of tenure security.  
 
Logistic regression (Table 6.2 model 2) also shows that while all other explanatory variables 
(form of leadership, political history, customary tenure and population density) had no 
significant effect on farmers’ positive attitudes towards land title, the effect of previous 
experience with land conflict was positively significant. Odds ratios show that farmers who 
had gotten land conflict were 3.7 times more likely to prefer land titles compared to those 
with no such experience. Even though population density had no effect on farmers’ positive 
                                                 
2
 A Sale certificate is a written or typed document signed by law a recognised enforcement authority (usually 
police or the gendarmerie)  attesting that party x sold a piece of land to party  with ABC and C as witness. The 
document is signed and dated by all contracting parties and their witnesses.  It carries an official physical stamp 
but it is not a land certificate.  
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attitude towards land titles, the positive and significant effect of previous land conflict on 
farmers’ preferences for land titles thus seems to support the evolutionary land rights theory 
(Platteau 1996).  
 
Respondents gave a number of reasons to justify their choices. Fifty-six percent of them said 
they would prefer the formal system because they have lost confidence in the traditional 
system as nowadays it is easy to corrupt traditional rulers and community members to decide 
in favour or against a given person in case of competing claims over a piece of land. One 
farmer during the interview said that  
  ‘land titles are preferable because with development and quest for greener pastures, most 
youths migrate to cities and even abroad whereas the older generation that governs the 
systems is dying out. You can lease your land to somebody and s/he works there for ages 
and when your children return to claim their land, there will be nobody to testify that the 
land is yours’.  
One of the major reasons that proponents in literature of land titles put forward is that farmers 
can use land titles to borrow money (Knox et al. 2002). However, only 1% of respondents 
mentioned this as a reason. This is not necessarily a justification to those authors who think 
that land titles may not be useful in borrowing money especially in the absence of a formal 
credit market. Instead, it may mean that in the absence of land titles there are no credit 
markets so the importance of land titles as collateral is underestimated. Another 3% of 
respondents thought that land titles provide enough security in case one’s land is expropriated 
by the government because government will pay compensation following such a case. 
Twenty-four percent of the people interviewed preferred the customary system because it 
involves very few procedures. Like Bromley (2008a) suggested, some respondents (4%) opt 
for the traditional system arguing that it reinforces solidarity amongst community members. 
Twelve percent preferred the customary system for convenience as they say they are used to 
it.  
 
Farmers gave a number of reasons to justify why they do not have land certificates. These 
include lack of adequate information on the procedures (32%); long and complicated 
procedures (27%); a lot of corruption involved in the process (22%); and finally, distance to 
urban centres (19%). One farmer proposed that ‘if land titles could be simplified like national 
identity cards, everybody would have one for his land and the question of whether a given 
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land belongs to x or y becomes as easy as proving that a given person on the street is a 
Cameroonian or a foreigner’.  
 
ii) Assessment of tenure security based on risk of eviction  
Sjaastad & Bromley (2000) emphasized that for tenure security to survive as a coherent 
concept, the element of assurance measured by lack of fear of eviction should be given more 
consideration compared to aspects of substance which take into consideration ‘breadths of 
rights’. Tenure security measured through assurance is relevant because it is the fear of 
eviction that may stop a farmer from investing on a given piece of land for which he claims 
ownership (Sjaastad and Bromley 2000; Knox et al. 2002; World Bank 2007). In this regard, 
farmers’ perceived risk of eviction by either statutory authorities (the Government) or 
traditional authorities including members of the community (using customary laws) was 
assessed. It was found that only for 4% of all their plots farmers were afraid they could be 
evicted by members of the community or traditional authorities. On the other hand, on 46% of 
their plots farmers were afraid of government eviction.  
 
Regression analysis was used to characterize those farmers who were afraid of eviction by 
government (Table 6.3). Results show that farmers who claimed individual ownership and 
those who asserted their land belongs to traditional chiefs or to the community were less 
afraid of government eviction, compared to those who think it is government land. This is 
simply because they have trust in their traditional institutions which state that all land belongs 
to the community headed by the chief. This symbolic perception of ownership of land simply 
portrays the community and the chiefs as protectors of individual rights and does not 
necessarily mean that all land is communal land or that the chief has rights to all land in the 
community (Fisiy 1992). Although not significant, regression results also illustrate that 
respondents with either land titles or sales certificates (signed by the police) were less likely 
to be afraid of government eviction. This is probably because, as argued by Bromley (2008a), 
they have some form of empirical evidence which they can use to claim ownership that is 
recognized by the government.  
 
The logistic regression in table 6.3 also tests the proposition put forward by Arnot et al. 
(2011) that the fact that scientists use both content and assurance measures to assess tenure 
security means that both constructs may be correlated. We found no such relationship 
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between the assurance measure (fear of eviction), and content measures (i.e. the right to sell 
land and proof of ownership).  
 
Table 6.3: Logistic regression  model of factors affecting fear of eviction by government  
 
Variable  
 
Exp(B) S.E 
  
   
Land Conflict (1= No, 0= Yes) 1.010 0.007 
Right to sell (1= No, 0= Yes) 0.852 0.759 
Proof of ownership of land (1= community, 0= land titles )  0.790 0.802 
Belief about ownership  
(1= individual, 0= Government and community ) 
0.240*** 0.189 
(1= community , 0= Government and individual) 0.360*** 0.168 
Form of leadership (1= Decentralised, 0 = hierarchical) 1.120 0.002 
Population density (mean = 65, s.d 58)  0.998 
 
Constant  
 
-2.476 (0.488)*** 
 
-2Log-Likelihood  
 
1196 
 
 Chi square 
 
80.410*** 
 
Sample size  
 
935 
 
% of correct prediction  
 
65% 
 
*** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * significant at 10%, N/B base categories in bold  
 
 
6.7 Main source of exploitation of and specificity of rights to NTFP 
resources 
6.7.1 Main sources of NTFP 
 
The results of this study confirm those obtained by Clark and Sunderland (2004) and Van den 
Berg et al. (2007) that NTFP are harvested from various sources among which natural and 
secondary forests, crop fields, cocoa and coffee fields. One major criterion used by Belcher 
and Schreckenberg (2007) to differentiate NTFP from other agricultural produce is the 
magnitude of wild harvesting usually from distant fields with less-secured rights to the 
forests. Results obtained seem to contradict the wild origin at least for the studied NTFP, as 
33%, 25% and 15% of respondents declared that their major sources were from cocoa/coffee 
fields, crop fields and home gardens respectively (Figure 6.4). Only 11% harvest/collect from 
what may be termed wild sources (forests/community forests).  
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Fig 6.4: Most important sources of NTFP listed by farmers  
 
Although most of the trees generating NTFP on land for which farmers claimed personal 
ownership may come from natural regeneration, results show that some farmers had 
effectively planted trees, confirming other studies that farmers are actually involved in 
domestication of NTFP (Leakey et al. 2004). Out of the 394 farmers we studied, 40% had 
planted at least one of the studied species since they took over the land from their parents 
(Table 6.4) whereas 88% had inherited at least one tree. No historical data existed to show if 
the inherited trees had been planted or nurtured from wildings. However, these data 
demonstrate that farmers are actually planting trees. 
 
Table 6. 4: Cross table analysis of total number of trees from studied species inherited 
as a function of total planted  
 
  Number of trees planted  
Number of trees  0 [1-10[ [10-50[ 50+   
inherited  Number of farmers  Total  
0 28 7 8 3 46 
[1-10[ 107 41 12 1 161 
[10-50[ 98 21 30 6 155 
50+ 4 2 11 15 32 
Total  237 71 61 25 394 
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6.7.2 Rights to NTFP on farmers’ land  
 
Most households have exclusive rights over the NTFP that are found on all the land for which 
they claim to have private ownership. Only 13% and 14% respectively, agreed that they can 
harvest or collect the selected species from another person’s farm for either home 
consumption or for commercial purpose without prior authorization. We argue that high 
prevalence of exclusive rights is, an incentive to the process of domestication or tree planting. 
This is true because with such rights farmer investments in NTFP are secured. In effect, other 
studies have reported that NTFP, especially gathered from indigenous species on individual 
farmland, can be accessed by all in the community. This is because such trees were originally 
perceived to grow naturally or to be a gift from God (Brown and Lassoie 2010). They could 
thus be considered a common property. Discussions during interviews show that restricted 
access is limited only to those NTFP that are highly commercialized. For example, one farmer 
explained that he allows people to collect the fruits of Pentaclethra macrophylla (common 
name: ebae) from his farm. He does so because he does not know to whom and where to sell 
them himself. He said that once he identifies a market, he would put an embargo on the 
species. This confirms the proposition of Sjaastad & Bromley (2000) that rights within 
individual plots are specified based on the perceived socio-economic importance of the 
specific resource. This means that by increasing precision and details of specific rights on a 
given plot or resource they are eventually removed from the public domain.  
 
6.7.3 Relationship between the decision to plant trees and assurance 
and breadth of rights over the land 
 
The relationship between the number of trees planted and tenure security could be tested 
using an econometric model. However, in this study this relationship was assessed by directly 
asking farmers if fear of eviction stops them from planting trees. Only 3% said yes. This oral 
method was chosen because; the numbers of trees planted recorded here, were only for the 
studied species and not for the total number of trees planted. Similarly, when asked whether 
lack of land was an issue that stops them from planting trees, 29% of farmers interviewed said 
yes, while 71% said no. These results suggests that as far as land is concerned, and while 
tenure security may be an issue, a more important problem to solve in the medium to near 
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future may be access to land. This is exacerbated by the fact that land markets are almost non-
existent in most of the studied villages as exemplified by the way farmers acquired land.  
 
6.8 Conclusions 
 
This study assessed farmers’ perception of the concept of land ownership and tenure security 
as determinants of agroforestry development. We found that farmers in Southern Cameroon 
most often acquire land through family inheritance as very little land is bought. In most 
studied villages, land markets are almost absent. When they are present, they are constrained 
by customary institutions rather than formal policies and regulations because by custom 
families have to reserve land for their progenies. While customary institutions may not be 
major barriers to tree planting, they may not lead to efficient allocation of land meaning that, 
for example, it may be difficult, though not impossible, for someone who has the means to 
invest in agriculture to acquire land in some areas. 
 
Farmers generally demonstrated positive attitudes towards land titles as a proof of ownership 
of land. Their responses as to why they have not obtained titles to secure their land as has 
been stipulated by the 1974 Land Ordinance indicate that lengthy procedures, ignorance and 
other transaction cost-related factors are the major impediments rather than resistance to the 
law. These stumbling blocks are not specific to Cameroon but are common in sub-Saharan 
Africa. This means that the debate should not focus on the acceptability of land titles because 
farmers do have positive attitudes towards them, but rather on how African governments can 
reduce transaction costs involved in the process of obtaining land titles. Arguments put 
forward by some farmers in favour of land titles also imply that they are losing confidence in 
their traditional institutions as arbitrators of land conflict because it is rather common 
nowadays to encounter corrupt traditional authorities.  
 
We found that farmers’ positive attitudes towards land titles weakened when respondents 
were asked to choose between customary systems and land titles. Although a significant 
majority still opted for land titles, the significant drop in favour of customary systems 
indicates that some farmers still have trust in traditional institutions. Most of the farmers who 
preferred the customary system were from the savannah and thus support our hypothesis that 
farmers from areas that have gone through minimal cultural decay will prefer customary to 
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formal systems. Results also support another hypothesis i.e. that farmers who have a history 
of cases of land conflict were more likely to prefer land titles compared to the traditional 
system. Although population density did not have any significant direct effect on farmers’ 
preferences for formal or customary systems as hypothesised, this study supports the 
evolutionary land rights theory in the sense that as time moves on and as customs get eroded 
by politics and modernity, more farmers will prefer tangible proofs of ownership.  
 
A majority of the sampled farmers harvest the studied species from individual plots for which 
they claim private ownership whereas provenances from open access were low. Access rights 
to the studied species and other NTFP of high commercial value found on individual plots are 
restricted by customary tenure governing private ownership. This may be an incentive to tree 
planting on individual plots because then farmers’ rights to the planted tree are secured. 
However, NTFP of low commercial value may be open access even on individual plots.  
 
The general conclusion of this chapter is that while tenure security may be an important issue 
to address tree planting, land availability may be more important in determining farmers’ 
decisions to plant trees ceteris paribus. This is because the existing customary system does 
give them enough security to plant trees. However, as customary systems become diluted in 
modern times, coupled with increasing pressure on land, customary tenure needs to be 
protected by formal systems specifically land title. Therefore, further research on tenure 
security should focus more on measures to reduce transaction costs related to obtaining 
individual land titles. This study does not, however, put the legitimacy of customary systems 
to question but argues that simplified formalisation procedures would contribute protecting 
customary rights or in granting more secured ownership of land to farmers so that the 
argument whether they own or possess land may no longer have sense. Farmers’ positive 
attitudes towards land titles is an indication that in the long run, formal institutions governing 
land are going to correct inefficiencies in customary systems.  
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Chapter 
7 A Tale of Transaction Costs and Forest Law Compliance: 
Trade Permits for Non-Timber Forests Products in 
Cameroon 
 
Abstract 
There are growing concerns about illegal activities in the forestry sector and some work is in 
progress to understand the causes and consequences of non compliance to forestry laws. 
However, most research on illegal forests activities is about illegal timber harvesting with 
little efforts on other activities like Non Timber Forests Products (NTFP). In Cameroon, 
commercial exploitation of most NTFP is regulated by a permit system. However a majority 
of traders who sell these products do not have the necessary permits. The objective of this 
paper is to assess and use Transactions Costs economics (TCs) to explain why traders in 
Cameroon do not comply with regulations on permits. Results show that the process to obtain 
permits may require more than 26000 USD and the applicant may monitor application files 
for more than 4 years with NGO support in order to be successful. Analyses of traders’ 
perceptions illustrate that, the major sources of high TCs in the forests sector are perceived 
complex administrative procedures and information asymmetry on procedures and 
requirements to obtain permits. The study concludes that it is the impracticality to abide to 
high TCs rather than the inclination to disobey the law that pushes traders to operate without 
permits.  
 
Keywords:  Forest law, Trade Permits, Illegal forest activities, NTFP Traders, Transactions 
costs, Cameroon  
 
This chapter is based on: 
 
Divine Foundjem-Tita .; Stijn Speelman ; Marijke D’Haese ; Ann Degrande A.; Guido Van Huylenbroeck; 
Patrick Van Damme P.; Zac Tchoundjeu. A tale of transaction costs and forest law compliance: trade permits for 
Non-Timber Forests products In Cameroon. Revision re-submitted to Forest Policy and Economics (in review).  
 
119 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
There are growing concerns about illegal activities in the forestry sector and some work is in 
progress to understand the causes and consequences of non compliance to forest laws. 
However most research on illegal forests activities are about illegal timber harvesting (Cerutti 
and Tacconi 2006; Assembe Mvondo 2009) with little attention for such alternatives like Non 
Timber Forests Products (NTFP). As an illustration, the latter group of products have been 
completely neglected in the Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT) 
process. This can be considered as an oversight taking into consideration the economic 
importance of NTFP in local, regional and international trade (Tieguhong et al. 2010).  
 
Illegal forest activities are defined to include a wide range of activities among which the 
occupation of forest land, illegal harvesting, transportation and trading of forest products 
(Contreras-Hermosilla 2002; Tacconi et al. 2003; Brown et al. 2008). Complying with laws 
and regulations governing these activities is therefore crucial in achieving good governance in 
the forestry sector. The concept of compliance is defined as all behaviours by actors to respect 
prescribed rules governing specific activities (Young 1979). While the extent and impacts of 
non compliance have been well covered in the literature, factors and motivations that affect 
individual actors to comply with forest laws are generally not well known (Hansen 2011; 
Ramcilovic-Suominen and Epstein 2012). In the World Forestry Congress (WFC) in 2009, 
good governance and effective institutions at all levels of the forestry sector were particularly 
recommended as important drivers  to be considered in order to achieve sustainable forests 
management (Serrano 2010). It is thus regrettable that NTFP are often neglected when illegal 
forestry activities are discussed. The objective of this chapter is to contribute in filling this 
gap in the literature by using the failing permit system for NTFP traders in Cameroon as a 
case study.  
 
As discussed in chapter two, the NTFP sector in Cameroon consists of numerous actors, the 
most prominent among which are producers or collectors, traders and the Government of 
Cameroon (GOC). One of the problems producers or collectors and traders face is the 
necessity to have formal recognition to legally trade in NTFP. This requirement is defined in 
the 1994 Forestry Law (Government of Cameroon 1994). The 1994 Forestry Law was 
conceived as an instrument to guide sustainable forest management in Cameroon but has 
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received criticisms for various reasons (see Chapter four). One concern is that it limits 
farmers’ rights to most NTFP to mere usufruct rights (exploitation for personal use only) as it 
subjects commercial exploitation (especially by traders) to permits (Ngwasiri et al. 2002; 
FAO et al. 2010; Laird et al. 2010b).  
 
Permits are either related to “special forestry products” or to other high value NTFP not 
included in the lists of “special forest products”. The Government of Cameroon (GOC) does 
not define special forests products per se but lists in section 9 (2) of the 1994 Forestry Law a 
number of products which are considered “special forest products”. These include ivory, 
ebony, and wild and medicinal plant species. It is specified that they constitute products of 
special interest to the state. The law further states that the list of forest products shall be fixed 
by the competent Ministry ‘as at when necessary’.  
 
NTFP marketed in Cameroon are gathered from the wild or from existing farming systems. 
The 1994 Forestry Law governing the permit system does not distinguish between these 
origins (Betti 2007b; Foundjem-Tita et al. 2012b) and controversies exists in the scientific 
literature whether a NTFP is a NTFP when it is harvested from farmers’ fields (Belcher 
2003); and whether NTFP harvested from farmers’ fields need to be subjected to the same 
permit systems as products gathered from the wild. The end result is also that the list of 
products regulated by the permit system is not known. The common practice is that most 
indigenous tree species and wild leafy vegetables are subjected to the forestry regulation 
irrespective of their source (Betti 2007b; Awono et al. 2012; Foundjem-Tita et al. 2012b). 
 
Based on the proposition of Coase (1960) that a legal system may affect TCs, some scholars 
argue that the costs to obtain permits together with other policy instruments such as licenses 
to start a business form entry or trade barriers, because they are expensive for poorer agents 
and they have a restrictive effect on trade (Bourke 1988; Shleifer and Vishny 1993; Scherr et 
al. 2004). The costs of obtaining formal recognition or the so-called entry costs into the NTFP 
business which are considered in this study are different from the traditional barriers of entry 
which are often referred to in economics such as monopoly and high capital requirements 
(Mujawamariya 2012). Here, the focus is on compliance with Government-imposed 
procedures.  
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The procedures to obtain an official status in Cameroon to trade in NTFP is described as long 
and complicated. It is depicted to take many years and may require extensive lobbying or 
networking (Laird et al. 2010b) for one to be successful. The sequence of documents required 
are the following: an approval, an exploitation permit (special or mutual), payment of a 
forestry tax and a way bill. Although the formalisation process requires a sequence of 
documents, the entire process is colloquially referred to as “permits”. The term “permits” will 
therefore be used throughout this chapter to refer to the above four documents. Where 
reference is made to a particular document, it will be specified. The series of documents 
required to obtain legal status to trade in NTFP have been specifically described by Betti 
(2007b), Djeukam (2007) and Ngwasiri et al (2002) and will only be sparingly depicted here.  
 
An approval according to section 41 of the 1994 Forestry Law gives the holder the right to 
exploit any forestry resource. As specified in the latter law, an approval gives the holder 
access to the forest profession. It is only after obtaining such an approval that the holder can 
request for an exploitation permit. The latter could be a special permit for “special forest 
products” or permit based on mutual agreement for other forests products not classified as 
special. The difference between special permits and permits based on mutual agreement is 
that the former is issued by an inter-ministerial committee while the latter is issued by the 
ministry in charge of forests. A way bill is intended to monitor and trace the quantity of a 
product carried at any specific time by a trader authorised to sell a NTFP.  
 
Different schools exist for explaining compliance with the law. These may focus on 
economics (Becker 1968), social factors (Cialdini and Trost 1998) and/or institutions (de Soto 
1989; Ostrom 1990). There are continuous calls that concepts and models of the NIE schools 
need to be broadened to address public policies (McCann et al. 2005). As discussed in chapter 
two, the NIE with a focus on TCs has been adopted as the broader theoretical lens to analyse 
the reasons why traders do not comply with the law governing trade in NTFP in Cameroon. 
 
TC theory as a branch of the NIE has been used to analyse entry costs or start-up costs of a 
business in other developed and developing countries.  One of the most cited is the work of de 
Soto (1989) who measured the cost of doing formal business in Peru.  He studied the costs of 
meeting formal procedures and starting a new business as opposed to costs of doing business 
informally. Zylbersztajn et al. (2007) while studying the start-up costs of doing business by 
small Brazilian firms challenged the methodology used by the World Bank in its studies on 
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doing business around the world (World Bank 2006). Instead, they adopted the method 
developed by the Ronald Coase Institute that uses real instead of hypothetical costs. The 
method makes provision to gather information from those who have succeeded in registering 
and also includes the perceived costs of registering by those who have been dissuaded from 
actually registering as a cause of these costs.  
 
Even though the World Bank reports on the climate of starting a business and addresses these 
cumbersome procedures in many countries, Arrow, (1969) argues that it is important to 
quantify the specific TCs in different contexts and under different systems of resource 
allocation. In other words, it is important to identify and analyse TCs in different types of 
business sectors. By so doing, it is possible to improve efficiency in each particular sector. 
This means that it is important to analyse TCs in the NTFP sector in order to bring out 
specificities that are needed to design policies or improve efficiency in the value chain in 
particular and in the forest sector in general. The issue here is that if obtaining permits 
requires years and has high costs, then this must have an impact on compliance level and 
consequently on the performance of actors in the value chain as they have to sacrifice time 
and money. The concern here is not that such costs exist but rather that if they are too high 
compared to the capital of NTFP traders, it would deter them from complying with the law 
(Richards et al. 2003; Wells et al. 2007; Blaser 2010).  
 
If actors in the field and particularly policy makers are aware of these costs, their sources and 
the effect on the overall economy and the natural resource base, then they can develop 
measures to consolidate them if they are low, or else design new options to mitigate their 
negative effects if they are high.  
 
The specific questions that will be answered in this chapter are: why do traders prefer illegally 
rented permits instead of applying for own permits? Is their decision to operate illegally 
related to perceived high transaction costs governing the demand and supply of permits? If 
yes what are the sources of these high transaction costs? In addition, the study intends to 
answer whether the current institutional arrangements in the issuing of permits generate 
incidences of corruption or rent seeking? Are there winners and losers in the current 
configuration? If yes who are they?  
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The rest of the chapter is organised as follows: first, key actors in the demand and supply of 
permits are described; in addition an analytical framework based on the NIE is developed to 
help in explaining the occurrence and sources of TCs involved in obtaining permits that 
regulate selling of NTFP in Cameroon. Furthermore, a cost-benefit model including TCs is 
developed to explain the traders’ trade-offs between formal and informal business models. At 
the empirical level, an attempt was made to calculate the costs of obtaining permits as a proxy 
for TCs. The perception of traders who had not succeeded in getting permits was elicited in 
order to assess their awareness of the procedures and perceived TCs involved in the process. 
Finally, the literature on the effect of the presence of the informal sector on an economy was 
used to explain the implications of high TCs on different actors in the NTFP value chain in 
Cameroon.  
 
7.2 Key actors in the demand and supply of permits in Cameroon  
Before specifying the cost-benefit model used in analysing winners and losers in the permit 
system, it is important to describe the stakeholders that are involved in the demand, supply 
and control of permits in Cameroon (Figure 7.1). The thickness of the arrows in figure 7.1 
indicates the intensity of the relationship.  
The GOC is the main actor that issues (through an inter-ministerial committee) and controls 
permits (through forest and police officers). The arrows between Government officials who 
issue permits and other actors in the chain indicate that anybody can ask for a permit to sell 
NTFP. The police/‘gendarme’ and forestry guards are supposed to enforce the law by 
verifying that traders who sell NTFP have the necessary documents. The bold arrows on the 
diagram indicate where controls are intensified whereas the dotted arrows indicate little or no 
control.  
 
The next group of actors are traders who are by law supposed to obtain permits to sell NTFP. 
In the group of traders, there exists a category we here refer to as ‘Economic Operators’ (EO). 
EOs may not be interested in selling NTFP but handle other forestry resources like timber. 
This is because an approval, which is the first document to be obtained to have access to the 
forestry profession, applies to both NTFP and timber. EOs may also be businessmen who, 
because of their influence, have succeeded to obtain the necessary documents (Kaimowitz 
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2003; Betti 2007b; Laird et al. 2010a). These EOs, rent out permits in the form of waybills to 
NTFP traders who have not succeeded to obtain one. However, the law clearly states that an 
approval should neither be rented nor leased. This means that their activities is illegal (Betti 
2007b; Awono et al. 2012).  The thick arrows linking EO and the mobile traders indicate high 
demand and supply of permits between EO and traders.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.1: Actors involved in the demand, supply and control of permits in Cameroon  
Source: author 
 
The last group of actors who may be involved in the permit system are producers or 
collectors. They may either sell at the door step (which is the usual practice) or transport their 
produce to village or urban markets. The broken arrows from permit controllers to producers 
indicate that when they sell at the door step they are not subjected to control. However, if they 
decide to transport their produce to markets then they may be subjected to controls.  
 
7.3 Analytical framework 
As mentioned above, the NIE framework is used to specify TCs involved in demand, supply 
and control of permits. Coase (1937) was the first to introduce the concept of TCs in his 
seminal article ‘The nature of the firm’ in which he stressed the fact that market activities are 
not costless but create costs of using the price mechanism. The analysis of TCs evolved to a 
branch in NIE driven by the work of Williamson and colleagues (Williamson 1975, 1979, 
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1985, 2000a, 2004). The NIE framework holds that the costs of transacting - determined by 
institutions and institutional arrangements between transacting parties - are the underlying 
determinants of economic performance (North 1990; Kherallah and Kirsten 2001). 
When using the TC framework, a transaction as opposed to the good being transacted is often 
considered as the basic unit of analysis (Williamson 2000b; Hobbs and Young 2001). Also, it 
is often important to define both the transaction and transaction costs being studied because 
numerous definitions and inconsistencies exist among different definitions (Benham and 
Benham 2001; McCann et al. 2005) and this may confuse the reader as to the objectives of a 
particular study.  
To Williamson (1996), a transaction occurs when a good or a service is transferred and to 
Ménard (2000) a transaction occurs when rights are transferred. Both Ménard’s and 
Williamson’s definitions of a transaction suit this study because the process of obtaining 
permits to sell NTFP involves the transfer of rights from the government department that has 
the responsibility to issue the permit, to a trader who receives it. Following the definition of a 
transaction, TCs can logically be defined as the costs involved in the transfer and protection 
of rights (Barzel 1997; Zylbersztajn et al. 2007). But in Coase’s (1937) original thinking, TCs 
are costs incurred in the open market. They constitute the cost of finding a buyer (information 
costs), to negotiate, bargain and reach for a deal, sign a contract (bargaining costs), and follow 
up implementation to make sure the terms of the contract are implemented as planned 
(monitoring costs) (Hobbs 1995; Hobbs and Young 2001; Wang 2003).  
Gordon (1994) defines TCs as expenditures incurred in participating in a market or in 
implementing a government policy. With regards to the latter, TCs can be distinguished based 
upon the actor who bears the costs (Stavins 1995). For example, Mettepenningen et al. (2011) 
distinguish between public and private TCs in implementing government policies related to 
agri-environmental schemes. When TCs are borne by government they are termed public TCs. 
They are termed private TCs when borne by an individual. This study focuses on the latter 
typology of TCs. In other words, we are not concerned about the TCs involved in the 
Government systems such as cost borne by the government to enforce regulations. Therefore, 
TCs in this study can be thought of as the costs borne by traders to obtain information 
necessary to know about and comply with government regulations to operate in the formal 
NTFP sector in Cameroon. They also include the cost to overcome barriers imposed by 
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cumbersome government procedures, resources spent in monitoring and waiting for permits, 
in bribing officials and in cutting through red tapes.  
According to Buckley and Chapman (1997) ‘all transaction costs are in an important sense 
perceptual matters’. This means it is the perceived importance of TCs by those expected to 
obtain permits that may either encourage or discourage them to apply for a permit rather than 
the real costs. In other words, if institutions and procedures are such that traders can seek the 
necessary information and pay the required fees then they will try to obtain a permit. On the 
other hand, when institutions and procedures are costly in terms of time and money resources, 
this will provide lower enticement for them in general and for the small-scale traders in 
particular to comply (Blaser 2010). Willingness to comply will be especially low if traders 
perceive that complying will yield lower benefits whereas by not complying they will reduce 
costs without giving up their business.  
 
7.4 Methodology and analyses 
7.4.1 Data collection  
 
Data for this study were collected from 70 traders specialised in selling four different NTFP. 
These include Cola spp, Ricinodendorn heudelotii, Gnetum spp and Irvingia gabonensis. 
These four species are among the most widely traded NTFP in Cameroon (Ndoye et al. 1998; 
Ingram and Schure 2010). Traders handling them often complain about frequent harassment 
by police and forestry officials requesting permits. Data are limited to traders because most 
producers sell at the door step and are thus safe from police and forestry control. In this 
regard, producers may not be aware of the requirements to obtain permits and were thus 
excluded from the survey. Data were collected over a period of six weeks (March – mid April 
2012). The sampled traders are specifically those who transport the studied species between 
supply villages and the studied markets. Retailers are therefore also excluded. For the 
respective products, the studied markets were either major local assembly or urban markets 
(Ebolowa, Bafoussam, Ashong, Yaounde, Douala, and Bamenda) or export markets (Ideanau 
and Bota waft). Each of the markets was visited at least two times within a week in succession 
i.e one market after the other. This was done in order to increase the chance of meeting a good 
number of different traders. Similarly, the method was also chosen to capture as much 
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variability as possible particularly as this category of traders is very mobile between supply 
villages (to secure purchases) and the studied markets. This makes estimation of the sampled 
population difficult.  
The data collection tool used was a questionnaire adopted from that developed by the Ronald 
Coase institute on the cost of exchange in registering a business (Benham et al. 2004). For 
this study, questions asked were related to: trader awareness and ownership of different 
official documents required to sell the selected species; perception of TCs involved in the 
process; assessment of factors that may affect variability in the perception of TCs among 
traders such as social capital (group membership), sex, political connection, ethnicity and 
others; if and by how much they bribe their way through police and forestry officials in case 
they do not obtain permits, etc.  
It was difficult to talk to a sufficient number of traders who had already obtained permits to 
measure TCs involved in the process. This was because; the few economic operators who rent 
out permits were either too busy to cooperate or refused to take part in the interview. 
However, one community-based common initiative group that had extended its activities to 
selling NTFP and had recorded most of the cost they had incurred in the process, provided 
data on the actual cost they incurred in obtaining an approval. For reasons of anonymity 
requested by the group, no detailed information can be given about them.  
Three members of the community-based organisation who took part in compiling and 
following up the file for an approval assisted in filling a question guide that was adapted from 
Benham et al. (2004). This data was crosschecked with that of a GIZ project reported by 
Nguenang et al (undated) that recorded similar information for a Common Initiative Group 
(CIG) in the East of Cameroon. The group in the east is also being assisted by the German 
Development cooperation (GIZ) to obtain the NTFP permit. The GIZ method consisted of 
recording every step and costs (time and money) that they incurred in the process. Data from 
these two sources were used as a reflection of the actual transaction costs required to formally 
trade in NTFP in Cameroon. Even though the chapter illustrates its arguments on estimated 
TCs based on these two examples, the authors agree that the sample is small and the small 
size is related to the already mentioned difficulty related to the non willingness to participate 
by those who had succeeded to go through the process. However, information from the case 
study groups have been included to demonstrate that the points raised have an empirical basis 
and are not simply speculations. 
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Descriptive statistics were used to analyse the proportion of traders who own permits and who 
knew the procedures involved, and also to study traders’ perceptions of the sources of TCs. 
Analysis of variance (ANOVA) was used to compare data regarding the four different NTFP 
species. Cost-benefit analysis was used to compute trade-offs made by traders by not trying to 
obtain permits and what the Cameroon economy loses as a result of traders not complying.  
 
7.4.2 Specification of the cost-benefit model to analyse winners and 
losers in the permit system 
The analytical framework highlighted perceived transaction costs as a major factor that 
discourages traders from going for permits. That is, if perceived TCs involved are high, 
traders will not go for a permit. Furthermore, if the traders believe that they may bribe their 
way through without a permit then they will certainly not go for it and will pay a bribe. The 
point is that the decision to go for a permit depends on traders’ perceptions of the costs 
(transaction costs) plus the bribe put against the benefits of having a permit. The cost benefit 
model is specified below.  
Variables in the model 
The Forestry Regeneration Tax (Rtx) – this tax is paid upfront once a trader has been issued 
an approval and a permit to sell a given NTFP. The Rtx is meant for regenerating the forestry 
resource that is exploited. The official amount requested by the government is 10FCFA/kg 
irrespective of the species  
 
Expected Government Revenue from regeneration tax (EGR) - amount of money the GOC is 
expected to make from the regeneration tax. Although the GOC is expected to generate 
income from other activities like stamps that applicants are supposed to buy and use on papers 
that they need to file for the requested documents, for simplicity reasons, only the 
regeneration tax was used. This may actually underestimate the financial losses from the 
forestry sector to the state if no permit were requested.  
 
Quantity (kg) of produce handled in 2011 by trader i (Qi)  
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Cost to rent out a permit (waybill) for one kg of produce (Spx) = imposed by an economic 
operator to traders who do not have permits 
 
Perceived transaction costs (TCs): Perceived cost of obtaining the required information, 
compiling and following up files to obtain the necessary permit.  
 
Based on the above variables, for a given trader i, where i = 1 → n, dealing with species j 
where j = 1 → m, total quantity of NTFP handled by trader i is given by equation 1.  
  
        
 
   
                                      
 
 Since it is assumed that all traders pay a regeneration tax Rtx irrespective of the species, 
payment to government or expected government revenue from all n traders is denoted by 
EGR and it is given by equation 2. 
  
      
 
   
     
 
   
                                  
 
If the i
th 
trader dealing in species j decides not to go for an official permit and instead rent one 
informally from an EO, s/he spends an amount REO (Rents to economic operators) as shown 
in equation 3.  
 
                                                  
 
 
Total amount spent by all the n traders in renting permits from EOs is given by equation 4. 
This equation also represents the total revenue received by economic operators (TREO) in 
renting out permits to all the n traders.  
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By renting out permits, traders incur an additional cost of TLp. This is so because; if they 
were to pay directly to the Government they will only pay EGR (see equation 5).  
 
                                             
 
However the traders also spend some money to bribe their way through the police and 
forestry officers. This happens despite of the fact that the trader has presented the rented 
permit (waybill) because the police and forestry officers know it is illegal by law to rent 
permits. Secondly traders often carry more than what is declared on rented waybills in order 
to compensate for cost of renting permits and paying bribes. This means that they may either 
be caught for one penalty or another. It is worth noting that the decision to rent a permit is a 
psychological one as the traders assume that they may avoid being punished by brandishing a 
rented permit. In theory the traders may take one of the following three decisions:  
 
i- Trader gets a permit and bears high transaction costs  
ii- Trader rents a permit and bears the cost of rents + bribe 
iii- Trader circulates without any permit and pays a bribe 
 
Yet, because option three is a rare occurrence it was not considered in the analysis as all the 
traders endeavour to have any form of document to brandish at the check points. In addition 
we could not identify traders who have succeeded to obtain the permits and who are actively 
involved in the NTFP trade. For this reason option one is also overlooked in our analysis.   
 
Let Bq = bribe paid per kg of product to the forest and police officers. The total amount 
received by agents from all the traders (TRpf) is given by equation 6.  
 
       
 
   
  
 
   
                                   
 
This means that traders who rent a permit and pay bribes to the police and forestry incur 
additional costs (TAC) due to the price of renting permits and informal taxes as shown by 
equation 7.  
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If the traders were to bear the TCs involved in obtaining permit and assuming that they got 
the permit they would not have paid the bribe and only spent the amount shown in equation 8.  
 
      
 
   
   
 
   
                                      
 
If the traders decide to operate without a permit it means that they made their calculations and 
observed that TCs plus all official costs of permits were greater than the cost incurred in 
renting permits plus bribe paid to the forestry and police (see equation 9).  
 
That is  
 
                                                         
 
In case equation 9 is true, i.e. perceived TCs are greater than the total costs incurred by traders 
to rent permits and to pay bribes to police and forestry officers minus the regeneration tax, 
then, it may explain why traders prefer to operate illegally by renting permits instead of going 
for own permits.   
Based on data collected from 70 traders dealing with four different NTFP, TRpf and TLp 
values were calculated.  
 
Based on data collected from 70 traders dealing with four different NTFP, TRpf and TLp 
values were calculated.  
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7.5 Results and discussions  
 
7.5.1 Description of traders and their activities  
 
The 70 traders interviewed were either handling at least one of the four respective species as a 
principal (82%) or a secondary (18%) source of revenue. Of these, 46 % were specialised in 
selling one specific NTFP, 43% handled either two or three species, while the rest handled 
four or five different products. Besides the four above-mentioned species studied, traders also 
traded other NTFP or other agricultural products among which Pentaclethra macrophylla, 
Garcinia kola and other spices of NTFP origin.  
 
All traders interviewed were operating their own businesses. Eighty-seven percent of them 
were wholesalers. This means they buy and sell in bulk. Seven percent perform both 
wholesale and export activities, while six percent carry out both wholesale and retail 
activities. In the year 2011, the 70 traders interviewed sold a total of 2,066 tons of the four 
selected NTFP worth 1.7 billion FCFA (1USD app 500 FCFA). One-way ANOVA revealed 
significant differences between average individual quantities handled per trader (F (3, 65) = 
15.58, p= 0.000). Post-hoc comparison using Dunnette T3 test shows that individual mean 
quantities handled by Gnetum spp traders were significantly higher compared to the other 
three species. The same test also revealed that mean quantities (Table 7.1) handled by I. 
gabonensis traders were significantly higher compared to those handling R. heudelotii and 
Cola spp. This can be explained by the fact that I. gabonensis and Gnetum spp. have huge 
regional export markets in Nigeria and Gabon while the first two are mostly consumed in 
Cameroon.  
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Table7.1: Quantities and value of NTFP traded by 70 traders in 2011 for four selected species  
 
Species  
Total 
quantity 
(tons ) 
Mean 
quantity in 
kg /trader 
Total Value in 
millions FCFA 
Mean value 
in million 
FCFA/trader 
Average   
price/kg  in 
FCFA 
N 
Gnetum spp 1120.80 53371 784.56 37.36 700 21 
Irvingia 
gabonensis 
739.92 33632 853.76 38.81 1154 22 
Cola spp 158.76 8820 37.80 2.10 238 18 
Ricinodendron 
heudelotii 
  
47.07 5230 54.92 6.10 1167 9 
Total  2 066  
 
1 731  24.73 
 
      70 
 
7.5.2 Traders’ awareness and possession of different types of 
documents needed to sell NTFP 
 
More than 94% of the respondents were aware of the legislation which requires them to have 
permits to sell the selected species. It was found that most of them became aware of this 
legislation as a result of requests by police and forestry officials during controls, which 
suggest weaknesses on the part of Government in communicating rules. 
 
Traders were generally confused about the specific documents as prescribed by the law. For 
example, at least 30% reported having used an approval, 41% an exploitation permit and 66 
% a way bill (Figure 7.2). Other than the waybill, for which 16% of the traders declared that it 
was personal, all other forms of legal documents were rented, usually on an annual basis. 
Traders’ declarations of personal possession of waybills may be related to misinterpretation or 
confusion between waybills and certificates of origin as obtaining a waybill is the last step in 
a sequence of three as earlier described. In reality, some traders especially kolanuts traders in 
order to minimise risk of seizure for lack of permits, contact divisional forestry officers (local 
level forestry administrators) to get a so-called certificate of origin. In return they pay 10 
FCFCA/kg. This amount in reality represents the regeneration tax.  
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Figure 7.2: Indicating if trader had use and sources of different types of formal documents  
 
7.5.3 Informal taxes  
 
Ninety-four percent of the respondents declared having paid some money to either the 
forestry department or the police during their last transaction and narrated that it is a common 
practice in their daily transactions. Ninety-five percent of them declared they had not received 
any receipt, indicating that payments were unofficial. In the few cases where some official 
documents were issued to justify payments, (for example to kolanuts traders) they did not 
bear the amount paid. Fifty-eight percent of the interviewees reported that on most occasions 
they pay to forestry officials while the remaining 42% paid to a combination of ‘gendarmes’, 
police and forestry officials. Average informal taxes paid varied between 15 FCFA per kg for 
kolanuts and 62 FCFA per g for Gnetum spp (Table 7.2).  
 
Due to high variability, the data in this case were transformed into a log-scale in order to meet 
the conditions of homogeneity of variances for ANOVA. One way ANOVA revealed 
significant difference between the four species (F (3, 62) = 10.61 p = 0.00.). Post-hoc 
comparison using Dunnette T3 test showed that mean informal taxes paid by kolanuts traders 
were significantly lower compared to those paid for the other three species. This may be 
explained by the fact that kolanuts in Cameroon are highly domesticated and are generally 
accepted to have been planted on and harvested from farms, whereas the other three species 
are mostly self-propagated and are thus generally considered to be forest products. However, 
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kolanuts were also found to have the lowest per kg price compared to the other products (see 
table 7.1). As will be shown later, there is only a weak correlation between the value of the 
product and the bribe/rents charged.   
 
Table 7.2: Mean unofficial taxes paid (FCFA/kg) by traders per product  
 
  N Mean Std Deviation 
Gnetum 21 62.24 57.44 
Irvingia 22 53.57 69.53 
Kola 18 15.78 26.65 
Njansang 9 58.50 55.86 
Total 70 46.47 57.44 
 
7.5.4 Overall perception of the registration process and sources of 
transaction costs by traders  
 
Although all seventy traders interviewed operate informally, i.e. they do not have permits of 
their own, 96% of them would like to obtain the required papers and operate in the formal 
sector, while 4% would prefer to remain in the informal sector. The latter group argued that, 
no matter whether you have the permit or not, you will still face problems from the police and 
the forestry officials, indicating low level of trust in Government institutions. The first group 
listed the most important reasons why they would like to obtain formal status (Table 7.3). 
Most frequent reasons were the need to avoid police and forestry control (47%) and the desire 
to operate legally (29%).  
 
Table 7.3: Reasons why traders want to register officially  
 
Reasons 
Number of traders 
Frequency Percent 
Avoid harassment from police and forestry officials 33 47 
Operate legally 20 29 
Reduce costs of buying way bills and paying bribe  10 14 
Contribute to state revenue 5 7 
Missing  2 3 
Total 70 100 
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Traders gave a number of reasons to explain why they currently do not have a permit. 
Multiple responses were possible (Table 7.4). Prominent amongst them were the perceived 
nominal costs to obtain permits (33%), limited access to the required information (28%) and 
perceived complexity (23%).  
 
Once it was found that traders had identified costs and information gaps as major setbacks to 
the registration process, the study attempted to estimate variability in the perceived amount as 
a proxy for misinformation. Thirty-seven percent of them were unable to give any figure to 
approximate the amount of money they would spend but acknowledged that they had learned 
from various sources amongst which friends, police and forest officers that it is ‘very 
expensive’. Those who attempted to estimate the amount gave figures in the wide range of 
100,000 FCFA to 203 million FCFA. This large variation demonstrates the level of 
misinformation about the nominal amount required to obtain a formal status. In terms of 
duration needed to process and follow up files, it was believed that the mean average time 
was 1.8 years (+/- 1.14 years). As it would be discussed later, traders’ estimates of costs 
somehow reflect reality but they under-appreciated the time required.  
 
Table 7.4: Reasons why traders prefer to operate in the informal sector 
 
  Responses Percent of 
cases  
(n = 70) 
  n Percent 
The process costs a lot of money 40 33 58 
Limited access to information on registration procedures  34 28 49 
The process is complex 28 23 41 
The process is time-consuming   13 11 19 
Respondent is new in the business 3 2 4 
Whether you have official papers or not, you will need 
to bribe your way through 
3 2 4 
I think this species is not a forestry product and so we do 
not need permits 
2 2 3 
 Total  123 100% 
 
 
 
An attempt was also made to identify the steps in the formalisation process that are 
considered as ‘complex’ by traders. In this case traders were asked to score the sequence of 
documents on a scale from 1 (very complicated) to 5 (very easy). Even though it was 
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mentioned  in section 7.5.2 that traders were confused about the type of documents required 
to apply for permits, results show that obtaining an approval (first step) was rated as either 
very complicated or complicate by more than 70% of the respondent. This thus suggests that 
despite the above stated confusion, a majority of the traders are aware of the hurdles to get 
and approval. Obtaining a permit was considered as the second most complicated. The next 
section calculates the cost and time it took for a community-based farmer organisation to get 
the approval.   
 
7.5.5 Estimated transaction costs borne by a local community-based 
farmer organisation to obtain an approval 
 
Information gathered from the community-based organisation revealed that they took an 
estimated 98 days and some 1.3 million FCFA to go through a ten-step procedure to compile 
the necessary documents to submit for an approval (Table 7.5). When the number of days are 
compared with some of the World Bank doing business indicators  such as starting a business
3
 
it is seen that starting a business in the forestry sector in Cameroon may be 5 times as difficult 
at least for the case study group as in any other sector in the country which generally requires  
19 days (World Bank 2011). About 40% of the amount (510,000 FCFA) spent to compile 
documents represented unofficial costs paid to Government officials.  
 
After compiling the documents, the organisation spent more than 12 million FCFA to follow-
up the files for more than 4 years (Table 7.6). The file was deposited in August 2000 whereas 
the approval was only obtained in October 2004. These figures can thus be considered as an 
estimate of the monitoring costs involved in going only through step one of the three that are 
needed to obtain a formal status to sell NTFP in Cameroon. When these figures are compared 
with traders’ estimates, one can conclude that their perceptions of the nominal amount of 
money required are closed to existing practices in the delivering of permits. In actual fact, one 
of the documents required by the government to be issued an approval is a proof of financial 
capacity. 
 
                                                 
3
 The World Bank starting a business indicator measures procedures (number) to legally start and operate a 
company; the timed required to complete each procedure (calendar days) and paid-in minimum capital (% of 
income per capita).   
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Table 7.5: Estimated time and costs to compile documents to gain access to an approval by a 
local community- based organisation in Cameroon   
 
Activities 
 
Amount paid (FCFA) 
Number 
of days 
Official 
amount paid 
to the sate 
Fees paid 
to the 
facilitator 
/consultant 
Unofficial 
amount 
paid to 
state 
employees 
Total 
1 Obtain a stamped application 
indicating individual or company 
name  
 
175,000 200,000 
 
375,000 
2 Provide a curriculum vitae 1 1,500 
  
1,500 
3 Obtain a non-conviction certificate  3 5,000 
  
5,000 
4 Obtain a register number  30 65,000 
 
200,000 265,000 
5 Obtain a social insurance number  30 35,600 
  
35,600 
6 Obtain a tax certificate  30 15,000 
 
35,000 50,000 
7 Obtain a statement of tax situation   
 
150,000 
 
150,000 300,000 
8 Obtain a receipt for the payment of 
processing fee  
150,000 
 
100,000 150,000 
9 Obtain a bank guarantee  2 0 
 
25,000 0 
10 Obtain a certificate of forest 
competency  
2 0 
 
Free 
service 
0 
  Total amount  98 597,100 200,000 510,000 1,307,100 
 
In other words, this may be equivalent to a bank statement to indicate that a trader has a given 
amount of money to run his/her business. No threshold amount has been specified by the 
Government. However, narratives from authorities of the Ministry of Forestry reveal that 
applicants who show proofs of financial capacity worth between 100 and 200 million are 
easily issued an approval. The case study organisation reported that through the assistance of 
some international NGOs they were able to present a bank statement worth about 200 million 
FCFA.  
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Table 7.6: Estimated amount spent by a farmer organisation in following up files after 
submission for a certificate of approval 
 
Time/costs in following up files  Number units Cost/Opportunity 
cost of time 
Total 
FCFA 
Opportunity cost of time spent in following up 
files = 4 times/year * 5 days a trip * 4 years *4 
persons/ trip  
320 days 5,000 1,600,000 
Transportation costs per person for four persons 
including intra-urban transport 
64 trips 20,000 1,280,000 
Feeding allowance/day * 4 persons  320 days 20,000 6,400,000 
Special trips spent by three traditional rulers to 
persuade government  
/ / / 350,000 
Estimated amount of unofficial fees paid during 
the four years  
   2,500,000 
Total  
      12,130,000 
N/B The community-based organisation was made up of four different villages and each had to be represented in 
each trip  
 
The figures presented by Nguegang et al (undated report to GIZ) with regards to the amount 
of money and number of days required to compile files were even 50% higher than that of the 
case study group.  This can be explained by the fact that our case study group was supported 
by elites who had strategic positions in Government. This finding is  supported  by Laird et al. 
(2010b) who stated that connections are needed to go through the process. This also means 
that TCs involved in obtaining formal status may vary depending on individuals and groups.  
 
7.5.6 Traders’ perception of factors influencing transaction costs  
 
Traders were asked to assess which amongst predefined factors related to corruption, 
discrimination and networking often reported in literature to affect business (Fafchamps 2003; 
Amine and Staub 2009) would ease or complicate the process of obtaining permits. Results 
show that a majority of the respondents considered close political connection to either help a 
lot or to help a little (Figure7.3). However, our case study group members said that close 
political connection played only a minor role in pushing their files through. Their opinion can 
be understood because despite the push they received from two former senior members of 
government and traditional authorities, the process still took more than four years. Other 
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facilitating factors, according to the traders are related to social capital such as membership in 
traders’ association and NGO assistance.  For example the case study group acknowledged 
that without support from an international NGO they wouldn’t have raised the necessary 
amount of money to go through the process.  
 
Factors that were perceived to negatively influence TCs are related to corruption, such as 
being a well known business. In line with Kaimowitz (2003) and Shleifer and Vishny (1993) 
and as will be discussed latter, powerful businessmen in the forestry sector (economic 
operators in our case) use their contacts and financial ability to bribe their way and obtain 
permits which they later rent out to traders. Some traders narrated that they were convinced it 
is these economic operators who have used their influence to bribe government officials who 
now make it practically impossible for them to succeed in the process.  
 
A majority of the traders considered that being a female would make no difference (about 
55%) or would help only a little (about 25%). Conversely, a majority of the respondents gave 
an ‘i don’t know response’ (about 55%) with regards to ethnicity or declared it makes no 
difference (20%) (Figure7.3). The interpretation of these results is that for gender, more 
traders were certain it played no significant role while for ethnicity, a majority were unsure 
and only a minority belief there is a little favouritism related to ethnic origins. The latter 
results are in conformity with Fafchamps (2003) who found no empirical evidence between 
ethnicity and discrimination in business. Even though women entrepreneurs are often reported 
to be discriminated upon (Fafchamps 2003; Amine and Staub 2009; Coleman and Robb 
2009), the results of this study suggest that according to traders’ perceptions, the difficulties 
they  face to obtain permits may not be related to discrimination or prejudices connected to 
ethnic origins or gender.  
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Figure 7.3: Traders perception of factors that may either ease or complicate the permit process 
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7.5.7 Cost benefit analysis of the impact of transaction costs on the 
performance of the NTFP value chain in Cameroon  
 
It is worth recalling that the analyses that follow are based on the 2011 sales of 70 NTFP 
traders interviewed in 2012 and also on the equations in section 4.2. Based on the latter 
equations, EGR for the 2066 tons, of NTFP sold by the 70 traders is estimated at 20.6 million 
FCFA (equation 2). The 70 traders spent a total of 212.5 million FCFA in 2011 on renting 
permits and on informal taxes paid to police and forestry officers. The highest share of this 
amount (54%) went to forest and police officers while economic operators who rent out 
permits received 37%.  Since almost all the traders rent permits from EO as reported in 
section 4.2, we assume at this stage that these EO paid regeneration taxes to the state. Based 
on this assumption, the GOC is supposed to have received the smallest fraction (9%) of the 
212.5 million. With reference to equation 9, the perceived transaction costs for the 70 traders 
is greater than 193 million FCFA which represent the amount of money traders paid to the 
police and forestry as bribe less the EGR.  Other analysis shows that the EGR represented just 
1.2% of the annual turnover of the traders (see section 4.1) while bribe plus rents represented 
a higher proportion of the latter (11%).  When the perceived TCs are computed per trader it 
amounts to an average of about 2.7 million FCFA per year (table 7).  
 
A one way ANOVA revealed significant differences between species, (F (3, 66) = 9.47, P = 
0.000.). Post-hoc comparison using the Dunette T3 test revealed that the mean amount spent 
on unofficial taxes by traders dealing in Gnetum spp and Irvingia gabonenesis was 
significantly higher than that spent by traders dealing in Cola spp and Ricinodendron 
heudelotii. For all the products unofficial taxes per kg of species were comparatively higher 
than the fixed amount of 10 FCFA taxed by the GOC as regeneration tax (Figure 7.5). This is 
in conformity with Shleifer and Vishny  (1993) who argue that bribery and corruption is much 
more costly than taxation and that ‘the secrecy’ of the unofficial taxes (bribes) makes bribes 
more distortionary to the economy than taxes.  This is because these bribes and rents are not 
accounted for by these agents (policy, forestry and EO) and therefore represent the monetary 
value of the studied products that are not captured in national statistics. 
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Table 7.7: Mean annual unofficial taxes and rents per trader and per species  
 
  
      N 
Mean amount  
FCFA/trader std. deviation  
Gnetum spp 21 5,456,161 5,343,061 
Irvingia gabonensis  22 3,147,018 2,693,183 
Cola spp 18 274,913 278,321 
Ricinodendron heudelotii 9 515,155 370,543 
Total 70 2,762,837 3,878,900 
 
It is logical to assume that unofficial rates charged by economic operators, police and forestry 
are in relation to the market value of the products. Although there was a significant positive 
correlation between per kg price of the studied species and the value of the bribe and rents (r 
(70) = 0.253 = P (0.04)) it was rather weak (Figure 7.4). This suggests that other reasons may 
be more explanatory. One possible explanation may be that, for I. gabonensis and Gnetum 
spp, export markets to neighbouring Nigeria and Gabon are better developed while the other 
two only have limited export markets. 
 
 
Figure 7.4: Relationship between buying price (FCFA) and unofficial taxes (rents + bribe)  
 
As was elucidated in the model specification section, if traders prefer to rent permits and to 
bribe their way, it is because they believe that the amounts they spent on these illegal 
activities are lower than the perceived TCs involved in obtaining legal permits (equation 9). 
As an illustration, if a trader decides to apply for his or her own permit as an individual, s/he 
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will spend at least the same amount to compile files as the case study group because the 
documents are the same for a group or an individual (Government of Cameroon 1994, 1995). 
However as earlier mentioned, these costs may vary between groups depending on whether 
the group receives any form of assistance from an NGO. This means that based on the 
expenditures of the case study group, a trader would spend a minimum of 98 days and 1.3 
million FCFA to compile the necessary documents; or a minimum of 2.5 million and 191 days 
based on the GIZ findings reported by Nguegang et al (undated). These costs do not include 
the opportunity costs of their time for the days used to compile the files nor does it include the 
amount of money they would use to monitor the files; it neither does not include the cost of a 
trader loosing his/her clientele while monitoring files. These arguments thus provide enough 
reasons to conclude that individual traders perceive TCs to apply for a permit to be greater 
than the above 2.7 million FCFA which they spend on bribe and rents and may thus justify 
their decisions to rent permits and pay bribes.   
 
One would wonder why traders could not associate in groups to obtain an official status just 
as the case of the study group. This may be because most NGOs who assist farmers perceive 
traders as businessmen and do not consider that they may have such problems or that by 
assisting traders they are indirectly assisting poor farmers. Moreover, NGOs neglect to assist 
traders may be related to high public transactions cost of organising traders into a union 
taking into consideration their geographical spread and high mobility.  
  
7.6 Conclusions 
 
This study assessed traders’ awareness of procedures and perception of TCs involved in the 
process to apply for permits to sell NTFP in Cameroon. Moreover, the study estimated the 
TCs borne by a community based organisation to compile and monitor the documents 
required to obtain NTFP permits. The results of the study are used to explain why most NTFP 
traders in Cameroon do not comply with the law on permits.  
 
Results show that a majority of traders were aware of the obligation to obtain a permit before 
selling the selected NTFP. Nonetheless, because of high TCs, none of the 70 traders had 
succeeded to obtain an approval, which is the first step in the formalisation process. 
According to the perception of traders, high nominal amount; limited access to information, 
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and the complicatedness of the process are the three most important reasons (and sources of 
transaction costs) why they prefer to operate without permits. It is worth mentioning that 
these relatively small scale NTFP trader businesses have to file the same documents as 
multinational timber companies with large capital resources. This therefore suggests the 
relevance for GOC to develop new regulations that will imply permit systems that are more 
accessible and tailored to NTFP traders.  
 
Results of the study also suggest that the traders in the sector suffer from incomplete and 
distorted information related to the costs and procedures required to obtain permits. This is 
because their major sources of information on the procedures were either the economic 
operators from whom they rent permits or from the police and forestry controllers to whom 
they pay unofficial taxes. It is therefore obvious that the police and economic operators take 
advantage of the situation by exaggerating the difficulties they may have to go through in 
order to keep them in the informal sector so that they will continue to seek unofficial taxes 
and rent from them. This is in line with Williamson’s core concepts of bounded rationality 
and opportunistic behaviours that are characteristics of agents in a transaction as discussed in 
chapter two. The high prevalence of asymmetric information in delivering permits suggests 
that the government and NGOs in the forestry sector need to develop strategies to provide 
transparent information to this category of forests actors (traders) in order to improve their 
performance in the value chain and the forests sector in general.  
 
High transaction costs may have the following consequences on the value chain:  
 
Reduction in Government revenue, increased corruption and misguided policies: The study 
has shown that the GOC is a major loser in the permit system compared to rent seeking 
economic operators and corrupt police and forestry officers. Two possible explanations are 
that first, the activity of renting permits is illegal and the economic operators who rent out 
permits to traders charge higher amounts per kg than the government. On the other hand, 
traders carry more quantities than is declared on the rented waybills in order to make some 
money to pay unofficial taxes. If the TCs in obtaining permits were low, every trader would 
probably have a permit and less corruption would occur. The consequence of illegal activities 
is that a majority of the transactions are also not recorded. This reduces the visibility of 
products like NTFP that are often neglected in national policies as they  are not included in 
national statistics because their value is overlooked (Schreckenberg et al. 2006a; Foundjem-
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Tita et al. 2012b). The outcome of such neglected policies is that the permit system may not 
effectively contribute to regenerate the resource through the regeneration tax as expected. It is 
worth mentioning that, the arguments developed here are not geared at seeking massive and 
abusive exploitation of forests resources through reduced TCs to obtain permits. Rather they 
are meant to advocate for more effective and efficient policy instruments that will guarantee 
more control over, and regeneration of, forest resources compared to the existing flawed 
permit system.    
 
Increased consumer prices and lower producer prices: consumers and producers of NTFP are 
the other losers of the system. As economic theory dictates, consumers are the final users of a 
produce and they definitely pay for any extra costs. Producers also pay for the extra costs as it 
is not uncommon for traders to capitalise on the unofficial taxes and costs to rent permits to 
bargain for lower producers’/collectors’ prices (Ndoye 2005).  
 
This study concludes that a majority of NTFP traders are motivated to apply for permits but 
TCs characterised by corruption, regulatory and procedural constraints and asymmetric 
information were perceived to be high such that only very rich entrepreneurs (economic 
operators) in the forestry sector could apply for them. It is thus recommended that other 
studies focus on strategies to reduce these TCs. While TCs to obtain permits have to be 
addressed, efforts also have to be made to reduce incidences of bribes collected by the police 
and forestry officers along major high ways. This is because incidences of bribes as we have 
demonstrated are important psychological determinants shaping the perception of traders and 
their decision to rent permits instead of going for own official permits.  
 
The main limitation of the study lies in the refusal of economic operators who already have 
permits to answer our questions. This limited the possibility to do a comparative analysis of 
TCs influencing factors between holders and non-holders of permits. However, this may be 
taken up by other studies that may want to get insights into the illegal activities of the EOs as 
well as by studies that may do a more robust analysis of TCs as a motivation of non 
compliance in the entire forestry sector including both formal and informal timber 
exploitation. Secondly the study recommends that new policy instruments need to be 
instituted to reduce TCs but did not assess whether reducing TCs will decrease incidences of 
bribery and corruption that characterise the system. Other studies can pick up from here. 
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Chapter 
8 A Choice Experiment Approach for Assessing Incentives to 
Forest Law Compliance: Case of NTFP Traders in Cameroon 
 
Abstract  
 
Compliance with the law on permits governing Non-Timber Forest Product (NTFP) actors is 
generally low due to high transactions costs and other factors. While considerable efforts are 
being deployed to reduce illegal forestry activities in the Congo basin forests, literature 
suggests that efforts made so far have been concentrated on addressing illegal timber logging. 
This paper applies a choice experiment approach based on data collected from 70 traders to 
value policy options that are hypothesised to provide incentives for actors to comply with the 
law on permits. Results show that, decentralisation of the process of obtaining permits to the 
regions, possibility of joint or individual ownership of permits, transferability of the 
exploitation permit between traders, duration of exploitation permit and amount of 
regeneration tax were found to be significant in determining traders’ choices to select a 
particular option. Based on their willingness to pay, the most-valued option by the sampled 
traders was decentralisation of the application process to the regions and reduction in the 
volume of paper work involved in the process. This study has implications for reducing 
illegality in the forestry sector where small scale actors are involved.  
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter is based on:  
D. Foundjem-Tita, S. Speelman, J. C. Tieguhong, O. Ndoye,  M. D’Haese,  Z. Tchoundjeu, G. van 
Huylenbroeck,  P. van Damme ( 2013). A choice experiment approach for assessing incentives to forest law 
compliance: case of NTFP traders in Cameroon.  International Forestry Review (in press). 
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8.1 Introduction  
 
The objective of this chapter is  apply a choice  experiment approach to evaluate policy 
options that are hypothesised to provide incentives for small scale forest actors to comply 
with the forestry law governing trade in NTFP in Cameroon. As discussed in chapter seven, 
law compliance is an integral part of any governance system and refers to the extent to which 
subjects or actors respect prescribed behaviours (Young 2005; Blaser 2010; Ramcilovic-
Suominen and Epstein 2012). It was reported in the previous chapter that in Cameron as in 
many  countries, forests products including Non Timber Forest products (NTFP) are 
harvested, transported and traded in violation of national laws governing such activities 
(Cerutti and Tacconi 2006; Assembe Mvondo 2009; Blaser 2010; Tieguhong et al. 2010). The 
negative impacts of such illegal forest activities include among others: degradation of forests 
and related goods and services; loss of government and private revenues (Contreras-
Hermosilla 2002; Kaimowitz 2003; Blaser 2010) ; lower prices to NTFP collectors; negative 
and misguided policies towards programs such as agroforestry that may contribute in 
regenerating forest resources (Schreckenberg et al. 2006a; Betti 2007b).  The World Bank for 
example reports that illegal logging alone is responsible for annual losses in global market 
value of more than 10 million USD and in government revenue of as much as five billion 
USD. 
 
The magnitude of the problem has prompted national and international NGOs to put forest 
law compliance on the agenda of international forums (Blaser 2010; Tieguhong et al. 2010). 
In addition, researchers are continuously seeking solutions to advance scholarly investigations 
in order to assist countries to address the issue (Kaine et al. 2010; Ramcilovic-Suominen and 
Epstein 2012). Based on the outcomes of five of such international forums organised by the 
Food and Agricultural Organisation of the United Nations (FAO) and the International 
Tropical Timber Organisation  (ITTO), the following points were identified as critical for a 
strategic approach to increase forest law compliance: ensuring broad and inclusive 
stakeholder participation; addressing the underlying causes of illegality; prioritising remedial 
actions and assessing the economic feasibility and social acceptability of proposed reforms 
(Blaser 2010).  
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In chapter seven an attempt was made to address the underlying causes of illegality related to 
NTFP permits from a transaction costs (TCs) perspective. This chapter will pay attention to 
two other factors listed above that are critical to increase forest law: (i) stakeholder 
participation in the development of policies and regulations and (ii) economic feasibility and 
social acceptability of proposed reforms aimed at reducing transaction costs and other vices 
governing the demand and supply of permits in Cameroon.  
 
In the forestry sector, the participation of stakeholders in the policy and law making process is 
highly recommended (Mayers and Bass 2004a; Laird et al. 2009). Stakeholder participation 
should ensure that policies and laws reflect real needs and priorities and that they will be 
widely accepted (Sutinen and Kuperan 1999; Mayers and Bass 2004a; Laird et al. 2009; 
Kaine et al. 2010). Stakeholder participation in the policy and law formulation process is in 
line with more recent approaches to understand compliance with the law, which are based on 
a normative perspective (Sutinen and Kuperan 1999; Kaine et al. 2010). This incorporates 
elements of personal morality, fairness and legitimacy. In this regard, individuals are expected 
to comply with the law to the extent that they perceive such a law as appropriate and 
consistent with internalised norms (Sutinen and Kuperan 1999; Ramcilovic-Suominen and 
Epstein 2012). In this case key variables determining compliance are individual perception of 
fairness and appropriateness of the law. From an economic perspective, compliance is based 
on a rational choice model of human behaviour, which incorporates calculated costs and 
benefits of compliance (Ramcilovic-Suominen and Epstein 2012).  
 
Most top-down approaches and command and control-style policies and regulations are often 
considered to be unfair and ineffective because they do not take into consideration the 
perceptions of those targeted by such institutions (Sutinen and Kuperan 1999; Mayers and 
Bass 2004a; Horne 2006). Consequently, when bottom-up approaches are used it is important 
to properly understand the extent to which individuals are motivated to change their 
behaviours to comply with proposed regulations (Kaine et al. 2010).  
 
While considerable efforts are being deployed to reduce illegal forestry activities in the 
Congo basin forests, the literature suggests that the efforts made thus far seem to be 
concentrated on illegal timber logging and wildlife poaching, neglecting other illegal forest 
activities such as Non Timber Forests Products (NTFP) harvesting and trade (Tieguhong et al. 
2010). The objective of this study is to contribute in filling this gap by investigating traders’ 
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preferences for several policy options that are hypothesised to reduce transaction costs (TCs) 
and other barriers in the process of complying with the permit system governing trade of 
NTFP in Cameroon. Suitable policies could reduce the inefficiencies in the NTFP value 
chains and by increasing respect for the law, the credibility of state institutions, which are 
prerequisites for economic performance  will be enhanced (North 1990). A method often used 
to elicit preferences or to evaluate policy options taking insights from target beneficiaries 
(stakeholders’ participation) into consideration is choice experiments (Alpizar et al. 2001; 
Hope et al. 2005; Horne 2006; Sur et al. 2006; Speelman et al. 2010). This method will be 
used in this study. 
 
 Effectiveness and ineffectiveness of policies and regulations may be theory based (related to 
bad laws) and process based
4
 (bad implementation of even good laws). While these issues 
have been raised in the preceding paragraphs, analyses in this study are limited to traders’ 
acceptability of existing and proposed policies and regulations. In this regard, the actual 
effectiveness of the proposed policies and regulations will not be tested.  
 
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows: first, we will make a short recall on the 
process of obtaining NTFP permits in Cameroon as described in the previous chapters. 
Secondly, the choice experiment method that will be used to asses traders’ preferences for 
policy options will be explained. In describing the choice experiment method, the study will 
further elaborate on the permit system because the method requires that the set of policy 
options that are retained are properly described. The analytical and econometric foundation 
for analysing choice experiment data will come next. Finally the results of the study are 
presented followed by a discussion and conclusions.   
 
8.2 Case study background- NTFP permit system in Cameroon  
 
As was discussed in the previous chapters, the right to sell NTFP in Cameroon is sanctioned 
by a permit system which deals with “special forests products”  as prescribed by the 1994 
Forestry Law (Government of Cameroon 1994). However it is not clear how the Government 
of Cameroon (GOC) defines “special forests products”. Often it is understood that it consists 
of species with economic and environmental values (Ingram 2012). The unclear definition of 
                                                 
4
 We thank an anonymous reviewer for this point. 
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special forest products actually makes it ambiguous which products are regulated by the 
permit system. Nevertheless, the day to day practice is that for most NTFP of high economic 
significance, traders are requested to show permits at road check points (Betti 2007b; Laird et 
al. 2010a; Ndoye and Awono 2010; Foundjem-Tita et al. 2012b). The majority of the traders, 
if not all, dealing in NTFP do not have their own permits, instead some of them rent permits. 
This practice is against the law as a result their activities are illegal (Djeukam 2006b; Betti 
2007b; Awono et al. 2012; Ingram et al. 2012; Ingram 2012). Their decisions to operate 
illegally may not be an intentional act to overlook existing legislation, instead it may be 
related to the high TCs involved in the process of meeting the excessive legal requirements 
(Wells et al. 2007; Blaser 2010); see also chapter seven. Thus efforts are needed to reduce 
these high TCs and address elements that may be perceived as unfair.  
 
Studies assessing transaction costs and options related to agri-envrionmental policies and 
regulations have been reported in Europe, the US (Stavins 1995; McCann et al. 2005; 
Mettepenningen et al. 2011) and in the forestry sector in some Latin American countries like 
Honduras and Nicaragua (Wells et al. 2007). Unfortunately the topic has not received much 
attention from researchers in Cameroon particularly not with regards to NTFP. Nonetheless, a 
few organisations like FAO and its partners have formulated proposals to the GOC aimed at 
reducing complications or in other words TCs related to the process of obtaining permits in 
the NTFP sector (FAO et al. 2010; Fokou Sakam 2010). The recommendations of FAO and 
its partners stem from stakeholders workshops. Literature on policy formulation processes 
however suggests that after the identification of such qualitative information by key 
informants through stakeholders workshops, policies should be subjected to a wider group for 
quantification and weighting of issues (Mayers and Bass 2004a). This provides the rationale 
for our study.   
 
8.3 Methodology  
8.3.1 Why a choice experiment  
 
A choice experiment is a form of choice modelling that has its roots in the field of marketing 
and transportation where it was originally used to study the trade-offs between product 
characteristics and characteristics of different transport services offered. Increasingly, the 
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method is being used in the valuation of non-market goods (Alpizar et al. 2001; Birol et al. 
2006). In the policy evaluation sphere, the method can be used to provide information on 
respondents’ preferences which can be interesting for the purpose of developing policies and 
laws (Sur et al. 2006).  
 
The decision to use a choice experiment in this study is guided by the opportunity it provides 
to contrast compatible policy options that may reduce TCs and other setbacks in the NTFP 
permit system in Cameroon. The technique entails presenting to respondents a number of 
combinations of characteristics (attributes) at different levels that describe a good. In this 
case, the combinations are related to regulations governing access to permits. For each choice 
scenario, they are asked to pick the combination of attributes they prefer most or that gives 
them the highest utility. When analysed, results can determine the relative importance of each 
attribute in determining preferences (Alpizar et al. 2001; Ryan et al. 2001a; Sur et al. 2006). 
In our case, it refers to the relative importance of each element to persuade traders to 
voluntarily apply and obtain permits required to trade in NTFP. In choice experiments that 
study the value of goods and services, respondents’ willingness to pay is often indirectly 
evaluated by including the price of the good as one of the attributes (Hanley et al. 2001; Street 
et al. 2005; Speelman et al. 2010). In this study, respondent willingness to pay for shifts from 
one proposed policy option to another was evaluated by including a regeneration tax as one of 
the attributes.  
 
There are several advantages of using choice experiments over other stated preference 
methods such as contingent ranking, contingent rating or paired comparisons. One reason is 
that choice experiments are suited for scenarios as ours where changes in attributes are 
multidimensional and trade-offs between them are of particular interests. In fact, the 
technique has the ability to identify the value of different attributes. Although contingent 
valuation techniques can be used as well, they are considered expensive and cumbersome as a 
series of contingent valuation scenarios would need to be included in the questionnaire 
(Hanley et al. 2001). Another advantage of the method is that respondents are given the 
opportunity to express their preferences on a varied but significant unknown future events 
(Hanley et al. 2001; Hope et al. 2005) whereas ranking methods are more used when the 
decisions to be evaluated are similar to the ones respondents have to make in everyday life 
(Ryan et al. 2001b).  
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When designing choice experiments, there is besides a good definition of the problem, the 
necessity to identify relevant attributes and attribute levels (Alpizar et al. 2001; Speelman et 
al. 2010). These are discussed below.  
 
8.3.2 The choice of attributes and attribute levels  
 
Attributes selected should be those that affect respondents’ choices and that are relevant to 
policy (Alpizar et al. 2001; Speelman et al. 2010). In this study, selection of attributes was 
guided by factors that are assumed to contribute to entice traders to comply with the permit 
system. Literature reviews, focus group discussions and stakeholder meetings are important in 
selecting attributes and their levels (Alpizar et al. 2001; Horne 2006). Based on this premise, 
a first set of attributes selected for this study was derived from a literature review amongst 
which a proposition made by FAO and partners
5
  (FAO et al. 2010) to the Ministry of 
Forestry and Wild Life (MINFOF) for consideration in subsequent review of the 1994 
Forestry Law. The proposition of FAO and partners to MINFOF was the result of two 
different stakeholders’ workshops to identify weaknesses in current legislation governing the 
NTFP sector in Cameroon. Above all the workshops were organised in order to generate 
inputs to amend law N° 94/01 of 20
th
 January 1994 governing the forestry, wildlife and 
fisheries regimes and its text of application (Fokou Sakam 2010). These workshops were 
organised in Bamenda in the Northwest region of Cameroon and in Ebolowa in the South 
region by FAO and its partners. Both workshops brought together a total of 173 actors 
representing 12 different categories of actors
6
 in the NTFP sector representing 9 out of the 10 
administrative regions in country.  
 
Three main attributes of the process of obtaining permits to sell NTFP, relevant for this study, 
were identified at this stage: the process of obtaining an approval, the process of obtaining an 
exploitation permit and the payment of the forest regeneration tax. These are not the only 
requirements to obtain the legal status to sell NTFP in Cameroon, but they are considered the 
                                                 
5
 Partners refer to a consortium of international organisations among which the International Centre for forestry 
research (CIFOR); the World Agroforestry Centre (ICRAF) and the Netherlands Development Organisation 
(SNV Cameroon). These organisations including FAO as lead participated in the execution of the project titled 
Mobilisation and Capacity Building of Small and Medium size Enterprises in involved in NTFP funded by the 
European Union.  
6
 Actors invited to the stakeholders’workshop included: producers/ collectors, traders, local NGOs, international 
NGOs, law enforcement officers including police and forest guards, Employees from MINFOF, the media, local 
councils etc.  
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most difficult. Details about the process of obtaining legal recognition are found in Djeukam 
(2007) and Beti (2007b). The selected three attributes were further subjected to detailed focus 
group discussions involving traders and also individual discussions with 9 different experts 
working in the field of NTFP amongst whom: staff of the Netherland Development 
Organisation (SNV), FAO, ICRAF, CIFOR and MINFOF. Traders involved in the focus 
groups were a broad representation of the sampled group. Three different focus groups were 
organised with the traders. The first two was made up of 7 and 8 different traders and the third 
was a consolidation of the results of the first two. Ten traders from the previous two sessions 
attended the third focus group. The objective of the focus groups and the discussions with 
experts was first to gain insights into the three most important attributes identified in the 
stakeholders workshops and secondly to define the levels for each attribute.  
 
Using more than 5 attributes in choice experiments may be detrimental to the quality of the 
information gathered because it increases complexity of the choice task (Mazotta and Opaluch 
1995). A too high task complexity may cause fatigue and boredom in responses, leading to 
careless responses. The same may occur if the number of choice sets  if  the number of choice 
sets presented to each individual is too high or if there correlation between attributes (Alpizar 
et al. 2001). Therefore to reduce complexity, only the most essential attributes were retained 
in this study. The attributes retained are described below and summarised in table 1.  
 
Most of what constitutes the attributes in this chapter has been discussed in chapter four and 
seven. However, to clearly explain their levels and reasons why they have been included in 
different choice sets, some repetitions could not be avoided.  
 
The approval  
This is the first legal document to be obtained by a trader. It gives the holder the right to 
exploit any forest resource in Cameroon. This means that only when this document is 
obtained traders may proceed to process other legal papers. The problem related to obtaining 
an approval is that the process is centralised in Yaounde, the capital of Cameroon. In addition, 
the process of following-up the files is considered expensive with a lot of transaction costs 
involved (see chapter seven and also Laird et al (2010b) ). NTFP traders with comparatively 
limited capital are expected to file in the same documents as timber exploiters because the 
same approval applies to both categories of actors (Government of Cameroon 1994, 1995; 
FAO et al. 2010). This is considered illegitimate by NGOs and NTFP traders.  
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According to Kaine et al. (2010), one strategy to promote compliance among individuals with 
unfavourable attitude towards an intervention is to include behaviours advocated by these 
individuals provided policy objectives are met. With regards to an approval, it is advocated 
that a special approval should be issued for NTFP traders and the process should be made 
easier (FAO et al. 2010; Fokou Sakam 2010). Some traders and experts consulted 
respectively through focus group and expert meetings even argued that this document should 
be completely revoked for NTFP. Based on the fact that the selected attributes need to be 
policy relevant and meet the expectation of traders without jeopardising government 
objectives of conserving the natural, the research team concluded that the government may 
not abide to the option of entirely cancelling the approval. It was thus imperative to search for 
ways to reduce TCs involved in the process rather than thinking of abolishing the option.  
 
The next question therefore was how to simplify the process? Two proposals came up during 
the focus group and expert discussions: (i) the number of documents to be submitted may be 
reduced and (ii) the process may be decentralised to the regions. To make the process easy, 
these two proposals were grouped as one option and then the status quo of obtaining the same 
document in Yaounde was maintained as another option. The main assumption here is that by 
instituting a special and simplified procedure to obtain an NTFP approval, obtainable at 
regional level, TCs involved in the process may be reduced and traders would be encouraged 
to apply for it.  
 
Joint or individual approval  
Another issue that came up in the expert and focus group discussions was that traders might 
be encouraged to apply for permits if given the opportunity to work as a group. Actually, the 
1994 Forestry Law states that any individual or moral persons (group) can apply for an 
approval. The simplest forms of organising farmers and other small scale rural enterprises are 
through common initiative groups (CIGs), associations or cooperatives (Government of 
Cameroon 1992). Currently, these forms of groups/associations are not allowed to apply for 
an approval and they would have to transform into limited liability companies in order to do 
so (Nguenang et al. undated).  
 
Some traders have struggled to organise themselves into CIGs but have not been successful in 
the process (Ingram 2012). The imperative to transform CIGs and associations into limited 
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liability companies may have a negative effect on traders’ decision because they believe that 
such companies/enterprises will be very big structures that have to pay a lot of taxes. 
Facilitating joint ownership through CIGs may permit a group of traders to join resources in 
this way reducing costs. It is even argued that when traders operate in groups, group pressure 
will compel group members to abide with the law (Sutinen and Kuperan 1999). It is also 
known that some individuals would also want to work individually in order to avoid negative 
effects of group activities on their business. Thus, two options were proposed to the traders: 
an individual or joined ownership application through CIGs.   
 
Exploitation permit  
An exploitation permit is issued to traders after the latter obtain the approval. The permit 
gives the holder the right to exploit and sell a particular NTFP. The permit specifies the 
quantity and zone of action where the trader is supposed to collect the produce. The permit is 
issued for one year and a prerequisite for this is the payment of a regeneration tax of 10 FCFA 
per kg, irrespective of the species. Literature reviews (Betti 2007b; Fokou Sakam 2010) and 
focus group discussions highlighted two weaknesses of the permit system: transferability and 
duration. 
 
a. Transferability of permits 
Whether NTFP permits are transferable or not is not clear in the law. Confusion arises from 
article 42 (1) of the 1994 Forestry Law which states that holders of permits can transfer or 
subcontract some of their rights. Paradoxically, section 42(2) stipulates that rights are 
personal and non-transferable. Detailed discussions with forestry officials, and NGOs 
advocating for farmers’ and traders’ right reveal that transferability currently is illegal.  
 
Some NGOs and traders are against transferability with the argument that it favours non- 
NTFP professionals (mostly powerful business men) to use their financial powers to obtain 
permits. In line with Kaimowitz (2003), these financially viable permit holders are accused of 
encouraging corruption and of increasing the transaction costs in the permit system. That is, it 
is alleged that they use their financial powers to corrupt government officials to tighten 
conditions so that they can have the possibility to rent out their permits to the small scale 
traders who are unable to secure permits (Tieguhong et al. 2010).  
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Other traders argue that the process of obtaining a permit is too expensive for simple traders 
to obtain whereby limiting transferability will kick them out of business. Other studies show 
that, because of high TCs to obtain permits, traders prefer to rent rather than to go for the 
permits themselves (see Chapter seven and also Awono et al. (2012)). Other stakeholders 
propose that transferability should be authorised but should be regulated by the government. 
That is, if a permit is transferred, it should be officially recognised by the government. This is 
in contrast with the current procedure where business operators merely photocopy their letter 
heads and show them at check points in this way pretend that they are working for the permit 
holder. The choice experiment assesses which of these three options is most preferred by 
traders:  no transferability, transferability with authorisation from the state or transferability 
based on mutual agreement between the permit holder and the borrower. 
 
b. Duration of exploitation permit  
FAO and its partners (Djeukam 2007; Fokou Sakam 2010) report that the short duration of a 
permit limits investment. This is true because money is involved in the process of obtaining 
an approval. Thus, a permit can be considered as an investment in the NTFP sector. Since 
NTFP permits are only valid for one year, traders complain that delays involved in the 
application process, prevent them from exploiting the quotas that are attributed to them. For 
example if it takes till October before the exploitation permit for one ton of Irvingia 
gabonensis is issued, and the trader pays the required regeneration tax to exploit one ton but 
only succeeds to exploit 50% of it by the end of December; s/he loses the remaining 50%. In 
this regard, by increasing the duration of the permit, traders would be able to carry over their 
quotas to the following year; it is expected that this would more easily allow for cost 
recovery. However, the main issue discussed in the focus groups was the duration of the 
permit. It was accepted that to avoid abuses, the permits should be limited to two or three 
years. To simplify the choice experiment, we opted for the status quo (one year) and an 
improvement to three years.  
 
Regeneration tax 
One of the reasons why Government sometimes devises policies and policy instruments such 
as the regeneration tax is to raise income to regenerate depleted resources (Betti 2007b). The 
regeneration tax has been described to be inconsistent and inefficient in controlling trade, in 
promoting regeneration and to be too high for traders (Ingram 2012). Thus, it can be 
considered as one of the reasons that discourage traders to apply for permits. Yet, other actors 
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in the chain think the amount charged is low and that it does not take into consideration the 
value of products (Betti 2007b; Fokou Sakam 2010). The low amount of taxes the 
government generates from NTFP may be one of the reasons why the sector benefits from 
less incentive-driven policies to encourage domestication and trade. During focus group 
discussions, some traders stated that the current charge of 10 FCFA/kg is not an issue to them 
and that they can pay more which is corroborated by the findings in chapter seven which 
shows that traders pay more for bribes in the current system. If this is the case, then 
government can actually benefit by charging higher rates. A good question to answer at this 
stage is, what is a trader’s willingness to pay (WTP) in terms of a regeneration tax? A 
summary of the selected attributes and their levels is shown in table 8.1.  
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Table 8.1: Summary of attributes and their levels 
 
Description of the selected 
attributes 
 
Attribute levels 
 
Effect being captured by the 
attribute: 
Type of document and where to 
apply for an approval (Type_EA) 
 
Whether special approval should be 
authorised for NTFP different from 
what timber exploiters do submit.  
 
1. Decentralised-simplified 
procedures specific to 
NTFP obtained from the 
regions 
 
2. Centralised  procedures 
obtained from Yaounde 
(statusquo) 
 
Transactions costs  
(time and costs to obtain the legal 
status) 
 
Effect of other costs  e.g. travel costs to  
Yaounde 
Joint ownership of  approval  (JI_EA) 
 
Whether or not a number of traders 
can unite to apply for an approval as 
a CIG   
 
 
1. Approval can be jointly 
owned by a group of  
traders through a CIG 
 
2. Approval should only be 
given to a single trader  
Whether by jointly owning an approval 
traders reduce transaction costs and this 
will entice them to ask for permits 
 
Transferability of exploitation permit 
(Tr_Ept)   
 
Whether a holder of an exploitation 
permit should transfer his rights to 
another trader provided the quantity 
authorised in the permit has not been 
exhausted   
 
 
1.  Can be transferred 
(statusquo) 
 
2. Cannot be transferred  
 
 
3. Can be transferred with 
authorisation from 
government   
 
Whether by preferring to hire permits 
traders keep transaction costs low 
Duration of exploitation permit 
(D_Ept) 
 
Number of years an exploitation 
permit should be valid 
 
1. One year ( statusquo) 
 
2. Three years  
 
Cost of keeping the agreement for a 
short period i.e if traders  go for more 
than three years,  then the costs of 
obtaining the document just for one year 
is comparatively higher 
Regeneration tax  (R_Tax)  
 
Up to how much can traders pay in 
terms  of regeneration tax 
1. 5 FCFA/kg  
 
2. 10 FCFA/Kg (statusquo 
) 
 
3. 20 FCFA/kg  
To measure actual willingness to pay in 
terms of regeneration tax  
 
8.3.3 Designing the choice sets  
 
In choice experiments, an experimental design is aimed at creating choice sets in an efficient 
way. This involves combining all attributes levels into alternative profiles (choice sets) to be 
presented to respondents (Alpizar et al. 2001; Hanley et al. 2001). Based on the number of 
attributes and their levels (three attributes with two levels and two attributes with three levels) 
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a total of 72 different combinations (2
3
*3
2
) would be a complete factorial design. It is obvious 
that 72 different combinations would be too many for an individual to choose from. It was 
thus important to reduce the 72 combinations into a manageable number from which traders 
could make their choices.  
 
The approach most commonly used is the so-called orthogonal design which results in 
uncorrelated alternatives of attributes (Alpizar et al. 2001). The orthogonal design was 
developed using the ortho–plan function in SPSS version 17. This resulted into 16 different 
combinations. These 16 combinations (choice cards) were still considered too many and 
difficult to evaluate at the same time as it may lead to complexity (Hanley et al. 2001). For 
this reason it was decided that each respondent be given a maximum of 4 options at a time 
among which to choose. A procedure reported by Street et al. (2005) was used to construct 
the four different options. The procedure allows for independent estimation of all effects and 
leads to optimal designs for main effects and near optimal design for main effects with two 
interactions (Street et al. 2005).  
 
The basic principle of the Street et al. (2005) procedure is to use the orthogonal output from 
SPSS as a starting point, generally as the first option, and then make systematic level changes 
using a generator and modular arithmetic to get option two, and another to obtain option three 
and so on. The end result is that as many pairs of profiles as possible have different levels for 
each attribute. Based on this methodology, 16 choice cards made up of 4 different options 
were obtained.  
 
In order to use all the 16 choice cards, they were grouped into 4 blocks. The essence of the 
blocking is to reduce respondent fatigue which could result in low consistency (Adamowicz et 
al. 1998; Speelman et al. 2010). Each block contained 4 choice sets (cards) and each choice 
set contained 4 options from which the respondents had to select one. The 4 blocks were later 
divided into subsamples of our sample. Each respondent was randomly assigned to a block 
containing 4 choice cards. Since it was expected that some of the traders would not be able to 
read properly, some attribute levels were transformed in to pictograms (Speelman 2008). An 
example of a choice set is shown in table 8.2. 
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Table 8.2 Example of a choice card 
Block 3 choice card 4 
Attributes  Option 1 Option 2 Option 3  Option 4  None   
Type of 
documents  for  
exploitation 
agreement  
(Type E_A)  
 
 
 
 
Joint or 
individual JI_EA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Transferability of 
permit  (Tr_EA) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Duration of 
permit  (D_Expt) 
 
1 year 
 
 
3 years 
 
1  year 
 
3  years 
 
Regeneration tax  
(R_Tax) 
 
20 FCFA 
 
 
5 FCFA 
 
10 FCFA 
 
20 FCFA 
 
Assume these 
were the only 
options 
available. Which 
one will you 
choose?  Tick 
only one box 
 
 
□ 
 
 
□ 
 
 
□ 
 
 
□ 
 
 
□ 
 
8.4 Analytical Framework 
 
The theoretical foundation for analysing data from the stated preference choice experiment is 
based on Lancaster’s (1966) model of consumer choice. The econometric analysis is based on 
McFadden’s (1974) conditional logit model grounded in the theory of random utility (Hanley 
et al. 1998; Birol et al. 2006; Horne 2006) .  
 
8.4.1 The consumer choice model 
 
Based on Lancaster (1966), individuals derive utility (satisfaction) from the attributes or the 
characteristics of a good rather than from the good itself. For an illustration of the model, 
consider a trader’s choice for a given option, and consider that his utility (determined by the 
level of  transaction costs) depends on the choices made from a choice set C, which contains a 
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number of all possible policy alternatives (four in our case). The trader is assumed to have a 
utility function of the form shown in equation 8.1.  
 
                                                          
 
where Uij represents the utility of trader i choosing a given option j from set C. The utility 
derived from any of the policy options depends on the attributes Z of the policy option and the 
socio-economic characteristics of trader S which may include his experience in the business, 
capital, age, education, availability of alternative sources of income, etc.  
 
The random utility theory describes the utility U of each alternative in C as a sum of two 
components: a deterministic component (V) and an error component (e). The deterministic 
component is a vector of the alternative specific attributes and the characteristics of the 
individual respondent (trader). The error component (e) is independent of the deterministic 
part and represents errors that arise from influences that are unobservable by the researcher. It 
is generally assumed that inclusion of the error term makes the choice random (Holmes and 
Adamowicz 2002; Horne 2006). In other words, the error component implies that predictions 
cannot be made with certainty (Birol et al. 2006).   
 
Based on the random utility theory, an individual i will choose a given option from the choice 
set C if the utility j or (Uij) derived from that particular option is greater than that (Uik) 
obtainable from any other choice k,  as shown in equation 8.2.  This means that,   
  
                                                              
 
Choices made between different alternatives are a function of the probability that the utility 
associated with a particular choice are higher than that related to another alternative. This 
means that the probability that an individual i chooses alternative j is the same as the 
probability that the utility of alternative j is greater than any other utility k in the choice set C 
as stated in equation 8.3:  
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8.4.2 The econometric model 
 
An assumption often used is that the error terms eij are independently and identically 
distributed with an extreme value (Weibul) distribution (Hanley et al. 2001). This assumption 
will lead to the conditional logit model, which is most widely used in analysing multi-
attribute choices (Horne 2006). The conditional logit model (McFadden 1974; Greene 1997) 
for individual i, choosing option j over the others can be given by equation 8.4:  
 
      
      
            
                                    
 
Generally, the conditional indirect utility function estimated is shown in equation 8.5.  
 
 
                                                               
 
where β is the alternative specific constant (ASC) that captures the utility of any attribute that 
is not specified in the choice set; n is the number of attributes and m the number of socio- 
economic variables describing the trader. The coefficients β1 to βn   and    to    respectively 
capture the influence of the vector of attributes studied and the vector of socio-economic 
characteristics describing each trader. The socio-economic variables do not vary across the 
different options selected by each trader. In this regard, they are only included in the model as 
interaction terms with the choice specific attributes (Hanley et al. 2001; Birol et al. 2006). 
The coefficients obtained from the interaction terms can be used to interpret the effect of the 
socio-economic characteristics in determining choices (Speelman et al. 2010).  
Once the parameter estimates have been obtained, willingness to pay can be calculated for 
each attribute (Alpizar et al. 2001; Hanley et al. 2001). For a linear utility function such as 
that expressed in equation 1, willingness to pay can be simply articulated as in equation 8.6:  
        
  
  
                                         
where bc is the coefficient of any of the attributes and by is the coefficient of the monetary 
value in equation one; in this study, it refers to the regeneration tax. Equation 8.6 is also 
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referred to as the path worth (implicit price) formula and represents the marginal rate of 
substitution between the monetary value (regeneration tax) and the other attributes in the 
equation.  
 
8.5 Data collection and entry  
 
The study population was made up of traders specialised in selling four different NTFP in 
Cameroon (for details on choice of traders and markets, see Chapter seven).  
 
Before each interview, the objective of the exercise was explained to the respondent. 
Specifically, a brief explanation was given on how the exercise could contribute to improve 
the policy related to the procedure to obtain permits. Traders were also explicitly informed 
that participation was voluntary. The symbols that relate to each attribute and their levels 
were carefully explained to each respondent in a step-by-step process and a test was made to 
ensure that they had clearly understood the process. Those who failed the test after two 
attempts were excluded from the sample. The questionnaire also included questions related to 
the socio-economic characteristics of the respondents and others targeted at meeting other 
objectives. A description of the socio-economic variables is found in table 8.3. Each survey 
took between 50 and 90 minutes depending on the ability of traders to grasp the concept of 
the choice experiment and other questions as defined in chapter seven. The questionnaire was 
personally pre-tested and administered by the author. This was to make sure the quality of 
information collected was consistent.  
 
In all, 280 choices were elicited from 70 traders who accepted to take part in the survey. Data 
collected were entered in SPSS version 17 and later saved in the statistical package Stata 11.0. 
The conditional logit models were analysed using Stata 11.0. In performing the conditional 
logit models, all quantitative variables such as duration of permits and regeneration tax were 
directly entered. The coefficients in the model therefore show the effect of the magnitude of 
these variables. The qualitative attributes were effect-coded. This means that the base level of 
a given attribute is assigned a value of -1 while the other levels may take values of 0 or 1. 
Holmes and Adamowicz (2002) showed that this way of coding reduces problems of 
collinearity with the intercept, which might occur if the attribute levels were dummy coded. 
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Interested readers are referred to their book chapter for the technicalities of this (Holmes and 
Adamowicz 2002). Base levels for the three qualitative variables used are as follows: for type 
of documents, the base level was ‘complicated-centralised procedures’; for joined or 
‘individual’ exploitation agreement, the base level was individual and for transferability of 
permits, the base level was ‘no transferability’.  
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Table 8.3: Socio-economic characteristics of respondents  
Variable Description Percentage Mean (s.d) Range 
Principal 
activity  
If species is traders 
principal source of 
revenue 
No = 19 
Yes = 81 
  
Species   
Gnetum = 30 
Irvingia = 31 
Kola = 26 
Ricinodendron = 13 
  
Membership  
If respondent belong to a 
traders association 
No = 46 
Yes = 54 
  
Sex Sex of respondent 
Female = 40 
Male = 60 
  
Boundary of 
exchange  
Level of exportation 
Low export = 37 
High export =63 
  
Experience of 
trader 
Number of years trader 
has been in the NTFP 
business 
 11.4 (9.16) 1-50 
Value_FCFA 
Trader’s annual turnover 
in 2011 in 1000 FCFA 
 
24,768 
(31,862) 
250-150,000 
Age Age of respondent  40(8.30) 23-65 
Household Household size  7.9(3.86) 1-18 
Education  
Number of years of 
education  
 10.7 ( 3.20) 0-17 
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8.6 Results 
 
A description of the socio-economic characteristics of the traders interviewed has been given 
in chapter seven. This is summarised in table 8.3. Results of the conditional logit models are 
shown in table 8.4. Model 1 is the basic model and illustrates the effect of different attributes 
in determining traders’ decision to apply and obtain NTFP trade permits. The attribute 
specific constant (ASC) included in this model represents the utility gains linked to not 
choosing any of the options provided to the traders. Even though the ASC was not significant, 
the negative sign suggests that choosing the opt-out alternative decreases implicit utility. This 
means that all things being equal, traders would prefer to see some changes in the current 
procedures based on the alternatives provided to them.  
Based on model 1, all the attributes except transferability with authorisation from the 
government had a positive and significant effect in determining traders’ choices. In other 
words, there is a preference for a decentralised and simplified process compared to a 
centralised and complicated one. Traders also prefer joined permits through traders’ group 
and not through limited liability companies. Also, transfer of permits between traders and an 
increased duration of a permit improved the chances that an option was selected by a trader. 
On the other hand and in line with basic economic theory, an increase in forestry tax had a 
negative significant effect on the probability for a particular option to be chosen. This 
therefore means that traders would prefer lower regeneration taxes.  
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Table 8.4: Conditional logit model: determinants of choice to obtain permits  
Attribute  
Model 1 Model 2 
Coefficient  SE Coefficient  SE 
Attribute-specific constant (ASC) -14.73 ns 47.331 -15.30 512.97 
Simplified decentralised procedures  
(base level: complicated procedure) 
1.06*** 0.09 1.10*** 0.33 
 
Joint ownership of an approval (base level, 
single ownership) 
0.45*** 0.08 0.49*** 0.18 
 
Traders based transferable permits (base 
level, non transferable permits) 
0.42*** 0.11 0.44** 0.21 
 
Government based transferable permits  
(base level non-transferable permits) 
0.05 ns 0.11 0.34*** 0.15 
 
Duration of exploitation permit  
 
0.27*** 
 
0.08 
 
0.28** 
 
0.13 
 
Regeneration tax  
 
-0.06*** 
 
0.01 
 
-0.05*** 
 
0.01 
 
Membership in traders association*Joined 
ownership  
  
0.60*** 0.17 
 
Experience in business*government based 
transferable permits  
  
-0.027** 0.011 
 
Sex*joint ownership    
-0.57*** 0.17 
 
Model statistics      
Log likelihood  -362.15 
 
-34'.98 
 
Pseudo R
2
 0.28 
 
0.31 
 
Chi square  0.00   0.00   
*** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, ns = non significant  
 
In order to target policies that satisfy traders with different socio-economic characteristics it 
may be useful to know how certain socio-economic variables influence traders’ choices. To 
meet this objective, only those socio-economic factors that were anticipated to influence 
preferences for specific attributes were chosen. For example, it was anticipated that, traders 
with relatively less capital, and those who are less educated would prefer joint exploitation 
agreements compared to traders who have more capital who may opt to operate individually. 
However, because of incidences of co-linearity that arise when many socio-economic 
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variables are included in a model (Holmes and Adamowicz 2002), several interactions were 
tested following Speelman et al. (2010) by running different models. Those that were 
consistent were finally retained.  
Results of different interactions reveal that most socio-economic variables shown in table 8.3 
were not significant in determining choices. However, membership in traders’ associations, 
sex of the trader and experience in business were found to significantly influence the choice 
of respondents.  
As was indicated in equation 8.6, by assuming a linear utility function, the monetary 
value of a marginal change from one attribute level to another (willingness to pay) is derived 
by dividing the implicit marginal utility of that attribute (coefficient) by the implicit marginal 
utility of the regeneration tax. Willingness to pay values (table 8. 5) derived from model 2, 
and subject to the socio-economic characteristics of traders can be viewed as the value of a 
marginal change from one attribute level to another. For example, a change from a 
centralised-complicated procedure to a decentralised-simplified procedure is valued at 
22FCFA per kg (table 5) while an increase in the duration of permits by one year is valued at 
5.6 FCFA per kg. This implies that a decentralised and simplified process is four times as 
important as increasing the duration of permits from one to three years. The positive signs on 
the willingness to pay values suggest that traders are generally going to benefit from a change 
in any of the attributes.   
 
Table 8.5: Valuation of attribute changes  
 
Attribute change  
Implicit willingness to pay 
FCFA /kg 
Complicated to simplified  22.00 
Single to joint  9.80 
No transfer –traders-based transfer 8.80 
No transfer –government-based transfer 6.80 
Increase in duration of permit by one year  5.60 
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8.7 Discussion  
 
This study used choice experiment as a method to incorporate stakeholders’ views in the 
design and evaluation of policy options and to assess traders’ perceptions about proposed 
regulations that are expected to entice them to better comply with the forestry law governing 
trade in NTFP in Cameroon. 
 
Results of the study show that all the selected attributes contributed in influencing traders’ 
choices of complying with the law. In other words, the traders would prefer to choose one of 
the proposed options rather than to opt not to choose any. Above all, these results suggest that 
all the attributes were relevant to the traders. This relevance may be related to the validity of 
the choice experiment which takes into consideration insights from the target beneficiaries 
through stakeholders’ workshops and focus group discussions, the latter involving 
representatives of the sampled population (Alpizar et al. 2001; Horne 2006). This approach 
contributed in selecting those options that the traders’ considered were fair or would 
contribute in reducing transaction costs in the process of complying with the permit system. 
The results therefore confirm two things (i) that participatory approaches are useful in 
selecting options relevant to formulating policies and legislations (Sutinen and Kuperan 1999; 
Mayers and Bass 2004a; Blaser 2010; Kaine et al. 2010; Ramcilovic-Suominen and Epstein 
2012) and (ii) that choice modelling is ideally suited to analyse the significance of the 
selected options (Hanley et al. 2001; Birol et al. 2006).  
 
Based on the WTP measures, the option most valued by the sampled traders was 
decentralisation of the application process to the regions and reduction in the volume of paper 
work involved. For example, by decentralising and simplifying the process, traders would be 
made better off to the extent of 22 FCFA/kg. This is higher than the current regeneration tax 
of 10 FCFA/kg. This means that most traders may be willing to pay a higher regeneration tax 
in order for the process to be simplified. If this is done the benefit does not only accrue to 
traders because regeneration tax can be an important source of revenue for the Government 
(Betti 2007b). The latter interpretation of traders willing to pay higher regeneration taxes is 
different from the negative sign obtained for the coefficient of the regeneration tax in table 4. 
The sign for the coefficient of the cost component in the choice experiment is interpreted as a 
test for theoretical validity of the model (Alpizar et al. 2001; Speelman et al. 2010).  The 
negative sign obtained in this study is thus in line with rational economic thinking that 
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individuals would like to minimise cost which suggest that all things being equal, traders 
would prefer to pay lower regeneration taxes. However, they would prefer to pay higher 
regeneration taxes to see the process improved from complicated to simplified procedures.   
 
Some socio-economic indicators such as turn-over, which was used as a proxy for capital, 
were hypothesised to influence most of the attributes and attribute levels. However, it did not 
turn out to be a significant factor. This is definitely because most traders interviewed are 
small scale traders which imply that variability amongst them was too low to capture an 
effect. The policy implication of this is that traders, at least of the sample population generally 
perceive problems related to permits in the same way and a common policy will be binding 
for all of them. However to have a bigger picture of the policy options to improve compliance 
in the forest sector in Cameroon, it would be important to extend this study to other sectors 
where illegal activities are common such as illegal timber exploitation and wildlife poaching.  
 
Literature reports that marketing groups can play significant roles in reducing transaction 
costs related to the search of information, negotiation and monitoring of activities (Griffon 
2001; Bienabe et al. 2004; Shepherd 2005; Tieguhong et al. 2012b) and this has been 
empirically reported to be possible in the NTFP sector in Cameroon (Foundjem-Tita et al. 
2011). As expected therefore, membership in traders association had significant positive 
effects on traders’ decision to choose joint approvals. This is important as one of the political 
objectives of facilitating CIGs in Cameroon is for small scale actors to mobilise limited 
resources to meet costs, something that would not be possible if traders operated individually. 
Narrative discussions with some traders revealed that the desire to obtain official papers is 
one of the main objectives why such groups remained united. It is therefore obvious for 
traders who are in groups to derive higher utilities for joint exploitation agreements than those 
who operate individually. Although traders’ focus in this case is on reducing transaction costs, 
the role of groups in facilitating compliance through the application of social sanctions to 
members has also been reported (Ostrom 1990; Sutinen and Kuperan 1999; Ramcilovic-
Suominen and Epstein 2012). Thus if CIGs are also allowed to apply for permits members can 
put pressure on others to comply with the law.  
 
Women are generally reported to be less successful in small businesses than men (Loscocco et 
al. 1991; Shelton 2006; Chirwa 2008; Amine and Staub 2009; Coleman and Robb 2009) but 
in this study women had significantly higher capital compared to men. Capital was not 
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significant in determining choices, meaning that the nature of the business characterised by 
harassment from forestry and police officials requesting permits at check points may explain 
why more women compared to men would prefer to operate as a group. The choice of women 
may be related to the fact that they may not have equal resistance to confront the police and 
forestry officials, thus by joining common initiative groups they feel they can easily succeed 
in going through the process. The latter explanation  is supported by Amine and Staub (2009) 
who report that women entrepreneurs in sub-Saharan Africa face daunting array of challenges 
which negatively affect their business. These negative challenges generally stem from the 
socio-cultural, economic, legal and political environment in which they live. These additional 
prejudices are expressed through differential attitudes towards women in general. 
 
Compared to no transferability the introduction of a transferable permit system regulated by 
the government did not significantly increase the preference of the traders. However when the 
government regulated permit system was interacted with experience in business, the effect 
became negatively significant. The negative significance means that traders with experience 
in handling the species were less likely to be motivated by transfers of permits that had to 
pass through the government. This is probably related to negative experiences with bribery 
and corruption encountered in dealing with forests and police officials who enforce the law on 
permits (Cerutti and Tacconi 2006; Ndoye and Awono 2010). This negative experience might 
have resulted in a general lack of trust in government institutions by the experienced traders. 
The implication of this is that even if the Government of Cameroon allows transferable 
permits, they may not be readily accepted as traders will be distracted by high transaction 
costs involved in the transfer procedure if the government coordinates the transfers.  
 
8.8 Conclusions  
 
Given the difficulties stakeholders in the forestry sector face to comply with laws which 
sometimes are related to transaction costs resulting from excessive regulations or 
dissatisfaction as a result of perceived unfairness of laws and regulations; it is important for 
research to assist policy makers through the provision of advice about rational and legitimate 
preferences as perceived by targeted stakeholders and feasible on the part of the Government.  
The case study applied the choice experiment technique to elicit traders’ evaluation and 
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preferences for various policy options that are hypothesised may lure them to comply with the 
regulation on NTFP permits in Cameroon.  
 
Results reveal that the following factors were significant in determining traders’ choices to 
select an option and would thus encourage compliance with the permit system: (i) CIGs and 
not only limited liability companies should be recognised as organisational structures that are 
eligible to obtain permits; (ii) the process has to be simplified  by reducing paper work and by 
decentralising procedures to the regions; (iii) transfers between permit holders should be 
allowed and, (iv) the duration of the permit should be increased by at least one year.  
 
Because all the selected attributes were significant in determining traders’ choices, the 
approach supports existing knowledge that stakeholders’ participation is an important process 
in the design and formulation of policies and laws that can be widely accepted by the targeted 
group. Likewise, choice experiment can be an important method to enhance stakeholders’ 
participation because it makes provision for a representative sample of the target group to take 
part in the selection of attributes and their levels. In this respect, aspects of economic 
feasibility (transaction costs reduction) and social acceptability (perceived fairness) of the 
proposed policies and regulations are assessed by the target group.  
 
To the best of our knowledge this is one of the few studies that used the choice experiment 
technique to assess policy options in the NTFP sector especially when applied to the Congo 
basin forests. As such, the relevance of the method needs to be tried in other empirical 
research especially in selecting the most important attributes and their levels that are relevant 
in the formulation of new policies and laws.  
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Chapter 
9 General conclusions  
 
9.1 Recapitulation of research design and objectives  
 
An analysis of the policy and institutional context within which production and 
commercialisation of  NTFP/AFTP takes place is important, in order to better understand, 
how incentives can be improved to increase the performance of actors across the value chain. 
This is especially so because the institutional environment creates the framework and 
conditions under which stakeholders develop alternative types of institutional arrangements 
necessary for production and exchange to take place. With regards to agroforestry, adequate 
policies are required to support development and adoption of new technologies. An adequate 
institutional environment is expected to enhance property rights to land and trees and reduce 
transaction costs related to the marketing of NTFP/AFTP.  
 
The study was divided into three parts. Part one consisted of chapters one to three. In chapter 
one, background information related to the problems faced by the NTFP and the agroforestry 
sector in Cameroon was presented. This led to the identification of policy and institutional 
gaps that needed to be covered in the rest of the study. The general theoretical literature on 
NTFP and AFTP was inconclusive on several vital questions with regards to policy and 
institutions. This study sought to answer four of these questions:  
 
- What formal policies or strategies and regulations currently exist to address agroforestry 
development in Cameroon? 
- What are farmers’ awareness and attitudes towards these policies and legislation or 
regulations in relation to agroforesty development?  
- How do formal and informal rules interact to manage both NTFP and AFTP, including 
access rules to land on which these species grow? 
- How do traders dealing in our target products, cope with formal rules governing trade and 
how do these rules affect their activities and performance in the value chain? 
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 Chapter two explored the theoretical and conceptual framework adopted to answer the key 
research questions. The main theory used was the New Institutional Economics with focus on 
Oliver Williamson’s four levels of institutional analysis (Williamson 2000a). Based on this 
theory, a conceptual framework was developed inspired by the Institutional Analysis 
Development framework proposed by Ostrom et al. (1994). The framework presented actors 
in the NTFP/AFTP value chain and their interaction with specific formal and informal rules 
governing access, production and trade in NTFP/AFTP and how these interactions may lead 
to different outcomes. Chapter three dealt with the setting. It described the studied species and 
the sampling plans for regions, products and respondents.  
 
Chapter four to eight are the empirical chapters. They addressed four main issues of relevance 
to the policy and institutional environment within which NTFP/AFTP actors in Cameroon 
operate. First, in chapter four, an analysis of existing government policies and legal 
frameworks governing access to and trade in AFTP/NTFP in Cameroon was performed. We 
analysed from a theoretical perspective whether the policies and legislation provide incentives 
or are rather disincentives for agroforestry development.  
 
Farmers’ awareness and perception of existing policies and institutions and how they affect 
their property rights to land and trees are crucial in determining their decision to adapt to 
institutional changes related to agroforestry development. Within this context, farmers’ 
perception of the legal framework governing trees in Cameroon was analysed in chapter five. 
In the same chapter, their willingness to accept proposed policy instruments (certificates of 
origin), hypothesised to overcome recognised gaps in current legislation governing trees was 
also analysed. 
 
In analysing institutions governing natural resources, an understanding of both formal and 
informal rules governing a resource is often recommended. One area where both formal and 
informal rules interact in the management of the same resource is land. In chapter six, the 
concept of tenure security as a factor to agroforestry development has been specifically 
studied. We thus examined: how farmers perceive ownership of land in their community; and 
whether they perceive land titles as an institution that may give them more security to their 
land and trees compared with the present customary laws governing ownership. The 
relationship between farmers’ perception of tenure security and tree planting was also 
established  
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Chapters seven and eight focused on institutions governing trade in NTFP. If NTFP traders as 
a link in the value chain cannot conveniently sell NTFP, then producers will not have a 
market for their produce and this may hinder production. Chapter seven was based on the 
premise that where the institutional environment is not sufficiently developed to support 
market activities, actors will often develop specific arrangements to coordinate their activities. 
The chapter specifically focused on institutional arrangements to obtain permits to sell NTFP 
in Cameroon. It considered the ability of NTFP traders to comply with prescribed laws 
governing the demand and supply of permits. Analyses further investigated whether existing 
institutional arrangements have the potential to generate corruption and rent seeking attitudes 
amongst actors in the chain. In addition, winners and losers of the permit system were further 
analysed.  
 
In chapter eight, we consider how traders’ access to permits could be improved by analysing 
through a choice experiment different policy options that may meet government objectives of 
conserving NTFP resources, generate revenue to renew the natural resource, reduce rents and 
corruption and at the same time be affordable to traders.  
 
9.2 General discussions  
 
The main empirical findings are chapter specific and were discussed within the respective 
empirical chapters. The objective of this section is to synthesize and briefly discuss the 
empirical findings to answer the main research questions posed in chapter one.  
 
- What formal policies or strategies and regulations currently exist to address agroforestry 
development in Cameroon? 
A review of policy documents and mission statements from the Ministries of Agriculture, 
Forestry, Environment and other rural development programs indicate that no specific 
agroforestry policy or strategy document exists for Cameroon. However, elements of an 
agroforestry policy can be found in major government policy documents related to 
agricultural development, forestry and poverty alleviation. There does seem to exist a 
commitment of the government of Cameroon to include elements of NTFP in its natural 
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resources management, and poverty reduction policies and therefore indirectly promote 
agroforestry. 
 
Even though several ministries in Cameroon have agroforestry and related tree planting 
activities in their portfolio, none of them has the mandate to coordinate such activities to 
ensure that both environmental and livelihood concerns are properly addressed. The result is 
confusion as to which activities, amongst numerous tree planting programs, fall within the 
domain of agroforestry, forestation or afforestation; what species need to be planted where, at 
what planting distances and with which crops, etc. The abundance of afforestation and 
reforestation programs to address environmental issues, specifically from the Ministries of 
Forestry and Environment may undermine the important role the Ministry of Agriculture 
should play in coordinating agroforestry development in Cameroon with particular focus on 
the interaction between crops, animals and trees on a piece of land, which is actually the 
essence of agroforestry. 
 
- What are farmers’ awareness and attitudes towards policies and legislation or 
regulations in relation to agroforestry development? 
Forestry legislation governing trees in Cameroon (1994 Forestry Law) designed with the good 
intentions of conserving natural resources, potentially limits farmers’ economic rights to 
exploit NTFP and de facto limits their rights to the trees they plant on their farms. In fact, the 
law defines forest products by saying that they differ from agricultural products, but does not 
define agricultural products.  In line with Belcher (2003), this leads to confusion as to whether 
products harvested from farm trees shall be considered as agricultural products or forestry 
products. This is particularly unclear for the tree and vegetable species studied in this thesis 
which are also found in the wild, such as kola (Cola spp.), bush mango (Irvingia gabonensis), 
njansang (Ricinodendron heudelotii), and Gnetum spp.  
 
Based on the 1994 Forestry Law, local populations are conferred usufruct rights which 
constitute the right to exploit NTFP for personal use, but not for commercial purposes. The 
implication is that farmers’ property rights are poorly defined, as the products coming from 
their farmland are subjected to control for permits. The effect of permits may not have a direct 
consequence on farmers’ decisions to either sell or plant the species because most of them sell 
at the door step and are seldom controlled for permits. But if farmers were to transport their 
produce to urban markets themselves they would be subjected to forestry control. Analyses of 
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farmers’ awareness reveal that a significant majority are not aware of official regulation 
governing access and trade in the selected species. Having explained the official legislation to 
them, about 40% declared they would stop dealing in the selected species if the law on 
permits were properly enforced. The reason why most farmers would still plant indigenous 
trees even if the regulations in play were effectively enforced is that agroforestry forms an 
integral part of their traditional farming systems and livelihoods, as has been reported by 
several authors (Russell and Franzel 2004; Schreckenberg et al. 2006a; Tchoundjeu et al. 
2006). Yet, as the regression analyses show, some farmers especially those closer to markets 
may easily give-up tree planting probably due to more interesting income generating 
opportunities provided to them. A significant majority (61%) are ready to accept new policy 
instruments, such as certificate of origins to distinguish farm products from those harvested 
from the wild.  
 
- How do formal and informal rules interact to manage both NTFP and AFTP including 
land on which these species grow? 
The concept of tenure security and interactions between formal and informal institutions in 
the management of land and trees were investigated in chapter six. Following the 1994 
Forestry Law, trees planted on land without a title deed belong to the state. According to the 
1974 Land Ordinance, ownership of land is only granted if a person claiming rights to land 
has a title deed. But there are arguments for and against land titles in literature. However, not 
much is known about farmers’ perception of land ownership and tenure security especially in 
the context of agroforestry production. Whether and which of the systems (formal or 
informal) gives more security over farmers’ land, therefore remains an open question.  
 
Although all respondents claim individual ownership over plots they are farming, a majority 
of them (76%) feel that they are not the real owners of the land. They share the symbolic 
views that land is the property of the chiefs, or community (46%) and the government (23%). 
A right to sell is limited as 81% cannot sell their land without prior authorisation of members 
outside of the household.  
 
Eighty percent of the sampled farmers would accept land titles to guarantee security over the 
land for which they claim ownership. When they were given the opportunity to choose 
between land titles and customary systems of securing ownership, a majority 59% still opted 
for land titles against 41% who chose the customary system. Nevertheless, further analysis 
179 
 
indicates that 25% switched from the formal to customary system. Regression analysis 
showed that farmers from communities that had resisted cultural decay were more likely to 
choose customary institutions compared to those whose traditional values had been 
comparatively more tempered by modernity and colonisation. Similarly, analysis of tenure 
security based on fear of eviction by either the Government using formal laws or traditional 
authorities using customary rules shows that farmers have more trust in traditional 
institutions. 
 
Almost all the interviewed farmers (97%) reported that fear of eviction was not a factor that 
stops them from planting. Instead, 29% feel that lack of available land is more a handicap to 
tree planting. This suggests that land availability may be more limiting to agroforestry 
development than the aspect of tenure security.  
 
For the three studied fruit species (Irvingia gabonensis, Ricinodendron heudelotii, Cola spp), 
farmers’ main sources of harvest/collection were from land on which they claim individual 
ownership. Only 11% collected/harvested from what may be termed ‘wild’ sources. Out of 
the 394 farmers, forty percent had planted at least one of the studied species since they took 
over the land from their parents. Most households had exclusive rights over the studied fruit 
trees that are found on all land use types for which they claim to have private ownership. High 
prevalence of exclusive rights is an incentive to the process of domestication or tree planting. 
This is true because with such rights farmers’ investments in NTFP are secured. This is 
however different for the case of Gnetum spp. As reported by Ingram et al. (2012) tress-
passing is still common on individual Gentum plots suggesting that customary institutions are 
yet to adapt to the transition of Gnetum as an agroforestry product.  
 
- How do traders dealing in the products cope with formal rules governing trade and how 
do these rules affect their activities and performance in the value chain? 
Analysis of institutional arrangements in the demand and supply of permits (Chapter seven) in 
the NTFP sector reveals high levels of non-compliance with the law. Factors motivating non 
compliance are generally related to high transactions costs involved in the process of applying 
for permits. This is characterised by a high nominal amount to be paid for the permit; and 
limited access to information and complicated bureaucratic processes. Laws that fail to reflect 
and fit in with the situation on the ground or that are perceived as unfair often lead to 
situations of illegality (Ramcilovic-Suominen and Epstein 2012). This is characteristic for the 
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situation in Cameroon. The amount required to process and obtain the necessary legal 
documents may be beyond the financial capacity of a majority of the traders involved in the 
NTFP business.  
 
Even though the process is generally complex, non-compliance is further aggravated by 
instances of opportunism and bounded rationality. Law enforcement officers take advantage 
of the fact that traders are not informed about the procedures and circulate distorted 
information making the process seemingly impossible for these traders. By so doing, they 
increase their chances of seeking rents from traders who are often apprehended for not having 
permits. Our findings confirm results from other studies (Cerutti and Tacconi 2006; Blaser 
2010) stating that corruption and high transaction costs to meet complicated government 
imposed procedures are major sources of non-compliance in the forestry sector.  
 
By using the NIE theory to analyse non-compliance, this study thus concludes that 
compliance with the law on permits on the one hand is a rational choice by traders to 
overcome high costs. By paying bribes they make more benefits than what they may gain if 
they go for permits. On the other hand, the decision not to comply with the law is not only 
limited to benefits and costs, it is also a result of constraints imposed by formal regulations 
that the traders generally refer to as ‘too complex’. In chapter seven, it is reported that none of 
the traders had permits. When asked if they would want to have one about 96% said yes. 
Some of their reasons for desiring to obtain permits reflect the moral part of these traders as 
can be derived from responses such as the ‘desire to respect the law and to contribute to State 
revenue’ (36%) which means that morality or moral norms as part of institutions are key in 
determining economic performance (North 1990) and may also support the findings of other 
authors that morality and moral norms can  catalyse compliance with the law (Sutinen and 
Kuperan 1999; Kaine et al. 2010; Ramcilovic-Suominen and Epstein 2012).  
 
Understanding and predicting the extent to which individuals are motivated to change their 
behaviours to comply with proposed regulations is critical to understanding how effective 
proposed regulations can be (Kaine et al. 2010). This was the objective of chapter eight. The 
choice model applied to assess policy options showed that traders would comply with the law 
on permits under the following conditions: (i) CIGs should be recognised as organisations that 
are eligible to obtain permits; (ii) the permit system has to be simplified and decentralised to 
the regions; (iii) transfers between permit holders should be permitted; and (iv) the duration of 
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the permit should be increased by at least one year. In addition, the study found that 
simplifying paper work and decentralising the process to the regions was the most valued 
alternative selected by traders. Following Alpizar et al. (2001), the choice experiment method 
has proven to be useful in evaluating policy options because it takes into consideration the 
interest of the target audience in the design and assessment of policy options(Alpizar et al. 
2001; Hope et al. 2005). Policy makers can thus use the information to guide reforms in the 
NTFP sector.  
 
Besides giving information on WTP, the study clearly shows which policy option may have a 
significant effect on traders’ decisions to comply with the law. However, this study does not 
necessarily imply that reducing transaction costs by applying the above mentioned attributes 
will reduce illegality or increase compliance in the NTFP sector because, as illustrated in the 
literature, many other factors may influence compliance amongst which the capacity of 
individuals to change their behaviour in a way that complies with regulations (Sutinen and 
Kuperan 1999; Kaine et al. 2010; Ramcilovic-Suominen and Epstein 2012). In this case, the 
moral part of traders hitherto stressed in the preceding paragraph is an important factor to be 
considered. The results of this study should thus be considered as part of a broader framework 
to increase compliance in the NTFP sector but by applying the choice experiment results, it is 
almost certain that aspects of perceived fairness and legitimacy of legislation or regulation 
would be addressed, because the attributes were based on participatory procedures and thus 
reflect traders’ expectations.  
 
9.3 Linking research results to outcome indicators  
 
In the theoretical and conceptual framework outlined in chapter two, it was illustrated that the 
interaction between actors, institutions and activities in the NTFP/AFTP value chain 
determines the outcome of the value chain. Outcomes were identified to be relevant factors 
(varying objectives for participating in the chain) against which the participation of selected 
actors in the chain could be evaluated. The results of the research questions for each group of 
actors (GOC, producers and traders) have been addressed in details in the respective chapters 
of this study. The objective of this subsection is to make a brief link between research results 
and the selected outcomes (performance indicators).  
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Starting with the GOC, it would be interesting to answer whether existing government polices 
and policy instruments governing access to and trade in NTFP/AFTP meet government 
objectives of poverty reduction and conservation of the natural resource base? As shown in 
chapters four and five, policy instruments intended to conserve the natural resource base 
discourage the cultivation of indigenous species as these policies limit trade in NTFP with 
indirect repercussions on AFTP. This is in contradiction to government policy to reduce 
poverty which takes into consideration sustainable use of the natural resource and their 
contribution to the income of rural dwellers. The regeneration tax is expected to contribute to 
the conservation and regeneration of the natural resource (Government of Cameroon 1994). 
Contradictorily, and in line with Betti (2007b), results in chapter seven shows that the GOC 
gains virtually nothing from such a tax and it is a victim of its own policies as rent seekers 
and corrupt police and forestry officers make more money from unofficial taxes and rents 
compared to the  government. As a consequence of the latter, appropriate funds cannot be 
raised to put in place the right programs to regenerate the natural resources base as envisaged.  
Instead, one can be forced to conclude based on traders’ declarations as typified in chapter 
seven that the species are overexploited to meet up with the demand of unofficial taxes 
charged by the police and forestry and rent seeking EO leading instead to a depletion of the 
resource base. This is particularly true for species like Gnetum Spp for which harvesting 
practices are a threat to sustainability (Fondoun and Tiki Manga 2000).  
 
For producers’ the issue to consider is whether existing policies affect secured property rights, 
provide incentives to plant trees and increase their revenues. Again as already mentioned for 
the case of the GOC, existing policies limit producers/collectors perceived property rights to 
land, trees and trees products and consequently limit their incentives to cultivate indigenous 
species. However, since enforcement at the level of producers is weak, a significant majority 
do not feel the impact of the policy instruments.  
 
Finally for the case of traders, results in chapters seven clearly demonstrate that current 
policies governing the NTFP/AFTP sector is characterised by high transaction costs and rent 
seeking government and economic operators. The direct consequence of which may be low 
producer prices, high consumer prices and low government returns all of which reduce 
performance in the value chain.  
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9.4 Theoretical and policy implications  
 
Despite the recognised importance of agroforestry in meeting virtually all the Millennium 
Development Goals, and the acknowledgment of its role to provide environmental services, 
this thesis and several other agroforestry-related literature in Europe, America, Africa and 
Asia (Garrett and Buck 1997; Dupraz et al. 2004; Roshetko et al. 2008; Santos Martin and 
Van Noordwijk 2011) all point to the fact that agroforestry does not receive adequate policy 
and institutional support. This study therefore adds to this body of knowledge and 
recommends an institutional change whereby agroforestry and NTFP/AFTP need to be given 
due consideration in formal definitions and in legal frameworks governing trees.  
 
Specifically for Cameroon, empirical and theoretical arguments suggest that policy makers 
need to adapt existing regulations to the current shifts in agricultural and conservation 
practices, whereby originally wild trees are now planted on farm. Indigenous species are the 
most discriminated and are the most affected by forestry legislation and thus need more 
concern.  
- A specific Strategy/program needs to be put in place to develop, guide and implement 
agroforestry strategies  
To take advantage of the opportunities provided by agroforestry to meet national and 
international development goals and also to secure the sustainable management of natural 
resources, appropriate policies, policy instruments, strategies and implementation 
mechanisms are required. However, such a strategy needs a concerted action between all 
ministries interested in tree planting. Such a strategy would define clear objectives and targets 
to meet. The Ministry of Agriculture may have a broader role to play in differentiating general 
tree planting, afforestation and reforestation programs from ‘agroforestry’, by incorporating 
elements specific to agriculture and livestock that may be overlooked by other ministries.  
- Distinction should be made between agroforestry products harvested from trees on-farm 
and non-timber forest products collected from the wild  
In designing legislative instruments to manage NTFP, policy makers should consider that 
most NTFP with high economic value currently collected from the wild are likely to be 
planted on farmers’ fields in the near future, thanks to recent advances in tree domestication 
research. Furthermore, most development projects in the domain of climate change mitigation 
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and adaptation (REDD and REDD+) most likely will encourage tree planting by farmers. 
Thus, there is a high need to define and develop criteria to distinguish agricultural and 
agroforestry products from forestry products and NTFP, while products bounded by specific 
legislation need to be clearly defined. 
 
Since it is virtually impossible to visually differentiate tree products harvested from the wild 
from those harvested from farmers’ fields, certificates of origin may be useful. While 
transaction costs in obtaining these certificates may be an issue, we have shown in chapter 
five that a significant majority of farmers in Cameroon would be ready to abide by certificates 
of origin if introduced.  
- Efforts should be made to reduce transaction costs related to obtaining land certificates 
Besides security of ownership, agroforestry - like other investment in agriculture - requires 
land. Competition between trees and other crops for space may push agroforestry to a second 
choice position. Therefore, the bottleneck may not really be rights to land as is often reported 
but rather the possibility of obtaining enough land. Customary laws slow down the emergence 
of land markets, as families are expected to reserve land for their progenies and are not 
allowed to sell it. Although availability of land may not be limited to agroforestry 
development alone, it is worthwhile recommending that strategies need to be developed to 
either encourage land markets or redistribute land to enterprising farmers in another manner. 
 
While some farmers mostly from areas where respect for traditional institutions is still strong 
and usually represented by lineage may prefer customary rules to guarantee security of tenure, 
results let us to suppose that a majority of farmers will opt for land title in the middle to near 
future. This is based on the argument that culture is far from static and continuously evolves 
under the pressure of a changing environment driven by population growth and modernity 
(Platteau 1996; Aldashev et al. 2012). There is therefore a need for the state to develop 
appropriate institutions to take over disintegrating customary systems and protect land 
ownership claims of farmers. One thing to do is to devise institutions to reduce transaction 
costs in obtaining land titles. Farmers even proposed that obtaining land certificates should be 
made as simple as obtaining a national identity card.  
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- Provide incentive for forestry law compliance 
This study has used empirical findings to show that dispositions in the 1994 law governing 
the issuing of permits to sell NTFP, has created an atmosphere of illegal activities; rents- 
seeking government officials and business men; corruption; loss of revenue by the state and a 
generally poorly functioning NTFP value chain. The theoretical justification of this argument 
points to policy options or rules that would not only reduce transaction costs in the permit 
system but also create opportunities that motivate self-compliance or provide incentives to 
comply with the law. The choice experiment in chapter eight identified major changes 
through which transaction costs can be reduced in the permit system, there by facilitating 
compliance. 
 
9.5 Limitation of the study and further research  
 
This thesis has offered an evaluative perspective of the policy and institutional environment 
governing the NTFP/AFTP value chains in Cameroon. This was done through an assessment 
of policies and legislation/regulations governing the sector and by sampling and interviewing 
collectors/producers and traders in the value chains. As a direct consequence of the objectives 
and methods used, the study has encountered a number of short-comings which need to be 
addressed in the future.  
 
First, for producers, the study was limited to indigenous species. In this respect, we foremost 
peruse whether and how the Government of Cameroon includes such species in its poverty 
reduction and other development strategies with the aim of identifying bottlenecks that may 
need policy intervention. Having identified institutional gaps as a major obstacle, the study 
then focused on appraising these gaps. By doing this we addressed one of three agroforestry 
concerns outlined by Place et al (2012) which is institutions governing private property rights 
over land and trees. The study however, neglected two other important elements that may 
have warranted attention when analysing agroforestry policies (policy in this case represent 
incentives in North’s definition of institutions) with a focus on indigenous species. These 
include:  
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(i) Policies related to tree germplasm multiplication and dissemination. In this case, it is 
important to address the way markets for tree germplasm work, how they are regulated 
and how the technical know-how should be transmitted. Currently as mentioned in chapter 
four, most on-farm tree planting materials and programs had been concentrated on exotics 
for which there are well-know propagation and management techniques. This does not 
exist for most indigenous species even though ICRAF has made efforts to develop such 
techniques for priority indigenous species.  
 
(ii) Policies related to the recognition of agroforestry as an attractive investment area within 
agricultural organisations and programme. The perception of stakeholders in different 
government and international agricultural organisations was not sought. This would have 
given the opportunity to analyse their knowledge, interests, positions and alliances to 
agroforestry development. This gap can be filled by subsequent research that seeks 
solutions to designing an optimal set of rules that would encourage agroforestry 
development. This even becomes more relevant with the increasing recognition of the 
contribution of agroforestry to climate change and payment for environmental services. 
Effective institutional arrangements can provide opportunities to effectively remunerate 
farmers’ efforts to plant trees on-farm.  
 
In chapter four a theoretical framework to show the influence of policy instruments together 
with other socio-economic, ecological and technical factors on farmers’ decision to plant trees 
was developed, and in chapter five, farmers’ decisions to plant trees based on existing 
regulations and proposed willingness to accept policy instruments such as certificate of origin 
was assessed. The study however, failed to consider from farmers’ perspective which of the 
factors when addressed will provide the highest expected incentives for them to plant trees. 
Such information can be relevant to prioritise policy interventions and thus need to be further 
investigated.  
In addition the results of this thesis cannot be considered as an endpoint to the analysis of the 
effect of agricultural and forestry policies and policy instruments on farmers’ on-farm tree 
planting decisions. One main issue is that most of these policy instruments are weakly 
enforced. This means that analysis of the assumed relationship between attitudes towards 
policy instruments and farmers on-farm tree planting intentions need to employ more rigorous 
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analytical frameworks such as the theory of planned behaviour as elaborated by Fishbein and 
Ajzen (1975) than as are used in this study.   
Specific to chapter six where we investigated farmers’ perception and preferences for either 
land titles or customary systems, an extension of the study may require researching ways of 
reducing transaction costs and other red tapes in the delivering of permits.   
Second, and in relation to traders and specific to chapters seven and eight, the scale of the 
debate on reducing illegal NTFP trade was limited to reducing transaction costs. Transaction 
costs may have received wide acceptance in the analysis of institutions, especially in 
providing a measure of institutional efficiency, as demonstrated in chapter seven. However, 
the use of transaction costs may mask other issues related to designing efficient institutions to 
govern demand and supply of permits, such as aligning incentives to motivate self-
compliance with the law on permits. An attempt was made in chapter eight to research options 
that may catalyse self enforcement based on perceived fairness or acceptance of proposed 
policies or regulations. However the method used was limited in that it did not test the 
effectiveness and efficiency of proposed solutions. This can be an area for further research.  
 
Another limitation of the study is that we investigated options to reduce transaction costs and 
other irregularities in the permit system but we did not examine whether by improving the 
system, vices such as bribery and corruption which characterise the governance of permits 
will be eliminated. This can be illustrated through the agency relationship between 
government officials who issue and control permits (the agent) and traders who demand and 
use a permit (the principal). The decision to go for a permit depends on the perceived 
transaction costs to obtain permits and on the good moral of the trader but it affects the 
welfare of the government official who receives bribes. Consequently, given the agent-
principal relationship, different institutions governing permits may influence in an unlike 
manner the behaviours of actors in the permit system. In this respect, to generate achievable 
policies and policy instruments that would increase effectiveness and efficiency in the 
governance of permits in the NTFP sector, there is need for subsequent research to develop 
corruption models that will predict the behaviour of different actors involved in the demand 
and supply of permit amongst whom government officials and other rent seekers (economic 
operators). In other words, it is important to answer the question whether efforts made to 
reduce TCs in the governance of NTFP permits can be accompanied by the desire of 
government officials to perform their delegated task without asking for bribes, or whether 
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they can resist the temptation of rent seekers who may want to offer bribes for reasons we 
already discussed in this thesis?’ 
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Summary 
 
The main objective of this study was to assess the policy and institutional environment 
governing the Non-Timber Forest Products (NTFP) and the Agroforestry Tree Products 
(AFTP) value chain in Cameroon. To attain the main objectives, specific emphases were put 
on NTFP/AFTP collectors/producers’ perceptions, awareness, and attitudes of opportunities 
and threats posed by existing policies and regulations governing land and trees on their 
incentives and decisions to plant selected indigenous fruit tree species. The interaction 
between formal and informal institutions in the management of land and trees by 
collectors/producers was also specifically studied.  Another aim was to find out the effect of 
such policies and regulation on traders’ activities, with attention to their decisions to operate 
in the formal or informal sector and the consequences of their decisions on the performance of 
the value chains. In the later case, incidences of corruption and rent seeking in the demand 
and supply of permits to sell NTFP were particularly investigated.  
 
The New Institutional Economics (NIE) was adopted as the main theoretical lens to look at 
the problem. With reference to the NIE, prominences were put on the economics of property 
rights and transaction costs in order to make the general assumptions that were necessary to 
diagnose gaps in existing policies related to agroforestry; explain incidences of corruption and 
predict the behaviour of producers and traders to respectively plant indigenous species on-
farm and to operate in the formal NTFP sector in Cameroon.  
 
The NTFP/AFTP producers who took part in the survey were drawn from a population of 
farmers involved in the production and sale of three selected indigenous tree products 
(Irvingia gabonensis, Ricinodendron heudelotii and Cola spp) and originated from villages 
and regions with different pre-colonial, colonial and cultural backgrounds, which were 
important to understand the interaction of formal and informal institutions in the management 
of land and natural resources in Cameroon. Interviewed traders were those who are involved 
in selling any of the above-mentioned products, in addition to a leafy vegetable Gnetum spp. 
Both producers’ and traders’ data were collected using separate questionnaires.  A choice 
experiment was included in the traders’ questionnaire.  
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The results of chapter four illustrate the commitment of the government of Cameroon to 
include elements of Non-Timber Forests Products in its natural resources management and 
poverty reduction policies and therefore indirectly promote agroforestry. However, the 
intentions are not materialised by specific programs or strategies. For example, the analysis of 
policy documents and mission statements of relevant Ministries in charge of Agriculture, 
Forestry, Environment and other rural development programs indicate that no specific 
agroforestry policy or strategy document exists for Cameroon. The consequence of the latter 
is the occurrence of numerous afforestation and reforestation programs to address 
environmental issues which often overlook the important role an agroforestry strategy will 
play in balancing the interaction between crops, animals and trees on a piece of land, which is 
actually the essence of agroforestry. 
 
Results of chapter four also point to the fact that forestry legislation governing trees in 
Cameroon (1994 Forestry Law) designed with the good intentions of conserving natural 
resources, potentially limits farmers’ economic rights to exploit NTFP and de facto limits 
their rights to the trees they plant on their farms. The findings of chapter five show that 
farmers are generally unaware of the official regulations governing access and trade in the 
studied species. Even though most of them demonstrated negative attitudes towards the 
regulations, a significant majority would continue to plant the studied species if the 
regulations were effectively enforced because indigenous fruits trees form part of their 
traditional agricultural practices and play a major role in their livelihoods. We however argue 
that the proportion that would not plant trees because of the regulation (40%) is high enough 
not to be neglected. Results also show that a significant majority of farmers are ready to 
accept new policy instruments such as certificate of origin, to distinguish AFTP from NTFP 
which is a major gap in current legislation and regulations governing indigenous trees in 
Cameroon.  
 
The concept of tenure security and interactions between formal and informal institutions in 
the management of land and trees was investigated in chapter six. Specifically, farmers’ 
perception of land ownership and tenure security especially in the context of agroforestry 
production were assessed. Above all whether and which of the systems: formal, characterised 
by land titles or customary systems gives farmers more security over their land was 
investigated. Although all respondents claim individual ownership over farm plots, a majority 
of them (76%) feel that they are not the real owners of the land. They share the symbolic 
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views that land is the property of the chiefs, or community and the government. Eighty 
percent of the sampled farmers would accept land titles to guarantee security over the land for 
which they claim ownership. Further analysis showed that farmers from communities that had 
resisted cultural decay were more likely to choose customary institutions to secure their land, 
compared to those whose traditional values had been comparatively more tempered by 
modernity and colonisation. Results also show that land availability may be a more limiting 
factor to agroforestry development than the aspect of tenure security. Farmers’ main sources 
of harvest/collection (at least for the studied fruit species) were from land on which they 
claim individual ownership and enjoy private property rights, supporting current lobby and 
advocacy initiatives from national and international NGOs for legislation and regulations to 
distinguish between NTFP and AFTP. 
 
Analysis of institutional arrangements in the demand and supply of permits in the NTFP 
sector was analysed in chapter seven. Factors motivating non-compliance are generally 
related to high transactions costs characterised by a high nominal amount to be paid for the 
permit; limited access to information and complicated bureaucratic processes at the centre of 
which are corruption and rent-seeking police and forestry officers and also rich economic 
operators. The chapter concludes that compliance with the law on permits is a rational choice 
by traders to overcome high costs. By paying bribes, they make more benefits than what they 
may gain if they go for permits.  
 
The conditions under which transaction costs could be reduced in the current system of 
delivering NTFP permits was assessed in chapter eight. The choice model applied to assess 
policy options revealed that traders would comply with the law on permits under the 
following conditions: (i) CIGs should be recognised as organisations eligible to obtain 
permits; (ii) the permit system has to be simplified and decentralised to the regions; (iii) 
transfers between permit holders should be permitted; and (iv) the duration of the permit 
should be increased by at least one year. In addition, the study found that simplifying paper 
work and decentralising the process to the regions was the most valued alternative selected by 
traders. 
 
The empirical and theoretical arguments of this study suggest that policy makers need to 
design optimal sets of rules to match existing shifts in agricultural and conservation practices, 
whereby originally wild indigenous trees are now planted on farm. Within the context of this 
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study, such rules should be able to encourage certain type of activities specifically the 
adoption of agroforestry practices and forestry law compliance.   
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Samenvatting 
 
Het doel van deze studie was het beoordelen van de beleids- en institutionele omgeving m.b.t. 
de waardeketens voor bosproducten anders dan hout uit natuurlijke bossen (NTFP) en 
gecombineerde land- en bosbouw (AFTP) in Kameroen. Om tot dit doel te komen werd de 
nadruk gelegd op het bewustzijn en de percepties van verzamelaars/producenten van dit type 
producten ten opzichte van de kansen en risico's die gecreëerd worden door het bestaande 
beleid en wetgeving op het gebied van land en bos en hoe dit hun drijfveren en beslissingen 
om bepaalde inheemse fruitbomen te planten beïnvloedt. Daarnaast werd de interactie tussen 
formele en informele instituties in het beheer van land en bos onderzocht. Een tweede doel 
was om het effect van dit beleid op de activiteiten van handelaren te bestuderen, met een 
nadruk op hun voorkeur voor het opereren in de formele of informele sector en het gevolg 
hiervan op het functioneren van de waardeketens als geheel. Voor handelaren in de informele 
sector werd gekeken naar het voorkomen van corruptie in de markt voor 
verkoopvergunningen voor NTFP.   
 
New Institutional Economics (NIE) werd gebruikt als de theoretische lens om het probleem te 
bestuderen. Dit houdt in dat de nadruk op eigendomsrechten en transactiekosten ligt voor het 
diagnosticeren van tekortkomingen in het bestaande beleid op het gebied van gecombineerde 
land- en bosbouw, het voorkomen van corruptie en het voorspellen van gedrag van 
producenten aangaande het planten van inheemse soorten en van handelaren aangaande de 
beslissing om in de formele NTFP sector in Kameroen te opereren.  
 
Producenten die deelnamen aan het onderzoek kwamen uit een populatie die actief bezig 
waren met het verzamelen en het vermarkten van drie inheemse bosproducten (Irvingia 
gabonensis, Ricinodendron heudelotii en Cola spp) en afkomstig zijn uit dorpen en regio's 
met verschillende pre-koloniale, koloniale en culturele achtergronden die relevant zijn om de 
interactie te begrijpen tussen formele en informele instituties. Geïnterviewde handelaren 
waren actief in het aan- of verkopen van dezelfde producten en een groente genaamd Gnetum 
spp. Producenten en handelaren kregen verschillende questionnaires. De questionnaire voor 
handelaren bevatte tevens een 'choice experiment'.  
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De resultaten uit hoofdstuk vier laten de betrokkenheid zien van de Kameroense overheid om 
expliciet rekening te houden met NTFP in het beleid rond het beheer van natuurlijke 
hulpbronnen en het terugdringen van armoede, waardoor gecombineerde land- en bosbouw 
indirect gestimuleerd wordt. Deze intenties zijn echter nog niet omgezet in specifieke 
programma's of activiteiten. Een analyse van beleidsdocumenten en missieverklaringen van 
het Ministerie van Landbouw, Bosbouw en Natuur alsook andere rurale 
ontwikkelingsprogramma’s tonen aan  dat er geen specifiek beleids- of strategiedocument op 
het gebied van gecombineerde land- en bosbouw bestaat voor Kameroen. Een direct gevolg 
van deze tekortkoming is een verscheidenheid aan bebossings- en herbebossingsprogramma's 
die natuurbescherming als doel hebben maar geen rekening houden met het belang van een 
coherente strategie die rekening houdt met de interactie tussen gewassen, dieren en bomen: de 
essentie van gecombineerde land- en bosbouw.  
 
Resultaten uit hoofdstuk vier wijzen er ook op dat de bosbouw wetgeving in Kameroen (1994 
Forestry Law) die ontworpen is met de goede intentie om natuurlijke hulpbronnen te 
beschermen, de mogelijkheden van boeren om NTFP te benutten beperkt en daarmee de facto 
hun rechten tot het benutten van bomen die ze planten op eigen grond. De resultaten uit 
hoofdstuk vijf laten zien dat boeren zich over het algemeen niet bewust zijn van de wetgeving 
aangaande toegang tot en handel in de bestudeerde soorten. Hoewel de meeste boeren negatief 
staan tegenover de wetgeving, zou een groot deel van hen onverminderd doorgaan met het 
aanplanten van de bestudeerde soorten als de wetgeving zou worden gehandhaafd, omdat 
inheemse fruitsoorten een onderdeel vormen van traditionele landbouwmethoden en een 
belangrijke rol spelen in hun levensonderhoud. Ik beargumenteer echter dat het aandeel dat 
zou ophouden met het aanplanten van bomen (40%) zodanig groot is dat het niet genegeerd 
mag  worden. De resultaten laten tevens zien dat een aanzienlijk deel van de boeren bereid 
zouden zijn nieuwe beleidsinstrumenten zoals certificaten van oorsprong, die onderscheid 
maken tussen AFTP en NTFP, te accepteren. Het ontbreken van dergelijke certificaten is een 
ernstige tekortkoming in de huidige wetgeving. 
  
In hoofdstuk zes wordt gekeken naar het concept van rechtszekerheid en interacties tussen 
formele en informele instituties in het beheer van land en bos. Meer specifiek wordt gekeken 
naar de perceptie die boeren hebben van eigendomsrechten in de context van gecombineerde 
land- en bosbouw productie. Het belangrijkste aspect hierbij is welk systeem – formeel, 
gekenmerkt door landeigendomsrechten of informeel via gewoonterechten – boeren meer 
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zekerheid geeft over hun landbezit. Alhoewel alle respondenten beweren dat het land in hun 
bezit is, geeft een meerderheid aan (76%) dat ze niet de werkelijke eigenaar van het land zijn. 
Ze delen de mening dat land eigendom is van stamhoofden, de gemeenschap of de overheid. 
Tachtig procent zou officiële landeigendomsrechten accepteren om zeker te zijn van toegang 
tot hun land. Een diepgaandere analyse toont aan dat boeren uit gemeenschappen die zich 
verzetten tegen culturele teloorgang vaker het gewoonterecht verkiezen om zich te verzekeren 
van landtoegang, in vergelijking met boeren wiens traditionele waarden meer beïnvloed zijn 
door moderniteit en kolonisatie. De resultaten tonen tevens aan dat de beschikbaarheid van 
land een grotere beperking vormt voor gecombineerde land- en bosbouw dan het gebrek aan 
landeigendomsrechten. Het gros van de productie (ten minste van de bestudeerde soorten) 
komt van land waarvoor producenten individuele landeigendomsrechten bezitten, wat huidige 
lobby- en voorspraakinitiatieven van nationale en internationale NGO’s om een onderscheid 
tussen NTFP en AFTP in regulering en wetgeving ondersteunt.  
 
Hoofdstuk zeven bevat een analyse van de institutionele regelingen in vraag en aanbod van 
vergunningen in de NTFP sector. Factoren die naleving beperken zijn over het algemeen 
gerelateerd aan hoge transactiekosten in de vorm van dure vergunningen, beperkte toegang tot 
informatie en ingewikkelde bureaucratische processen veroorzaakt door corrupte politie, 
bosbouw officieren en welgestelde ondernemers. De conclusie van dit hoofdstuk is dat 
naleving van de wet door te werken met vergunningen een rationele beslissing is van 
handelaren om hoge kosten te vermijden. Het betalen van steekpenningen is winstgevender 
dan werken met vergunningen.  
 
In hoofdstuk acht worden de voorwaarden waaronder transactiekosten verminderd kunnen 
worden in het huidige verstrekkingssysteem van vergunningen bestudeerd. Het keuzemodel 
toegepast op beleidsopties toont aan dat handelaren zich aan de vergunningswet zouden 
houden als (i) Common Initiative Groups (CIGS) erkend worden als vergunningsgerechtigde 
organisaties; (ii) het vergunningensysteem versimpeld en gedecentraliseerd zou worden; (iii) 
overdrachten tussen vergunninghouders toegestaan zouden zijn; (iv) de geldigheidsduur van 
vergunningen verlengd zou worden met ten minste een jaar; en (v) een lagere regeneratie 
belasting van toepassing zou zijn. Het verminderen van bureaucratie en decentralisatie wordt 
als het belangrijkst ervaren door handelaren.  
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De empirische en theoretische argumenten in deze studie suggereren dat beleidsmakers 
optimale regels dienen te ontwerpen die rekening houden met bestaande verschuivingen in 
landbouw- en natuurbehoudsmethoden, waarbij van origine wilde inheemse soorten nu 
geplant worden. In de context van deze studie, zouden dergelijke regels bepaalde activiteiten 
aanmoedigen, in het bijzonder aangaande adoptie van gecombineerde land- en 
bosbouwmethoden en naleving van bosbouwwetgeving.  
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